MULTIPARTY MEDIATION: IDENTIFYING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MEDIATION DREAM TEAM

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ABSTRACT

Elizabeth J. Menninga: Multiparty Mediation: Identifying Characteristics of the Mediation Dream Team
(Under the direction of Stephen E. Gent)

This dissertation explores when and how multiparty mediation can help the prospects for peace in civil wars, considering when additional mediators are desirable and when they are not. While additional mediators can provide positive sources of leverage, they also increase the risk that forum-shopping, mixed messages, or free-riding will hinder the negotiations.

I identify three characteristics of mediation efforts expected to improve mediation's chances of success. First, complementary efforts improve the mediation team's ability to respond to challenges at all phases of the resolution process, providing three important sources of leverage: contextual knowledge, economic/military resources, and staying power. Furthermore, complementary efforts reduce the risk of overcrowding by excluding mediators who do not bring a unique source of leverage to the table. Second, balanced mediation efforts include mediators biased toward both sides of the conflict. Each side has a mediator they trust to protect their interests at the negotiating table as well as to protect them if the other side reneges on the agreement. In this way, balanced mediation can help alleviate disputants' security concerns, improving the chances that negotiations are successful. Finally, coordination among the mediators should improve the chances of mediation success by maximizing the ability to take advantage of the additional resources and tools of another mediator while also minimizing the negative consequences of adding a new party to the negotiations.

To evaluate these expectations, I employ statistical tests on a set of mediation attempts in civil wars between 1989 and 2005. In these analyses I consider three measures of mediation success: reaching an agreement, overcoming the difficult two-month period post-agreement, and producing a durable peace. In addition to these statistical analyses, I discuss two cases of multiparty mediation: Angola and Mozambique. These cases allow for a clearer look at the dynamics of complementary, balanced, and

coordinated mediation during the conflict resolution process.

To my parents, who shared with me their love of reading and passion for learning.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

As a popular conflict management tool, mediation receives great attention from both scholars and policy-makers. Much of this attention conceives of mediation and its effects in terms of how the mediator relates to the disputants or how the mediator influences the disputants' relationship with one another. Crocker, Hampson and Aall (2004) describe this dynamic, writing that "Mediation is an inherently triangular political process" (23). Mediation, however, frequently involves more than one mediator. In fact, almost fifty percent of the efforts to mediate civil wars between 1989 and 2005 identified by DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna (2011) were multiparty mediation efforts.[1] Focusing on conflicts in Africa, Zartman asserts that "Africa does not lack mediators...African heads of state do more than stand ready to be of assistance—they rush forward in numbers" (Zartman, 2000, 142). Thinking of mediation as triangular necessarily collapses multiple third parties into a single actor. Multiparty mediation, however, not only changes the nature of the mediator; it changes the nature of the mediation. Understanding the process of mediation therefore requires understanding the connections and interactions among the mediators as well as the connections and interactions between the mediators and the disputants.

To the extent that the presence of multiple mediators is considered in the literature thus far (see e.g. Beardsley (2011)), the conclusions drawn are often pessimistic: multiparty mediation decreases the chances of mediation success. This conclusion might seem intuitive at first, given that mediators face an incredibly challenging task. Disputants turn to mediators for assistance when they are unable to resolve their differences bilaterally. They recruit mediators to help them both find common ground as well as rebuild enough trust (or develop sufficient monitoring and enforcement mechanisms) that both sides are

[1] I define mediation in line with Bercovitch and Houston (1996). They define mediation as "a reactive process of conflict management whereby parties seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, or organization to change their behavior, settle their conflict, or resolve their problem without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law" (13). While this definition is quite broad, I believe it captures the important aspects of mediation while also distinguishing mediation from other conflict management tools, such as arbitration or peacekeeping.

willing to put down their weapons in pursuit of a negotiated settlement. Multiparty efforts add additional complexity to the mediation process, facing several unique challenges not present during single-party mediation, such as forum-shopping, mixed messages, and free-riding among the mediators (Crocker, Hampson and Aall, 1999*a*). The civil wars in Burundi and Guinea-Bissau attracted many mediators and are prime examples of what happens when mediators fail to coordinate and send different signals to the disputants. Despite these challenges, however, multiparty mediation does sometimes succeed. In Angola, the Troika (composed of the United States, Russia, and Portugal) worked with the United Nations to broker the Lusaka Protocol (Hare, 1999). In Mozambique, a multiparty mediation team including the Community of Sant'Egidio and Italy helped negotiate a lasting peace agreement (Bartoli, 1999).

Moreover, the presence of the Troika was considered an important part of the resolution process in Angola. Hare (1999) cites United Nations Special Representative Beye as telling the Troika representatives, "It is not certain that the mediators will be able to bring peace to the Angolans, but it is perfectly clear that they will never achieve it without our help" (658). So why do mediators seeking to improve the prospects for peace embrace multiparty mediation in these cases? When do the benefits of multiple mediators outweigh the costs? I argue that while all mediators face tough obstacles to peace, the right mix of mediators can improve the chances these obstacles are overcome. More, however, is not always better. The composition of the mediation team[2] has meaningful implications for the likelihood an agreement is reached, the probability an agreement is implemented, and the expectation that the agreement will last. While multiparty mediation efforts face a challenging task, understanding the dynamics of multiparty efforts gives mediators the tools necessary to respond to these challenges and capitalize on their strengths. The better prepared and designed the mediation team, the better the team's chances of success.

Importantly, even a perfectly designed and executed mediation effort might not succeed. Mediators cannot control every aspect of the conflict environment and many factors outside the mediators' control could send the disputants away from the negotiating table and back to the battlefield. Thus, even the best

[2]It should be noted that I use the terms "mediation effort" and "mediation team" to refer to a group of mediators involved in the same conflict at the same time. This phrase does not necessarily imply that these mediators are actively working together or coordinating their efforts. Coordination among the mediators varies substantially from mediation attempt to mediation attempt ranging from strongly coordinated efforts to completely uncoordinated efforts.

designed mediation team is not a sufficient condition for peace. The right mix of mediators, however, can improve the chances.

Identifying when and how additional mediators improve the chances for success has important implications for policy-makers as well as states, international organizations, and other international mediators. Potential mediators have to select in which conflicts they are going to invest time and resources. This forces third parties to prioritize in which conflicts, if any, they desire to intervene. These pressures can lead to redundancy in conflicts where many potential mediators have interests and can marginalize other disputes in which the belligerents are ready to negotiate. A more refined understanding of how an additional mediator helps (or hurts) chances for resolution will help third parties better allocate their resources. Understanding what makes for an effective mediation effort will help identify cases in which an additional mediator would provide meaningful support or resources, thus improving the chances of success. Likewise, it could help states and organizations identify cases in which their presence would only detract from current efforts, decreasing overcrowding in those conflicts and freeing up resources for other crises.

This dissertation explores what the ideal mediation team looks like. In order to develop expectations regarding which types of mediation teams will be most effective, Chapter 2 considers the role mediators play in conflict resolution, the obstacles blocking resolution, and the various tools mediators can use to help the disputants overcome the obstacles to resolution. In short, I argue that multiparty mediation is a heterogeneous club good in which desirable members of the club improve the chances of overcoming the obstacles to resolution while undesirable members complicate the negotiations without providing new sources of leverage or influence, diminishing the chances for successful resolution.

From this framework, I identify three characteristics of mediation that should encourage successful conflict resolution: complementary sources of leverage, balanced biases, and coordination. A complementary mediation effort brings together multiple sources of leverage that the mediators can use to overcome the obstacles to successful settlement as well as avoids unnecessary mediators that only complicate the mediation process. A balanced mediation effort, in which there is at least one mediator biased toward each side of the conflict, provides the multiparty effort unique advantages unavailable in a single-party context. Balanced mediation is uniquely positioned to benefit from mediator biases while not exacerbating disputants' security concerns. Coordinating mediation efforts protects the mediation

attempt from the risk of free-riding, mixed messages, and forum-shopping. Coordination enables the mediation effort to take advantage of the mediators' sources of leverage and influence while mitigating the complexities additional mediators bring to the table.

The success of a resolution process can be conceptualized along many dimensions; this project defines successful mediation by the kind of agreement reached at the end of the mediation attempt, as well as whether the mediation attempt results in halted violence and a durable peace. Chapter 3 outlines the research design used to test my hypotheses, operationalizing these measures of success as well as the mediation characteristics of interest. Chapter 4 evaluates the hypotheses generated in Chapter 2, empirically testing the effectiveness of complementary, balanced, and coordinated mediation in producing successful mediation outcomes. In Chapter 5, case illustrations of the mediation processes in Angola and Mozambique provide a deeper look at these characteristics of mediation and how they helped conflict resolution processes in these countries.

Mediation and Conflict Resolution

As mediation has become a popular strategy to resolve crises, both international and civil, it has received substantial scholarly attention. These works range from studies of who offers to mediate, to when combatants accept mediation offers, to how mediation improves the chances of reaching a stable settlement. From these various studies, scholars have learned that mediators with historical linkages to the disputants are more likely to offer their services (Greig and Regan, 2008). Additionally, supplying mediation incurs costs for the mediators. These costs range from administrative burdens and operational expenses to reputational damage if the process fails, to the opportunity costs of foregoing intervention elsewhere (Terris and Maoz, 2005). These costs lead Clayton and Gleditsch (2014) to conclude that potential third parties are most likely to offer mediation when they have a stake in the resolution of the war and believe that their intervention will improve the chance of resolution.

Not all offers of mediation, however, are accepted. Melin, Gartner and Bercovitch (2013) discuss a strategic dilemma of mediation: the characteristics of the conflict environment that make third parties more interested in mediating (intense conflicts, high likelihood of an agreement being generated, and ties to the conflict) are also those characteristics that make mediation less attractive to the disputants.

They consider the incentives to offer mediation and to accept mediation in tandem, providing a better picture of what leads to mediation onset. Also exploring when mediation is accepted, Terris and Maoz (2005) find that disputants are most likely accept mediation in highly volatile conflict structures. Additionally, governments are reluctant to accept mediation as agreeing to mediation tacitly legitimizes the rebel group (see e.g. Clayton and Gleditsch, 2014; Melin and Svensson, 2009). This discourages governments from agreeing to mediation unless the costs of negotiating are outweighed by the benefits. While most scholars assume rebels are almost always willing to mediate as mediation bestows legitimacy upon the non-state actor, Beardsley (2011) asserts that rebels also have incentives to be reluctant to agree to mediation. Beardsley argues that mediation reduces the control that rebels have over negotiation outcomes, especially given the power asymmetry that is typical between a rebel group and the government (154). Sometimes this loss of control can be advantageous. When disputants know that the resolution will require unpopular concessions, combatants are more willing to accept mediation, using mediation as political cover Beardsley (2010). This reluctance to accept mediation indicates that mediation is adopted in the most difficult conflicts where bilateral negotiations are difficult to implement and the costs of continued fighting are high (see e.g. Svensson, 2007*a*; Greig and Regan, 2008). Importantly, these studies of mediation onset all indicate that mediation is not selected into randomly. Therefore, while many mediated agreements fail shortly after signing, this does not necessarily indicate that mediation is ineffective.

As Gartner and Bercovitch (2006) stress, mediation is typically used in the most difficult cases, those that the disputants cannot resolve bilaterally. Once there, however, mediators provide resources and leverage that can encourage resolution. Gartner and Bercovitch refer to this as mediation's competing "selection" and "process" effects. Once these selection effects are controlled for, the positive process effects of mediators on the negotiations are more easily visible.

Effects of Mediator Bias

Mediation's process effects have become the focus of scholars seeking to understand how and when mediators are able to navigate the obstacles to peace and help belligerents find common ground. The obstacles to peace are often divided into two categories: problems generated by private information and credible commitment problems. Scholars interested in both sets of problems have identified mediator bias as a useful mechanism for overcoming these obstacles. Svensson (2009) summarizes the four broad

mechanisms by which biased mediators are expected to be more effective than neutral mediators. First, they have incentives to protect their protégés. Second, they can reveal information. Third, they have the necessary connections and influence to pressure their ally to make unpopular concessions. Finally, they are capable of "counterbalancing the asymmetry in the concession-making process" (448). While a wealth of scholarship has explored these different mechanisms, I focus on the role of bias in overcoming information problems and alleviating commitment problems.

Kydd (2003) focuses on the role of mediators in overcoming the information problem. Kydd argues that mediators that are biased toward one side are able to communicate (and be believed) when counseling caution to their preferred side. In a related argument, Maoz and Terris (2006) assert that mediators with strong interests in the conflict are more motivated and prepared to resolve the conflict, but that this sometimes comes with mediator preferences for a solution that does not agree with the belligerents' interests (411). Focusing on mediator credibility, Maoz and Terris argue that the more credible the mediator, the less intrusive the mediator will be in the negotiations and more successful the mediation will be. Crescenzi et al. (2011) provide three mechanisms that increase a mediator's credibility by increasing the mediator's costs of deception. They assert that democratic mediators face greater costs to lying and are thus more credible, that a strong democratic community increases the costs of deception, and that the more connected the disputants are to the international community (through common membership in International Organizations) the greater the costs of deception as well.

Savun (2009) empirically evaluates the relationship between the mediator's ability to provide relevant information to the disputants in international conflicts and mediator success. Savun considers the strength of the mediator's military intelligence agency, diplomatic relationships in the region, and military alliances (factors she expects to correlate with having more relevant information), finding that informed mediators are more likely to produce an agreement than uninformed mediators. In an empirical study of mediation in international conflicts, Savun (2008) finds that biased mediators (defined as having preferences that align with one party over the other) are more likely to be successful at generating a ceasefire or peace agreement in international conflicts, providing some support for these theoretical expectations.

This literature highlights that, unfortunately, revealing information to the combatants and generating an agreement that is perceived as legitimate (and thus more likely to stick) are often at odds with

one another. An impartial mediator has difficulty credibly communicating with the disputants. The disputants know that if the mediator's primary goal is to generate peace, then the mediator has an incentive to misrepresent the opposition's resources and minimally acceptable demands in order to pressure the disputants into an agreement. Instead, states providing support to either of the disputants or actors that prefer an outcome more in line with the preferences of one side over the other can play an important role at the negotiating table. Because of their known bias, biased mediators have less incentive to misrepresent the opposition's strength or resolve.

When the mediator is biased toward one side, however, the other side is more likely to see the mediation as unfairly tilting the agreement toward the preferred side. As Zartman (1995) phrases it, "mediators need not be impartial, but they must deliver the side to which they are perceived as close; they must not be perceived as selling a proposed agreement that is biased in their friends' favor" (21). This is incredibly difficult (if not nearly impossible) for a single mediator to do. Every concession in favor of the mediator's preferred side is an opportunity for the opponent to reject the agreement on grounds of bias.

These drawbacks of bias and concerns about legitimacy encourage scholars like Carnevale and Arad (1996) and Beber (2012) to believe unbiased mediators are more effective. Because biased mediators, despite perhaps being able to reveal information to their ally under some narrow circumstances, are unable to communicate credibly with the other side, Beber (2012) argues that biased mediators are actually less effective at resolving conflict than unbiased mediators. Beber asserts that only unbiased mediators can credibly reveal "conflict-relevant" information (399). Beber provides qualitative evidence from international conflicts in support of these assertions. Carnevale and Arad (1996) agree that the best mediators are neutral (having no preference over the outcome) and impartial (having no preference over the disputants).

Comparing the selection of mediation against other conflict management techniques (good offices and arbitration), Gent and Shannon (2011) consider how bias influences the technique chosen and the content of negotiations. Interestingly, they find that biased third parties are more prevalent in less intrusive techniques (good offices and mediation) and that biased third parties address a more narrow range of issues than unbiased mediators during the settlement attempt. Gent and Shannon conclude that unbiased third parties are more effective, because disputants invite unbiased third parties when they want more

intrusive strategies with a greater chance of success to be employed. In a study of super power mediators, Favretto (2009) argues that the extent of the mediator's bias influences outcomes. Strongly biased mediators are more effective because their threats (and promises) to use force to secure a settlement are more credible than a weakly biased mediator. She asserts that impartial mediators will actually be more effective than weakly biased mediators because impartial mediators will not use coercion, looking instead for agreements the disputants are willing to accept without enforcement.

Others, concerned with the role of bias in overcoming commitment problems, assert that biased mediators can alleviate disputants' fears during the transition period in which they are particularly vulnerable to defection. Svensson (2007*a*) empirically explores the relationship between mediator bias and mediation success, concluding that third parties biased in favor of the government have a positive effect on delivering a negotiated settlement while mediators biased toward the rebels have no significant effect. He explains that the peace process shifts power relationships over time, taking power from the government and giving it to the rebels (180). Therefore, mediators that are biased in favor of the government are able to assuage the government's fears of being exploited by the rebels. Biased mediators are in a better position to assuage these fears than impartial or neutral mediators as they can more credibly promise to protect their side during the implementation phase. Interestingly, Svensson (2009) finds that rebel-sided mediators are more effective at generating power-sharing and third-party guarantees than mediators that favor the government. As third-party guarantees have a positive impact on conflict resolution (Walter, 2002), the direction of the mediator's bias has interesting implications for mediation outcomes.

The literature on mediator bias considers, theorizes, and evaluates the bias of singular mediators. These studies assume a single mediator is present in each effort. In this dissertation, I build upon the bias literature by considering the role of bias in multiparty mediation efforts. In short, I argue that mediation efforts that include a mediator biased in favor of the rebels and a mediator biased in favor of the government are more effective than efforts that are neutral or have one-sided bias. Balanced efforts are able to take advantage of all the benefits of bias identified in the literature while also increasing the mediation's effectiveness and legitimacy by providing protection and influence on both sides of the conflict.

Mediator Leverage and Mediation Strategies

Mediators employ a variety of strategies and tools to influence disputant behavior. Touval and Zartman (1985) divide the strategies employed by the mediator into a three-fold typology based upon the level of involvement of the mediator in the negotiation process: communication-facilitation, procedural, and directive. Bercovitch and Houston (2000) consider the effects of the choice of mediation strategy on outcome, finding that communication-facilitation strategies are most common while directive strategies are most effective at generating an agreement. Quinn et al. (2013) confirm this finding that mediators are most effective in negotiating agreements in ethnic conflicts when using a more intrusive strategy. Beardsley et al. (2006) tell a more nuanced story confirming again that manipulation has the strongest effect on reaching agreement but also that facilitation decreases the tension between the combatants post-crisis more than the other strategies.

These findings raise an interesting question: if directive strategies are most effective, then why are they not also the most common? Perhaps a partial answer to this question is that not all mediators are capable of utilizing more intrusive strategies, making the strength of the mediator important. Beardsley (2009) explores when and why weak mediators intervene in conflicts. While weak mediators still bring some positive benefits to the negotiating table, they are limited in the resources they are able to expend. Beardsley defines strong mediators as great powers, groups of states, and the United Nations; all other mediators (other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), states that are not major powers, individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)), Beardsley considers to be weak. Beardsley finds that weak mediators are more likely to be involved in conflicts that are peripheral to the international system as well as conflicts in which the belligerents have incentives to negotiate insincerely. Svensson (2007*b*) looks at the effect of mediator strength on mediation outcomes, dividing mediators into "power" mediators and "pure" mediators[3]. Power mediators, according to Svensson, have the leverage to influence the disputants using carrots and sticks, but do not necessarily have the requisite skills to address the underlying causes of the conflict. Pure mediators lack carrots and sticks, but might have the necessary knowledge and influence to navigate the deeper sources of disagreement. Svensson concludes that a

[3]Power mediators refer to those that have resources or specific interests in the conflict. Pure mediators lack both resources and specific interests in the conflict (232). While using different terminology, Svensson's operationalization of power mediators and Beardsley's operationalization of strong mediators is very similar. Svensson includes the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council, regional powers, former colonial powers and neighboring states as power mediators. Beardsley looks at mediation in interstate wars while Svensson is interested in intrastate wars.

combination of power and pure mediations is optimal, finding that the combination has the strongest positive effect on signing a peace agreement relative to no mediation.

These positive effects of mediation, however, come at a price. Beardsley (2008) discusses the time-inconsistency problem that mediation can generate. The presence of mediators in a negotiation process changes the environment of the negotiations, the dynamics between the disputants, and the relative pay-offs of continued conflict compared to peace. As Rothchild (2008) states, "Leverage is derived from the parties' need for a solution they cannot achieve on their own. To the extent they depend on a mediator to facilitate an agreement, they strengthen his or her ability to reward cooperative moves and raise costs on inaction" (107). Kuperman (2008) discusses ways that mediators can encourage negotiations, including offering side payments that generate "mutually enticing opportunity" (10). Kuperman also warns that such manipulation by mediators can backfire. By using their influence and resources to manipulate the negotiation environment, mediators are able to induce cooperation and produce an agreement between the disputants. Reaching an agreement, however, does not necessarily lead to peace. Beardsley (2008) finds that mediated successes are generally short-lived. The durability of these agreements is limited as the long-term incentives and preferences of the belligerents are often unchanged, increasing the risk of war recurrence.

The time-inconsistency problem highlights the importance of mediators addressing the commitment problems belligerents face both during and after the negotiations. Moreover, the mediator best qualified to assist during the negotiations might not be the best mediator to assist in the implementation phase. Different mediators have different strengths and different sources of leverage, or influence, over the disputants. Recognizing these different sources of leverage, scholars have considered the comparative advantages of different mediators. Gartner (2011), for example, argues that regional organizations are better able to mediate civil wars and produce a lasting peace than other international mediators because member states share political and cultural features with the disputants, enabling them to more easily build trust. Furthermore, neighboring states are more invested in the conflict's outcome as they have more to lose if the conflict spreads across borders. Bercovitch and Houston (1996) make a similar argument in their assessment of mediation in international wars. Organizations are better prepared to navigate the negotiations while neighboring states have greater incentives to remain after an agreement is signed and assist in the implementation of the agreement and the transition to peace.

Different types of mediators, therefore, have different tools they can bring to the negotiating table and thus have different impacts on mediation outcomes. Kaufman (2006) argues that focusing on the need to overcome information or commitment problems ignores the symbolic roots of the conflict, especially in ethnic conflicts, asserting that resolution requires acknowledging and reconciling the deeper "intragroup symbolic politics" (47). Kaufman cautions against mediators focusing exclusively on institutional responses urging more contextual considerations of the conflict instead. Cohen (1996) argues that the culture of the mediators matters as well. For a mediator to bridge the gap between the disputants, the mediators must understand what barriers to communication exist between the disputants. Mediators from a different culture or negotiating tradition, Cohen asserts, will struggle to overcome these barriers. Cohen provides qualitative evidence for the impact of the mediators cultural misunderstandings on producing peace agreements.

Reid (2015) builds on the idea that the effect of mediation will be context specific. Importantly not all weak/pure mediators have the same available tools. Reid (2015) characterizes mediator leverage along two dimensions: capability and credibility. She characterizes capability leverage as a mediator's ability to use military/economic resources to compel/coerce the combatants. Credibility leverage is a softer set of tools where the mediators use past experience and relationships with the disputants to help them navigate the peace process. Weak mediators could still be able to influence the negotiations through these softer forms of leverage. In her analysis of mediation in civil wars, Reid finds that capability leverage improves the likelihood of reaching an agreement but suffers from the time-inconsistency problems identified by Beardsley (2008) in international conflicts. Credibility leverage is not associated with a higher chance of producing an agreement, but it is associated with longer-lasting peace once an agreement is signed.

This tension between mediator characteristics that produce agreements versus those that reduce the risk of war recurrence indicates another important part of the mediation and conflict resolution literature: duration of post-agreement peace.[4] Quinn et al. (2013), in their study of ethnic wars in Africa, find that mediator strategy has no significant relationship with decreasing post-crisis tensions, supporting Beardsley's time-inconsistency story and perhaps validating Kaufman's concerns that focusing on

[4]I focus here on work looking at the impact of mediation on post-conflict peace. A large literature has explored other potential influences on agreement duration. Readers interested in this broader literature should see Badran (2014); Mattes and Savun (2009); Hartzell and Hoddie (2003); Gurses and Rost (2013); Quinn, Mason and Gurses (2007).

material causes and solutions has limited benefit to resolving the underlying causes of the crisis.

Once again, however, this literature has focused on the leverage of individual mediators. This dissertation builds upon this part of the mediation literature by considering multiple sources of mediator leverage and influence. I consider three broad sources of mediator leverage or influence: material resources (reminiscent of power or strong mediators), contextual knowledge (similar to Reid's credibility leverage), and credible staying power. This third source of leverage accounts for the short life of most peace agreements, highlighting the important role that mediators who can credibly commit to assist not only during negotiations but also during implementation can play. In particular, I consider how these sources of leverage fit together. While it is possible to have a single mediator with all three sources of leverage, I expect this to be rather rare. Instead, I argue this is another situation in which considering the often multiparty nature of mediation can enrich our understanding of what generates successful mediation outcomes.

Multiparty Mediation

These studies, while significantly advancing our understanding of mediation, consider mediators in isolation. Either they assume that only one mediator is present in any given conflict, that multiparty efforts operate as if the mediators are a cohesive unit, or that the influence of each mediator is independent of all other present mediators. Some scholars control for multiparty mediation efforts with an indicator variable for the presence of multiple mediators (see e.g. Beardsley, 2011). These studies, however, do not consider the diversity of multiparty mediation efforts and how this diversity influences outcomes. Clumping all multiparty mediation efforts together, the findings on multiparty mediation are rather pessimistic, often concluding that multiparty efforts are less effective than single-party efforts. I argue this pessimism comes from the unacknowledged diversity within multiparty efforts. Relationships, connections, and characteristics of the individual mediators as well as how the mediators influence each other are important pieces of the mediation story.

Studies considering the nature and effect of multiparty mediation more extensively have predominantly been the work of Böhmelt (2011, 2012), and Crocker, Hampson and Aall (1999*b*, 2001*b*, 2004). Crocker, Hampson, and Aall take a practitioner's view of mediation, focusing on qualitative accounts of multiparty mediation efforts in a wide variety of conflicts and contexts. They propose that a collective approach is preferable, as finding a single mediator with all the necessary qualities (leverage,

staying power, political stamina, and resources) is rare (Crocker, Hampson and Aall, 2004, 15). These same authors, however, refer to multiparty mediation as "herding cats," highlighting the challenges of intervention by multiple third parties in the same conflict (Crocker, Hampson and Aall, 1999*a*).

Work systematically exploring the efficacy of multiparty mediation thus far has been rather limited. Böhmelt (2012) considers the onset of multiparty mediation in international conflicts. He finds that coalitions of states are most likely to be used when the states have a lower average GDP per capita, a higher level of accountability, and are closer together geographically. In his 2011 piece, Böhmelt considers the characteristics of mediation teams that lead to greater success, hypothesizing that medium-sized coalitions, more cooperative interactions among the mediators, and higher average levels of democracy in the mediation team will increase the likelihood multiparty mediation succeeds (Böhmelt, 2011).

These studies, however, are limited to coalitions of states mediating in interstate conflicts. The pool of mediators, especially in civil wars, is much broader than states, including intergovernmental organizations, individuals, and nongovernmental organizations. Moreover these non-state actors provide important sources of leverage that states are often unable to exploit, making their role an important consideration in a study of multiparty mediation. The theoretical framework I develop to explore what combinations of mediator leverage should improve the chances for success allows for the inclusion of non-state mediators, providing a more comprehensive understanding of multiparty mediation.

Another strand of mediation research has considered the presence of multiple diplomatic interveners over time. In his article, "Failing to Succeed?" Böhmelt (2013) explores the cumulative impact of mediation efforts in international conflicts. He pushes back against the conventional wisdom that repeated interactions should reduce uncertainty and lead to a greater chance of success. Böhmelt theorizes instead that the cumulative effect diminishes after a point, producing a curvilinear relationship between the number of mediation efforts and mediation effectiveness. Looking more broadly at peacemaking efforts (which include mediation but are not limited to mediation), Heldt (2013) notes that between 1993 and 2004, it took an average of thirty-one peacemaking attempts to produce an agreement in emerging civil conflicts. Interested in the impact of these consecutive attempts on producing stable agreements, Heldt asserts that a lack of coordination across efforts is a substantial challenge to success. He argues that uncoordinated peacemaking processes prevent the peacemakers from learning from previous efforts.

I believe that coordination among those intervening diplomatically should be important not only

across time, but also in simultaneous multiparty mediation efforts. I consider the extent to which multiparty efforts coordinate, expecting a coordinated effort to be substantially more likely to succeed than uncoordinated efforts.

This project explores multiparty mediation in civil conflicts, identifying and evaluating the characteristics of a mediation team that encourage or hinder success. I consider how bias, leverage, and coordination impact mediation outcomes. I explicitly acknowledge the often multiparty nature of mediation, considering how mediators' biases and sources of leverage can influence each other. By explicitly considering multiparty mediation, I build upon previous knowledge of mediation's role in conflict resolution, while also allowing for a richer understanding of how and when multiple mediators can improve the prospects for peace. In the next chapter, I develop the theoretical framework through which I assess multiparty mediation and elaborate upon the characteristics of an ideal mediation team and how these characteristics overcome obstacles to improve the chances for peace.

CHAPTER 2

THE MEDIATION DREAM TEAM

Past studies controlling for multiparty mediation efforts find that multiparty mediation is equally as or less effective than single-party efforts, depending on the particular metric of success used. These studies, however, ignore the diversity of multiparty efforts. By lumping multiparty efforts that coordinate mediators with diverse strengths together with multiparty efforts involving many redundant mediators, these past studies obscure the positive effect of some multiparty mediation efforts.[1]

This treatment also generates a false dichotomy separating single-party and multiparty efforts when, in fact, the characteristics of the mediator(s) are often more relevant than the number. Successful mediation is more likely when the mediator(s) provides enough leverage to credibly build trust between the disputants, helping the disputants overcome the obstacles to peace (by revealing information and overcoming credible commitment problems). Perhaps this can be achieved by a single international actor, such as a regional power, with knowledge of the conflict as well as the resources and will to assist in the implementation of the agreement. Often, however, the ideal intervention will involve more than one mediator. Multiparty efforts can take advantage of the comparative strengths of each mediator, building a more powerful mediation team that is better prepared to steer the conflict toward peace than any single actor. For example, a team with a major power *and* a neighboring state benefits from the material resources of the major power while also benefiting from the neighbor's deep knowledge of the conflict, disputants, and grievances. Mediation by a major power alone can exert material, political, and economic influence over the disputants, but it likely lacks important contextual knowledge that would enable it to use those resources effectively. It is important to note that the composition of the mediation dream team will not be the same for all conflicts. The right combination of mediators in one conflict

[1]It should be reiterated that by "mediation team" I am referring to multiple actors mediating in the same conflict at the same time. These actors may be working together, coordinating their efforts, and presenting joint proposals. Alternatively, they may be operating separately, interacting with the disputants independent of the other mediators.

will not necessarily be the best combination in another.

Mediation as a Club Good

Admittedly, the pessimism coming out of past works stems from valid concerns about the challenges of multiparty mediation. Multiple mediators mean more sources of leverage, a greater possibility of deep ties to all sides of the conflict, and more resources available for use both during the negotiation and implementation phases of the peace process. More, however, is not necessarily better. The benefits of another mediator must be weighed against the disadvantages of adding an additional party to the negotiations. The addition of a new mediator complicates the process by increasing the diversity of interests and opinions at the table. This can slow down the negotiations and make finding an agreement acceptable to all parties more difficult. Additional mediators, therefore, can generate negative externalities that hurt the chances of success. The value of an additional mediator is a function of the new resources or modes of influence the mediator brings to the table as well as the complexity they add.

In this way, mediation can be conceived of as a club good: members participate voluntarily, non-members are excluded, and mediation can result in congestion or overcrowding.[2] Mediation is voluntary: international actors are willing to mediate because it produces a net benefit in terms of international prestige or the ability to influence the outcome of the conflict to align more closely with their preferences). Non-members are excluded: international organizations and states not present at the negotiating table might benefit from some of the outcomes of mediation (such as regional or international stability), but they do not receive any of the benefits associated with helping to broker the peace. Furthermore, actors interested in joining the efforts must gain the permission of at least the disputants and potentially any mediators already present in order to gain a seat at the negotiations; not all interested mediators are welcome to participate. Finally, mediation suffers from overcrowding. Having too many mediators increases the risk of forum-shopping, mixed messages, and free-riding, which in turn decreases the probability that mediation is successful. Multiparty mediation efforts are heterogeneous clubs. Some members have desirable traits that increase the utility of the club (by increasing the probability of success) while others have less desirable traits that decrease the utility of the club (by decreasing the probability

[2]For a thorough discussion of the characteristics of clubs and club goods, see Sandler and Tschirhart (1997).

of success).

I identify these desirable traits and how they fit together to generate the mediation dream team. First, I discuss the obstacles to peace that mediators face and how mediation can help the disputants move past them. I then highlight the specific problems associated with overcrowding in mediation efforts. Finally, I identify three characteristics of mediation teams that maximize mediation effectiveness and assert that desirable mediators contribute to these characteristics while undesirable mediators do not.

Obstacles to Peace

Mediators play a key role at three important phases of the negotiation process: resolving immediate concerns in order to bring and keep the relevant parties at the negotiating table, identifying a mutually acceptable agreement, and resolving commitment problems in order to implement the terms of an agreement effectively. Each of these moments presents a new obstacle that requires a specific source of leverage from the mediation team in order to move forward. To overcome these obstacles, mediators need to possess contextual knowledge of the conflict, help the disputants navigate information asymmetries, alleviate the commitment problems that inevitably arise, and be able and willing to exert the military and economic resources necessary to help the disputants transition through the implementation phase.

Preparing the Table: The Importance of Contextual Knowledge

Maintaining meaningful negotiations requires contextual knowledge on the part of the mediation team. The team must understand the conflict in order to allay both the immediate fears of the disputants and those that will arise during and after the negotiations. Enduring peace agreements share certain dimensions, such as being inclusive, resolving the security dilemma, and establishing a working government (Licklider, 2001). Generating an inclusive peace process is non-trivial. It requires determining which actors (both domestic and international) are necessary to include and which actors will only distract. Cunningham (2006) advises including all veto players (which can be rebel groups, government actors, and external states if sufficiently invested in the conflict) and excluding all non-veto players in negotiations. Veto players, as defined by Cunningham, are those with the ability to unilaterally prevent settlement. Some actors might seem important to an outsider but actually do not wield enough power

to be able to block an agreement. Others might be more important to reaching a stable agreement than is readily apparent. Furthermore, some actors might not be crucial to reaching an agreement but have the ability to interrupt the implementation of an agreement. A contextual understanding of the conflict is therefore critical to being able to identify the relevant and irrelevant actors, as well as being able to update that classification throughout the negotiations so that the necessary parties are always included.

After the parties to the negotiations are agreed upon, the mediators still face substantial challenges in getting them to talk and compromise. While several sources of leverage and influence can help the mediators encourage discussion and concessions, contextual knowledge plays a role here as well. As Cohen (1996) has stressed, facilitating communication requires acknowledging the cultural dynamics that influence and shape how the parties perceive the negotiations. Once again, neighbors or countries with cultural ties to the disputants are more likely to understand the conflict and disputant-specific obstacles to communication.

The relevant parties and the concerns that must be addressed during the negotiations vary substantially from conflict to conflict. As generating an agreement requires knowledge of the relevant disputants are in the negotiation process, the barriers preventing these disputants from negotiating bilaterally, the vulnerabilities of each side, and how to mitigate these vulnerabilities, not all international actors interested in mediating will have the same depth of knowledge. Mediators with strong historical and cultural connections to the belligerents are more likely to possess the knowledge necessary to navigate the unique complexities of the situation. Regional organizations, neighboring states, or colonial powers, for example, are more likely to have (or easily obtain) this information than large international bodies (like the United Nations) or distant major powers. Thus, mediators that share cultural and historical linkages provide a specific and important source of influence at the negotiating table.

Reaching Agreement: Knowledge and Strength

Mediators must overcome two main obstacles to produce a signed agreement. First, mediators must help the disputants find the mutually acceptable range of compromises. This can entail revealing information about the disputants' resolve and capabilities or trying to increase the perceived gains from cooperation by bringing the disputants' attention to new issues or linking pre-existing issues together. Alternatively, mediators can use their own resources or power to manipulate the bargaining range by

threatening punishment if no agreement is reached or rewarding an agreement through economic, political, or military assistance. Second, commitment problems arise throughout the negotiations. As these problems plague the peace process not only during but also after negotiations, the role of mediators in mitigating the commitment problems will be discussed in the next section.

Information and Legitimacy

The first hurdle to reaching an agreement is revealing private information. Finding a mutually acceptable agreement that all disputants would prefer to war requires being able to obtain and reveal information about the available bargaining range to the combatants. As mentioned in the previous chapter, some scholars point to mediation bias as a useful tool for revealing information. As the conditions under which bias enables the revelation of private information is very narrow and the other side is likely to be reluctant to believe information from a biased mediator is credible, I side with the skeptics of bias when it comes to the role of mediators in revealing information. Since both impartial and biased mediators have incentives to misrepresent, the disputants will be skeptical of information provided by both types. Instead of focusing on mediators revealing information the disputants do not already have, I consider the role mediators play in changing how the bargaining range is perceived by the disputants through agenda-setting or issue-linkage.

Mediators with contextual understanding are more likely to know what issues can be linked or what agenda needs to be set in order to tackle the obstacles to agreement. While not revealing information directly, they are able to help the disputants communicate and are more able to use the information the disputants share effectively. Mediators with a contextual understanding of the conflict are able to influence how the disputants see the bargaining range and reveal compromises previously not viewed as plausible.

This indicates that perhaps the role mediators play with regard to information is less about sharing information and more about helping the disputants identify common ground, see previously-obscured issue-linkages, and set an agenda for the talks. Organizing the talks to address the disputants' grievances, while also ordering the topics so that compromise, linkages, and concessions can be made without derailing the process requires a mediator who understands the needs of the disputants and the conflict-specific obstacles to resolution. Mediators who have close relationships with the disputants (through historical ties or cultural ties) are most likely to have or easily gain this understanding. Mediators

with little history with the conflict or combatants are unlikely to have this specialized knowledge and are therefore less likely to navigate these obstacles effectively, potentially pushing issues before the disputants are ready or not prioritizing issues that must be resolved before further progress can be made in the negotiations.

Strength and Manipulation

Agenda-setting and issue-linkage rely on softer forms of influence to encourage negotiation. In addition to using relational leverage, mediators can also try to encourage resolution by directly influencing the range of mutually acceptable agreements with carrots and sticks. The mediator must have sufficient economic or military power over the disputants in order to to use threats and promises to influence behavior effectively. Conventionally strong mediators will be in the best position to manipulate the bargaining range to encourage agreement, but such manipulations suffer from the time-inconsistency problems discussed in the last chapter. Thus, if agreement is reached by influencing the bargaining range, commitment problems are likely to be exacerbated. In some cases, using relationships to influence the bargaining range might be sufficient to produce an agreement. For other cases, a strong mediator might be more effective, at least in the short run.

Mediators who are best suited to find the opportunities to increase the disputants' expected gains from negotiation and those who have the muscle to influence the bargaining range will vary from conflict to conflict. Moreover, strong mediators and mediators with relational leverage are often not the same. Multiparty efforts that include both conventionally strong mediators and mediators with strong relationships with the disputants can wield both sources of influence in pursuit of a settlement.

The Problem of Credible Commitment

Throughout the peace process, both sides of the conflict will face moments of vulnerability. Neither side can credibly commit not to take advantage of the other side during moments of weakness. This dynamic is what generates the commitment problems that make conflict resolution difficult. These commitment problems can be very difficult for the disputants to resolve bilaterally. Disputants, therefore, select into mediation when these commitment problems are sufficiently severe that the disputants cannot generate enough bilateral trust to negotiate without third parties. Moreover, impartial mediators are often unable to help mitigate these concerns. Impartial mediators cannot credibly promise to monitor

the disputants and report violations, because they have incentives to let minor violations slide if they fear revealing those violations would jeopardize the prospects for peace. Disputants anticipate the competing incentives impartial mediators face, preventing impartial mediators from effectively alleviating the disputants' security concerns.

Biased mediation can help address security concerns, although this assistance comes at a price. Biased mediators have incentives to protect the side toward which they are biased. This not only means providing support at the negotiating table, but more importantly, being able to provide assurances that facilitate trust during the negotiation process. Government-biased mediators can help alleviate the government's concerns about losing power to the rebels throughout the negotiations by credibly committing to protect their interests and monitor rebel activity (Svensson, 2007*a*). This decreases the government's perceived vulnerability in negotiating with the disputants, increases the government's willingness to discuss compromised settlements, and thus increases their confidence in the conflict resolution process.

Mediators biased toward the government do little to alleviate rebel concerns, however, and in fact might exacerbate rebels' feelings of vulnerability. Without protection for the rebels, the rebel groups are concerned that once they sign an agreement (which often requires demobilization), the government will take advantage of their temporary weakness to launch a counteroffensive. These concerns cause rebel groups to lose confidence in the peace process and become unwilling to sign agreements that leave them vulnerable. With a mediator biased in favor of the rebels, however, the rebels can have more confidence that the mediator will not abandon them as soon as an agreement is signed. Such a mediator has an interest in ensuring that the government follows through on its agreements. Therefore, the rebel group believes the mediator's promises to monitor the actions of the government and to assist during the implementation. Some evidence of this is seen in Svensson (2009); mediators biased in favor of the rebels are more likely to include third-party guarantees in the negotiated agreements than other mediators.

While mediator bias can alleviate one side's security concerns, it also risks leaving the other side feeling more insecure. Even beyond the negotiation table, those affected by the agreement more broadly are unlikely to perceive an agreement brokered by a biased mediator as fair and legitimate. Those negatively affected by the agreement (for example, any military personnel forced to demobilize, or groups that lose power in the post-conflict government) will be unlikely to embrace the implementation

of the agreement, preventing a smooth transition to peace. By leaving one side feeling vulnerable, biased mediators exacerbate the commitment problems and distrust that block implementation, resulting in an unstable environment in which to establish peace.

Multiparty efforts that include mediators biased toward both sides of the conflict are able to reconcile the challenges and benefits of bias in alleviating commitment problems. Moreover, multiparty efforts composed of the mix of mediators best able to address both the information and commitment problems should be more effective at reaching an agreement than single-party efforts and other multiparty compositions.

Implementation

Reaching an agreement is an important and necessary step to a lasting peace, but implementing even a partial ceasefire requires overcoming a new set of challenges. The implementation process exposes all parties in the conflict to new periods of vulnerability. Almost fifty percent of peace treaties signed in civil wars between 1945 and 2004 failed within eight weeks of being signed (Gartner, 2012). This high rate of failure highlights the importance of considering the impact of mediation on the agreement's chances of being implemented.

Enforcing or monitoring the implementation of an agreement has been acknowledged as a tool available to third parties interested in fostering peace (see e.g. Fortna, 2004; Walter, 2002; Sisk, 2009). Mediators can include formal or informal provisions in the agreement to assure the disputants that they will stay throughout implementation to monitor the transition to peace. Not all mediators who promise this, however, are likely to be believed. Some organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) or African Union (AU), have a reputation for sending monitors or peacekeepers to conflicts. States that can credibly signal an interest in the long-term outcome of the conflict or an interest in protecting one side of the conflict are also better able to signal a commitment to staying after the formal negotiations are over than neutral or impartial mediators.

The parties best able to overcome the initial barriers to negotiation and effectively navigate the process of reaching an agreement are not always the parties best able to oversee implementation and provide security guarantees in the aftermath of the conflict. For example, organizations that have been working extensively in the warring country likely possess the relevant contextual knowledge to get the disputants to the negotiating table and find a mutually agreeable solution, but they likely lack the military

and economic resources to monitor implementation and intervene appropriately if violations occur.

Again, multiparty efforts are in an advantaged position. Organizations such as the UN or AU have experience coordinating and deploying peacekeeping forces to post-conflict areas. Countries such as the United States have the power and resources to fund and supply such missions. Intervention by the UN alone is not sufficient, however, as UN efforts without major power support are very difficult to execute (see e.g. Crocker, 2001). The UN relies on its member states for resources and personnel; for a UN promise to be credible, it must be accompanied by states' promises to send money and troops. Major powers often lack the political will to shoulder the burden of a monitoring or peacekeeping mission alone. When these two types of mediators work together, states can avoid shouldering the entire burden of such missions while the organization benefits from the states' resources. Organizations and major powers together can more credibly signal that peacekeeping be deployed, if necessary, and that troops will stay throughout the transition.

Challenges of Overcrowding

The obstacles to successful resolution identified above are obstacles faced by all mediation efforts, regardless of the number of mediators present. While multiparty efforts are often better suited than single-party efforts to overcome these obstacles, multiparty efforts also introduce new complications, potentially impeding the chances of success. Each mediator has its own interests in the outcome (or they would not be willing to mediate), making common ground harder to find. Furthermore, third parties potentially have interests external to the conflict that influence their behavior during negotiations and their preferences over the negotiated outcome. Neighboring states with their own rebel populations do not want to appear too soft on insurgents. Powerful states such as the United States have geopolitical interests, such as supporting pro-Western governments or promoting democracy and economic liberalization in the post-conflict state. These competing interests can result in longer, slower negotiations with more roadblocks to agreement. With additional mediators, finding an agreement that the mediators are willing to present to the combatants is harder, and even more so is finding an agreement that the mediators and the disputants are all willing to accept. The longer negotiations drag on, the more vulnerable the negotiation process becomes to spoiler violence, changes in the relative balance of power shifting belligerents' willingness to compromise, or even stagnation in the negotiations.

In addition, Crocker, Hampson and Aall (1999*a*) identify three important challenges unique to multiparty mediation: forum-shopping, mixed messages, and free-riding. These problems are challenges for all multiparty efforts but are magnified in overcrowded efforts. Forum-shopping occurs when disputants search for a sympathetic mediator. This search by the disputants can delay mediation onset as disputants drag their feet in order to identify a mediator with similar preferences. Forum-shopping also delays on-going mediation as it encourages disputants to spend energy searching for a sympathetic ear and playing mediators off each other instead of investing in the current negotiation process.

Forum-shopping not only changes the behavior of the disputants, but it also puts the mediators in a difficult position. Mediators have good reason to be distrustful of the disputants' sincerity, making differentiating between legitimate concerns and stall tactics challenging. Forum-shopping can be mitigated by identifying a mediation team that makes both sides of the dispute feel that their concerns are being addressed. In addition, the mediators can discourage new mediators from joining the negotiations once talks have begun.

Mixed messages arise when the mediators have divergent preferences and send competing signals to the disputants. Mediators who prioritize different aspects of the conflict will propose and support competing peace plans. Different promises, ideas, or expectations from the mediators make resolving the conflict and reaching a settlement more difficult. Conflicting information and agendas can bring the progress of negotiations into doubt and decrease the willingness of the disputants to engage in continued mediation. Mixed messages can be avoided by coordination among the mediators, so that proposals are presented as a unified message.

Finally, the presence of other mediators can encourage free-riding within the mediation team (Crocker, Hampson and Aall, 2001*a*). Mediators endure costs when they intervene in a conflict. These costs vary across conflict environments, ranging from reputation costs (if the resolution process fails) to the opportunity costs of not extending diplomatic intervention elsewhere. The presence of multiple mediators encourages individual actors to delay action in order to shift costs onto other mediators. This is especially true when there are multiple mediators with the same sources of leverage. If there are multiple mediators that can exert the same influence over the disputants, then each mediator has an incentive to diminish its individual costs. This classic collective action problem can be mitigated by minimizing the number of mediators present, starting with the removal of redundant mediators that do not bring new

tools, sources of leverage to the table.

The Mediation Dream Team

To most effectively overcome these obstacles to peace and minimize the negative externalities of overcrowding, the ideal mediation team is complementary, balanced, and coordinated. Complementary efforts maximize the sources of leverage at every phase of the negotiations, providing the knowledge, resources, and credibility necessary to improve the prospects for peace while also avoiding redundant mediators that crowd the mediation process. Balanced efforts help resolve the commitment problems associated with negotiating and implementing an agreement. By including an ally of both the rebels and the government, balanced efforts leave both sides feeling more protected, decreasing the severity of the commitment problems faced by the disputants. Coordinated efforts help overcome the problems unique to multiparty mediation efforts, diminishing the risk of forum-shopping, mixed messages, and free-riding. Mediators that help balance or complement the team possess desirable traits that increase the probability of mediation success. Mediators that can complement or balance each other will vary across conflicts. While the ideal composition of the dream team will vary by context, I expect these characteristics to be important for all intrastate conflicts.

Before elaborating upon how the mediation dream team improves mediation success, it is worth considering what it means for a mediation effort to be successful. An important initial step in the resolution process is getting the disputants to reach agreement. Getting a peace agreement signed is difficult; by this metric, most mediation efforts result in failure. In fact, 65.6 percent of mediation efforts in civil wars between 1989 and 2005 failed to produce a partial or comprehensive peace agreement. Even if a peace agreement is signed, the chance of war recurrence post-mediation remains high in civil wars. Forty-two percent of partial and full peace agreements signed in the same time period failed in the first month. This implies that short- and long-term conceptualizations of the peace process might have different obstacles and thus different roles for mediators to play.

Evaluating Success

My first conceptualization of resolution success is the production of a signed agreement. Signing an agreement, regardless of whether the agreement is implemented, separates those efforts that were

successful in getting the disputants to find a mutually acceptable compromise from those that could not find common ground between the disputants. As most agreements fail within two months of being signed and mediation has shown to have competing short- and long-term impacts, I also consider the durability of the agreements. First, I measure the durability of the agreement by determining if the agreement managed to last through the difficult initial two-month period. A second conceptualization of the durability of the peace agreement measures the months of post-agreement peace. Taken together, these conceptualizations of success allow for evaluating the short- and long-term impacts of mediation. While some characteristics of the dream team might encourage an agreement to be signed, considering the duration of post-agreement peace allows for evaluating if mediation is producing agreements that have no chance of resulting in a durable resolution.

Complementary Mediation

Complementary mediation teams bring together mediators with different sources of leverage. By having mediators with sufficient contextual knowledge of the conflict, enough will to credibly commit to stay involved as long as necessary, as well as the resources necessary to generate and enforce an agreement, the team is in a stronger position to overcome all three obstacles to resolution. Mediators can generate complementary teams in several ways. Perhaps the team includes a local organization with contextual knowledge and the will to help implementation, as well as a regional or global power with the necessary resources. Perhaps each role is provided by a different actor. The important characteristic of the dream team is that each role is filled, without unnecessary mediators crowding the negotiations.

Mediators with contextual knowledge are crucial to identifying the relevant parties to the negotiations, as discussed previously. Contextual knowledge of the crisis and the disputants gives the mediator a better understanding of the bargaining range and ways to expand the range through issue-linkage or outside assurances. Mediators with contextual knowledge are in a better position to make sure all necessary parties are involved in the talks and to use their knowledge to help the disputants find a mutually acceptable agreement.

While agenda-setting and issue-linkage can help disputants find a mutually acceptable agreement in some cases, in other cases such agreements might not be readily available. In these more difficult

cases, mediators with economic or military power will have the leverage necessary to compel or coerce the disputants into an agreement. Promises of aid or preferential trade relationships could expand the bargaining range, opening up mutually acceptable compromises. Likewise, threatening military action, economic sanctions, or the removal of current aid packages could increase the costs of continued conflict, expanding the bargaining range.

While strong mediators will have the leverage to use these carrots and sticks to encourage resolution, the reality is that the influence of such efforts would be short-lived. This makes the third component of a complementary effort, staying power, very important. Mediators that are willing to stay after the agreement has been reached are able to respond to new tensions as they arise. Having actors that are still in dialogue with the disputants provides earlier detection of problems and potentially more readily available solutions. Identifying moments where additional influence from the mediators could be useful (perhaps to reopen talks and deal with an unforeseen source of conflict, to assert more pressure, or to provide additional protections and assurances) could help stabilize the implementation process and reduce the chances the agreement fails.

Moreover, I argue that disputants interested in a lasting peace are aware of the time-inconsistency problems often associated with mediation agreements. Disputants who expect an agreement to fail immediately will be reluctant to sign on to the agreement in first place. Actors with staying power are important from the very beginning of the negotiations in order to improve the disputants' expectations about the effectiveness of the talks, encouraging them to invest fully in the negotiations.

Complementary efforts will positively effect the chances of reaching an agreement that will endure. By having all three sources of leverage present at the negotiating table, the mediation team is equipped to address a variety of challenges and potential obstacles. The consequences of overcrowding imply that while the presence of these three types of leverage is important, avoiding redundancy within the mediation effort is also important. Additional mediators are not always desirable. The value of another mediator is a function of how that mediator contributes to the strengths of the mediation team. Mediators that add new sources of leverage to the mediation effort will increase the chances of mediation success, while those that are redundant hurt the chances of success.[3]

[3]It is conceivable that the effect of redundant mediators might be different depending upon the composition of the mediation team. In particular, perhaps redundant mediators might be more damaging when the mediation team is incomplete than when the team is complete. I do not expect the risks of free-riding and mixed messages, however, to be a function of whether all

This discussion identifies two important dimensions to a complementary effort: having all three sources of leverage (being *complete*) and having no redundant mediators (i.e. mediators who do not bring a unique source of leverage to the table). I expect complete efforts to be more successful than incomplete efforts (regardless of the number of redundant mediators). Likewise, mediation efforts with fewer redundant mediators should be more successful, all else equal.

The mediation effort by the Community of Sant'Egidio, the United States, Italy, and the United Nations in Mozambique illustrates the effectiveness of complementary mediation. The Community of Sant'Egidio provided contextual knowledge and cultural leverage, the UN provided peacekeeping forces and legitimacy, and Italy and the United States provided resources and credibility to the process. Italy also served as a liaison between the United States and the rest of the mediation team, allowing the team to draw on the United States' resources, while also minimizing the complications that would result from a more direct American presence (Bartoli, 1999).

The case of Mozambique highlights the benefits of having a *complete* mediation effort in which all three sources of leverage are present. The Community of Sant'Egidio, the United States, Italy, and the UN provided different tools to the mediation effort, collectively ensuring that the mediation team had contextual knowledge, resources, and credible staying power. Efforts like this are able to exert influence at each stage of negotiations, helping the disputants navigate the hurdles they face. Incomplete efforts (i.e. those lacking in one or more of these sources of leverage) might still have some influence over the disputants, but this influence will be limited, reducing their effectiveness at helping negotiate a settlement.

Hypothesis 1 *Complete mediation teams increase the probability of successfully reaching a mediated agreement, as well as the duration of post-agreement peace, relative to incomplete mediation teams.*

Consider alternatively a multiparty mediation team consisting of representatives from four neighboring states. Each of these mediators likely provide contextual knowledge, an interest in generating regional stability, and some resources. All four neighbors, however, provide the same sources of leverage, making three out of the four of these states redundant and encouraging free-riding among the mediators.

three types of leverage are at the table. Therefore I do not test this interactive possibility in the main analyses. Models with this interactive term can be found in Tables A.13, A.14, and A.15 of the appendix.

If more than one mediator possesses the same resources and leverage, those mediators have incentives to minimize their costs by delaying action in the hopes another actor bears the costs. This generates inefficiency, potentially slowing down the mediation team's efforts, stalling progress, complicating the process, and ultimately reducing the chances of success.

Hypothesis 2 *Mediation teams with fewer redundant mediators increase the probability of successfully reaching a mediated agreement, as well as the duration of post-agreement peace, relative to mediation teams with more redundant mediators.*

The composition of the mediation team are important influences in the outcome of mediation. The ideal mediation team provides enough leverage to help the combatants reach agreement, yet avoids complicating the mediation effort with actors that generate inefficiency. Furthermore, each mediator fills a specific role, requiring each member to play their part in order to reach the desired outcome, while also ensuring that each function is provided. It is worth noting that single-party mediation can be complementary, if that single mediator possesses all three sources of leverage. The relevant variance is in the types of leverage present at the negotiating table, not the number of mediators.

Balanced Mediation

Balanced mediation is unique to multiparty efforts because achieving balance requires at least two mediators. A balanced effort is a mediation process in which each side of the dispute has a mediator looking out for its interests. In other words, a balanced effort has at least one mediator who favors the rebels and at least one mediator who favors the government. While many forms of mediator bias exist, in this project a mediator is considered biased if she has provided support to one side during the conflict or if she has ties to one side of the conflict such that she prefers an outcome that advantages that side. Bias then is captured both in terms of the mediator's actions and the mediator's preferences. Mediation efforts that are not balanced are either impartial or unbalanced. Impartial efforts are those in which no mediator is biased toward either side. Unbalanced, or biased, efforts are those in which at least one mediator is biased toward one side and no mediator is biased toward the other side.

To explain the advantages of balanced mediation, consider the positive process effects mediation can have and how these effects are influenced by multiple third parties. Biased mediators have two main

functions: to provide information so that the disputants can find a mutually acceptable agreement and to help the disputants overcome the commitment problems that accompany conflict resolution attempts. While mediators can in certain circumstances reveal information, their ability to do so is often quite limited. A balanced mediation effort could improve information revelation as each side would have a mediator to recommend caution when appropriate. Proposals approved by a balanced mediation effort would also have a higher level of legitimacy. This improvement, however, would be constrained by the ability of these mediators to learn information their preferred side does not already know. Therefore, the primary mechanism by which balanced mediation efforts improve the chances of success is in mitigating the credible commitment problems.

Impartial mediators would not exacerbate the security concerns of the disputants, but they also cannot extend credible promises of protection or monitoring to either side. Biased mediators are in a unique position to address the concerns of their allies. A biased mediator is more likely to alert its ally of any opponents' action that indicates defection from the negotiations or agreements. This early warning provides additional protection to disputants, alleviating the urge to defect first in order to protect against an ambush by their opponent. In addition to serving as an early warning system, biased mediators can also credibly promise to protect their allies should the opposition try to take advantage of a period of relative weakness. For example, demobilization leaves the side putting down weapons vulnerable; reacquiring arms can be both costly and time consuming. The time it takes to rearm could be sufficient to allow the other side to change the balance of power between the disputants and ruin any progress toward peace. A biased mediator can *credibly* promise to send support should such a situation arise, protecting their ally from this risk and encouraging their ally to agree to temporary ceasefires, demobilization, or other necessary steps that might leave them at a temporary military disadvantage. In this way, biased mediators can reduce the costs of exploitation, decreasing the need for preventive action and encouraging disputant cooperation in a way that impartial mediators cannot.

In alleviating the concerns of one side, however, mediator bias can intensify the feelings of vulnerability felt by the other side. By making one side feel safer, a biased mediator can decrease the security of the other side, potentially encouraging the insecure side to back out of the peace process. In Northern Uganda, for example, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) refused mediation by South Sudan, claiming that Uganda's support of South Sudan during South Sudan's fight for independence biased South Sudan

in favor of the Ugandan government. The LRA thus claimed that their concerns would not be taken as seriously. An effort in which both the rebels and the government have an ally provides all the advantages of bias in overcoming commitment problems on *both sides* of the conflict. By alleviating the disputants' commitment problems during the negotiation and implementation of a peace accord, balanced mediation improves the chances of mediation success. By including mediators biased in favor of each side, the mediation effort as a whole benefits from both sets of protections that biased mediators provide. Mediation teams that include the right mix of mediator bias improve the chances of reaching an agreement by helping mitigate the commitment problems that lead to negotiation breakdown. This enables the mediation effort to benefit from mediator bias without leaving one side feeling more insecure.

Reaching an agreement does not remove the commitment problems between the disputants. Instead, new vulnerabilities often arise as the process of implementing the agreement unfolds. Even after reaching agreement, neither side wants to expose itself to defection by the other side without being prepared. This prevents the sides from taking the first steps toward demobilization and encourages preemptive attacks. Moreover, the process of demobilization is often asymmetric. These asymmetries create new commitment problems that can heighten tensions, erode trust, and destabilize the peace process. Furthermore, the political benefits are often not received immediately as power-sharing arrangements take time to set up. Biased mediators are more likely to stay after an agreement has been signed because they are more invested in the outcome of the conflict and in the security of their ally. With incentives to leave political advisors and monitors to help ensure the safety of their ally, biased mediators continue to mitigate the vulnerabilities of initial implementation and encourage the disputants to put their trust in the mediator instead of their opponent. The benefits of balanced mediation therefore carry over into the post-agreement phase; balanced mediation protects both sides with credible assurances that their interests are being looked after, providing the disputants with a safety net while they initiate implementation.

The risk of war recurrence lingers as the combatants move from violent conflict to political engagement. The asymmetries created by demobilization and new political systems are rarely resolved quickly. Eventually, even biased mediators will lose interest in monitoring the disputants' progress toward a long-term peace. While having an involved mediator who prefers the other side might encourage biased mediators who are part of a balanced effort to stay actively involved longer, eventually other interests will become more salient priorities. Therefore while I expect balanced mediation to improve

the durability of the peace, I do not expect this impact to be as strong as balanced efforts' more initial effects.[4]

Hypothesis 3 *Balanced mediation teams increase the probability of successfully reaching a mediated agreement, as well as the duration of post-agreement peace, relative to unbalanced and impartial mediation teams.*

When it comes to bias in a mediation effort, the ideal mix of mediators is one of balance. Impartial teams (in which none of the mediators are biased) do not exacerbate commitment problems, but they also cannot alleviate them. On the other extreme, unbalanced mediation teams, in which mediators are biased only toward one side of the dispute, are likely to result in distrust and heightened insecurity from the underrepresented side. By leaving one side feeling vulnerable, the commitment problems that prevent implementation, encourage belligerents to be suspicious of their opponent's actions, and thus generate an unstable environment in which to establish peace, continue to plague the generation and implementation of agreements negotiated by unbalanced mediation teams. While many obstacles stand between negotiation and the establishment of a lasting peace, both sides of the conflict having an ally provides the resolution process tools to encourage the combatants to pursue peace.

Coordination

By protecting against the challenges that arise from adding additional mediators to the negotiations, coordinated mediation teams are more likely to succeed than multiparty efforts in which the mediators intervene in the conflict independently of each other. Uncoordinated multiparty efforts suffer increased risk of forum-shopping, free-riding, and mixed messages. Mediators can make different promises or signal different priorities, depending upon their interests in the conflict and their relationships with the disputants. These discontinuities decrease the possibility of reaching an agreement. Establishing order and hierarchy within the mediation team can help guard against these risks. With coordinated mediators, communication between the disputants and the mediators is less likely to generate mixed messages.

[4]It would be interesting to evaluate if balanced efforts that also included a member with staying power strengthened the durability of the peace as perhaps this would be the idea combination theoretically. Unfortunately, interacting balance and complementary efforts in the empirical analysis is not plausible as the observed data does not have enough variation.

Ignoring this variation in mediation efforts leads to inaccurate conclusions about the effect of multiparty mediation. If coordinated efforts are more likely to produce successful outcomes than single-party efforts but uncoordinated efforts are less likely to produce successful outcomes than single-party efforts, then our understanding of how multiparty mediation influences the prospects for peace will conflate the positive effects of coordinated efforts with the negative effects of uncoordinated efforts. Variation within multiparty efforts, therefore, is an important consideration when evaluating the effect of multiparty mediation on conflict resolution.

The level of coordination in multiparty mediation teams varies from effort to effort. Some mediation teams go so far as to organize summits and select a leader. Often, the mediators will have meetings at various stages of the negotiation process in order to set the agenda or agree to a plan of action. These meetings indicate that the mediators are coordinating their work. This institutionalized coordination sits in stark contrast to efforts on the other end of the spectrum where mediators make contradictory statements or promise the disputants' incompatible outcomes. Sometimes the mediators might meet to coordinate the mediation process but leave the meeting without having reached an agreement (e.g. the prominent countries in ECOWAS during their efforts to mediate the conflict in the Côte d'Ivoire). Coordinated efforts, therefore, are not just a matter of will but also of the mediators' ability to overcome their differences.

Once again, the mediation effort in Mozambique, by the Community of Sant'Egidio, the United Nations, the United States, and Italy provides an illustration of a characteristic of the dream team. The mediators in Mozambique actively coordinated with one another. Despite their diverse interests and roles, the mediators worked together to diminish the risk of sending mixed messages to the disputants and increased the effectiveness of the mediation process. Coordinated multiparty mediation efforts benefit from all of the advantages of multiparty mediation while diminishing the risk of negative consequences. As a result, I expect coordinated multiparty efforts to be more effective at reaching agreement than uncoordinated multiparty and single-party efforts.

Uncoordinated efforts are unable to utilize the benefits of multiparty mediation effectively, and they suffer from overcrowding. The civil war in Burundi attracted many mediators and is a prime example of what happens when mediators fail to coordinate, and send different signals to the disputants (Hara, 1999). The political and reputational incentives for mediators outweighed the complications of

multiparty mediation, encouraging many mediators with little sense of coordination. Fabienne Hara asserts that the number of mediators interested in Burundi were "out of proportion with Burundi's strategic value" and that many of them saw Burundi as "a laboratory to test new conflict resolution and prevention approaches" (Hara, 1999, 142). Burundi saw mediation attempts by international organizations (including the UN, Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the European Union (EU)), states (including the United States, Canada, South Africa, and Kenya), as well as non-governmental organizations (including the Community of Sant'Egidio). These mediators all had fundamentally different approaches to mediation, identifying different challenges and focusing on different grievances (Hara, 1999, 142). This generated a wide variety of responses by the international community.

For many of the mediators, coordination with the rest of the international community was seen as desirable, but the sheer number of actors with different frameworks for mediation left the goal of coordination unachieved (Hara, 1999, 143). The Community of Sant'Egidio, for example, tried to build connections between the international actors and the disputants in order to make the talks more cohesive but had limited success (149). The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Act of August 2000 was signed at the end of these negotiations, predominantly as a result of the efforts of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Nelson Mandela of South Africa. This agreement, however, failed to stop the conflict. Key rebel groups refused to sign the agreement and even those parties who did sign the Arusha Act had serious concerns about the agreement and the prospects for peace (Southall, 2006, 201). The response by the international community reflected an interest in resolving the crisis in Burundi. The number of actors who intervened, however, resulted in poor coordination and ultimately forum-shopping and free-riding. Mediation in Burundi reflects the consequences of an overcrowded mediation effort.

Similarly, mediation in Guinea-Bissau involved many ad hoc initiatives with many actors coming and going. In the words of Massey (2006), "Multiplication of mediators is less a matter of choice than a fact of life in today's world" (83). The challenges of multiparty mediation in Guinea-Bissau, however, stemmed from different sources than the challenges faced in Burundi. The main obstacle for Guinea-Bissau was the competition between France and Portugal for influence in the region (Massey, 2006, 89-90). After a series of very ad hoc efforts by a number of third parties, including Portugal, Angola, Sweden, Libya, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bissau, and Gambia, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established itself as the primary mediator (86). France influenced

the mediation process through proxies in ECOWAS. During a lull in ECOWAS's negotiations, Portugal entered the process through Communidade dos Paises de Lingua Portuguesa (CPLP). Portugal sought to use this opportunity to increase its influence in its former colony, turning the mediation efforts into a competition between France and Portugal. As the two mediation factions sought to maximize their importance and secure their interests, they diminished the opportunity to generate a lasting peace.

Throughout the process, the mediators acted with "little unity of purpose", pursuing divergent agendas with little information sharing (85). The Abuja agreement signed in November 1998 was not implemented, the promised elections were postponed, and the violence continued (Ostheimer, 2000). The agreement was described as "unconvincing", and despite the agreement, the conflict ended with the rebels taking control of the government and exiling the former ruler (Massey, 2006, 83). In this case, coordination was not a priority of the mediators. Portugal and France (and their proxies) were more interested in securing their position in the peace process and post-conflict environment than working together to generate a stable transition to peace for Guinea-Bissau. Portugal knew that sending CPLP into the conflict would complicate the negotiations, generate tension with France, and would provide little in the way of new sources of leverage or resources that would encourage resolution. Their political interests in the region, however, outweighed the potential risks, leading CPLP to join the negotiations anyway. This dynamic illustrates how multiple, uncoordinated mediators can disrupt the conflict resolution process.

When mediators can coordinate as they did in Mozambique, I expect very different results from cases in which they cannot. Efforts like Burundi are the ones that leave multiparty mediation looking like "herding cats". In these efforts, I expect the positive impact of the mediation effort to be overpowered by the negative consequences of overcrowding and poor coordination, resulting in uncoordinated multiparty efforts being less likely to succeed than single-party efforts.

Hypothesis 4 *Coordinated multiparty mediation teams increase the probability of successfully reaching a mediated settlement relative to single-party and uncoordinated multiparty mediation. Single-party mediation increases the probability of successfully reaching a mediated agreement relative to uncoordinated multiparty mediation teams.*

The impact of coordination, however, is only expected to effect the reaching of an agreement. Coordination is not hypothesized to impact whether the agreement endures Coordination alone does not signal staying power, the ability to mitigate commitment problems, or long-term interest in the conflict.

The mediation dream team is complementary, balanced, and coordinated. Mediators with contextual knowledge or bias will vary from conflict to conflict, and therefore the dream team will be different in different contexts. As mediation is only used in the most difficult to resolve conflicts, the task undertaken by any mediator or group of mediators is not an easy one. While the dream team is expected to improve the chances of peace, the presence of the dream team is not expected to be sufficient to guarantee an enduring peace in all conflicts. While the dream team might not ensure mediation will succeed, this is an important step forward in understanding how the international community can improve the chances of peaceful conflict resolution. In the next chapter, I operationalize these characteristics of the dream team and present the research design I use to test these hypotheses.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN & DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

To evaluate the hypotheses from the previous chapter, I develop new measures to operationalize the characteristics of the mediation dream team. These measures draw on both existing data sources as well as original data collection. I collected data on the list of mediation attempts in civil wars taken from the Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset (DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna, 2011), restricting the years of interest to 1989–2005. This restriction provides a more temporally homogeneous sample, avoiding complications that could arise from including mediation efforts that occurred during and after the Cold War era.[1] For civil wars ongoing during this time period, CWM identifies the mediators present in each mediation attempt as well as the outcome of the attempt.

Measuring Mediation Success

Using this sample of mediation attempts, I estimated a series of statistical models to explore the effect of the dream team characteristics on mediation success. Importantly, I operationalize success in three ways in order to assess the effect of complementary, balanced, and coordinated efforts on both short- and long-term outcomes. I measure success in terms of reaching a negotiated settlement at the end of the mediation attempt as well as if the settlement halts the violence and ultimately if the settlement leads to a durable peace.

Reaching an Agreement

The first analyses evaluate the effectiveness of complementary, balanced, and coordinated mediation efforts in overcoming the obstacles to reaching an agreement. To evaluate this, I operationalize

[1]While the temporal heterogeneity with respect to the effect of mediation is an interesting question, it is left for another project.

mediation success in terms of what type of agreement, if any, was reached at the end of negotiations. Negotiations can result in failure (no agreement reached between the belligerents), a process agreement promising future negotiations, a ceasefire that agrees to halt hostilities but does not resolve the underlying source of the hostilities, a partial peace agreement, or a comprehensive peace agreement that seeks to end the violence and address the grievances of the belligerents. I consider mediation efforts to be more successful if they produce more formalized, comprehensive agreements. Therefore, these mediation outcomes fall into a natural progression from failure to comprehensive peace agreement. Because process agreements and ceasefires often accompany one another, establishing a clear coding rule to distinguish between the two is difficult. Furthermore, both process agreements and ceasefires are temporary agreements that leave the door open for future negotiations but do not address the causes of the conflict. For these reasons, I include these two possible outcomes in one category: limited commitment agreements.

Using this hierarchy, I implement ordered logistic models in which the dependent variable, *mediation success*, is defined as the outcome of the negotiations: no agreement, a limited commitment agreement, a partial peace agreement, or a comprehensive peace agreement.[2] Table 3.1 presents the frequency distribution of this measure of success.[3]

Table 3.1: Distribution of Mediated Settlements

Failure	Limited Comm	Part Peace	Comp Peace	Total
51	147	61	43	302
16.9	48.7	20.2	14.2	100

Counts and percentages of mediation attempts in each category.

Halting the Violence

Next, I consider only those mediation efforts that resulted in an agreement and operationalize *mediation success* as the termination of violence after the signing of an agreement. For this set of analyses, ceasefires, partial peace agreements, and comprehensive peace agreements are included. In each of

[2]These codings are taken predominantly from DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna (2011). Some changes have been made by the author as a result of further investigation, including cross-checking with the UCDP Peace Agreements Dataset and further reading on the mediation process and outcome from news sources accessed through Lexis Nexus and ProQuest Historical Newspapers. A list of these changes is available upon request.

[3]Models with partial and comprehensive peace agreements coded as one category are reported in the appendix.

these agreements, the combatants make promises to put down their weapons. All three of these types of agreements should have short-term impacts on reducing violence. Violence termination is coded from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Harbom, Högbladb and Wallensteen, 2006) and the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz, 2010). Violence is considered to have terminated if it halted for at least two months after the signing of an agreement.[4] With this dichotomy, I evaluate the effect of complementary, balanced, and coordinated mediation efforts on short-term post-conflict success using logistic regression.[5] Of the 302 mediation attempts, 183 of them ended in a ceasefire, partial or comprehensive peace agreement. Just over fifty percent of these agreements failed to stop the violence for two months (93 cases, or 50.8 percent). The remaining ninety cases (49.2 percent) reached this two-month threshold.

Generating a Durable Peace

Finally, I operationalize *mediation success* in terms of the durability of the post-agreement peace. For this analysis, only peace agreements (partial and comprehensive) are included, as limited commitment agreements often come with a termination date and are thus not expected to endure indefinitely. A mediation effort's success is determined by the duration of peace after the agreement was signed. The duration of peace is coded as the number of months that passed before the peace agreement failed, either implicitly through the return of hostilities, or explicitly by either side as coded by the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Harbom, Högbladb and Wallensteen, 2006). As not all mediation efforts identified in CWM match up with agreements in the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, the duration of the remaining agreements is coded from the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz, 2010). In this sample, fifty-eight of the post-agreement peace episodes are censored, not failing during the UCDP's window of observation (leaving forty-five uncensored observations). Figure 3.1 illustrates the duration of post-agreement peace in the uncensored and censored observations (in months). As these graphs show, many

[4]While two months is somewhat arbitrary, this threshold was motivated by analyses conducted in past studies. The conclusions drawn from the model are unchanged using any threshold up to six months. Longer thresholds than six months were not tested as this variable is supposed to capture a short-term post-agreement outcome.

[5]Censored probit models (also referred to as Heckman probit models) were also estimated in order to control for the selection into an agreement. These models are notoriously unidentified (Brandt and Schneider, 2004). The censored probit models estimated here also suffer from identifiability issues and are therefore not chosen as the primary analyses for this operationalization of success. Output from the censored probit models are included Table A.9 in the appendix.



Figure 3.1: Duration of Post-Agreement Peace (in Months)

agreements fail quickly, with eighty percent of the uncensored agreements (forty-seven percent of all peace agreements) failing within the first year. Yet, many agreements manage to make a lasting impact, as can be seen in the censored cases which range from four years to twenty years and counting.

The effect of the mediation dream team on the hazard of peace failure (i.e. the risk of war recurrence) is estimated using a Weibull event-history model. As peace agreements are not signed at random, I estimate and report a Weibull model with selection (Boehmke, Morey and Shannon, 2006) in the appendix to see how the inclusion of a selection equation influences the results. While many agreements fail shortly after signing, this risk of failure decreases as the agreement endures, making the Weibull

an appropriate choice of event-history model. The Weibull distribution assumes a baseline hazard rate that is either flat, monotonically increasing, or monotonically decreasing and estimates this rate with the parameter p (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). The baseline hazard is expected to be monotonically decreasing as the risk of failure should decrease over time. Therefore, the Weibull distribution accommodates and tests the assumed relationship between peace duration and risk of failure.[6] Also included in the appendix are Cox proportional hazard models. As semi-parametric models, the Cox model makes no assumption about the baseline hazard rate. While this has some advantages, the main disadvantage is that it prevents the estimation of substantive quantities of interest, including median expected duration. As this project is interested in not only statistical relationships, but also the substantive impact of differences in mediation efforts, the Weibull results and predicted mediation durations are reported as the main analyses.

Measuring the Dream Team

With the measures of mediation success specified, the characteristics of the mediation dream team must now be operationalized. Measures of complementary and balanced efforts are developed from existing data sources, with the procedure used to code these variables summarized in Tables 3.2 and 3.6. To capture the coordination of multiparty efforts, original data collection was conducted.

Complementary Mediation

A complementary team is one in which each of the key sources of leverage is accounted for (contextual knowledge, military/economic resources, and credible staying power), and each mediator provides at least one unique source of leverage. Mediation efforts can fail to be complementary in two ways. First, they can fail to include all three sources of leverage. These attempts are referred to as *incomplete*. Second, they can include mediators who fail to provide a unique source of leverage. These mediators are referred to as *redundant*. The complementary nature of mediation teams was determined by coding the sources of leverage each mediator brings to the table. These individual sources of leverage are then aggregated to determine the number of redundant mediators as well as whether the meidation effort as

[6] In the analyses presented below, $ln(p)$ is statistically significant and negative ($p < 1$), providing support for the assumption that the baseline hazard for civil war recurrence is monotonically decreasing.

a whole is complete. This process is described below and summarized in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Complementary Mediation Coding

For Each Mediator			*For Mediation Team*		
	Value	Description		Value	Description
Contextual Knowledge	1	previous successful mediation or ethnic/religious ties	Complete	1	all present
	0	otherwise		0	at least one missing
Mediator Strength	1	major or regional power	Redundancy	≥ 0	# redundant mediators
	0	otherwise			
Staying Power	1	reputation for peacekeeping			
	0	otherwise			

Contextual Knowledge

Mediators develop contextual knowledge through historical and cultural connections with the disputants. Sources of contextual leverage include a shared religion or ethnicity, previous intervention in the conflict, or other experience in the country at war. For mediators like the Community of Sant'Egidio, strong contextual knowledge was signaled by its association with religious communities within the state but also by a history of humanitarian and civil society activity in Mozambique. The key to contextual knowledge is picking a threshold for these relationships that separates those actors with relevant knowledge from those that have interests in the country but not the depth of knowledge necessary to exert relational influence as a mediator. Shared cultural identity is a fairly high standard with only 9.5 percent of the mediators in the data having a shared identity with either of the disputants. Previous intervention in the conflict alone, however, does not signal contextual knowledge as mediators could intervene repeatedly without gaining insight into the disputants' needs. Additionally, while repeated intervention could indicate investment by the mediator, it does not signal that the mediator understands the cultural differences preventing communication or the opportunities for issue-linkage or agenda-setting that would enable the mediator to shape the negotiations productively.

Other potential means of separating mediators with contextual knowledge from those without could try to identify characteristics of mediators that are more likely to be correlated with possessing contextual knowledge. For example, neighbors are more likely to possess this knowledge than distant powers. Not all neighbors, however, will inherently possess such knowledge. Moreover, neighbors are also more likely to be directly impacted by the war (through refugee populations or spill-over effects). Coding all

neighbors as having this kind of influence risks conflating those with contextual knowledge with other characteristics of neighbors, such as their concern for regional stability.[7]

For this study, mediators have contextual knowledge in a given mediation instance if: a) they have successfully mediated in the conflict previously, b) they have a cultural tie to either side of the conflict through common religion or ethnicity. If either of these conditions are met, then the individual mediator is determined to have contextual leverage. Narrowing the field to only mediators with previous successful interventions helps eliminate mediators who might have a history with the conflict but not the relational ties necessary to understand the unique challenges the disputants face. Mediators who have successfully negotiated an agreement, on the other hand, have demonstrated an ability to navigate the conflict's challenges and have built productive relationships with the disputants. Such mediators have signaled that either they possess contextual knowledge or are able to gain such knowledge from the disputants.

Condition a is determined by previous entries in the CWM dataset; a mediator is coded as having contextual knowledge if the mediator was successful in negotiating an agreement within a year of the current negotiations. Past success is only coded for this narrow time window because the knowledge and relationships from a successful mediation are likely to decay over time. New problems, new insecurities, new challenges, and new opportunities for compromise will have arisen.[8] A mediator who has not kept in close communication over time will not have the newest information and therefore will no longer have the necessary contextual knowledge.

Determining if the mediator has a cultural tie with any of the disputants requires identifying the religious and ethnic identity of the mediator and the combatants, if relevant. IGOs offering mediation are coded as having no religious/ethnic identity.[9] Therefore, IGOs cannot satisfy condition b. Individuals who mediate could theoretically be culturally connected to the conflict if they cite their ethnic or religious similarities as reasons for their willingness to or interest in mediating. In this sample, however,

[7]Robustness checks including neighbors being coded as having contextual knowledge are included in Tables A.20, A.21, and A.22.

[8]Alternative codings at two- and five-year thresholds were also included. The results of these alternative operationalizations can be found in Tables A.20, A.21, and A.22.

[9]While IGOs might send individual mediators who have religious or ethnic connections to the conflict, these individuals will be operating on behalf of and through the constraints of the organizations that sent them. As these IGOs represent many states and thus cultures, they are coded as not having a strong religious or ethnic identity.

none of the individuals who intervene satisfy this criteria. This means that only states and NGOs have cultural connections to the disputes in this sample of mediation attempts.

To determine if a state mediator satisfies condition b requires coding the religious/ethnic identity of the state as well as the religious/ethnic identity of the disputants. The religious/ethnic identity of the mediator and the government in conflict was identified using the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset (Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009). EPR identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups (including ethnoreligious groups) in a given state.[10] For each group, EPR codes the extent to which that group controls the current government. The level of control ranges from groups that have "absolute power" to those that are "exclu[ded] from central power". The ethnic/religious identity of a state mediator or government disputant is ethnic group that has absolute control (*monop*=1 or *dominant*=1) or is the senior partner in a power-sharing agreement (*senior*=1).

The rebel group's religious/ethnic identity is coded by combining information from the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset (Asal, Pate and Wilkenfeld, 2008), the Minorities at Risk (MAR) quantitative dataset (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009), the EPR dataset (Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009), and the Ethnic Armed Conflicts (EAC) dataset (Cederman, Min and Wimmer, 2008). The EAC dataset identifies whether the conflict had ethnic/religious ties through recruitment or goals. This signals whether the rebels have an ethnoreligious identity. The identity of these groups is indicated in the EPR dataset by matching the conflict codes from EAC. The MAR and MAROB datasets provide additional support for these coding decisions as needed.

As few NGOs mediated in civil wars during the time period under consideration, the ethnic and religious identities of mediating NGOs was coded by reading the NGOs' mission statements and objectives. If these indicate a strong religious or ethnic motivation, that identity is coded for the NGO. For example, the Community of Sant'Egidio is coded as a Catholic organization because its mission and peacemaking activities are clearly rooted in its Catholic identity. Taken together, a mediator satisfies condition b if the mediator's ethnic/religious identities intersect the identities of the government or rebel groups.

Table 3.3 indicates the frequency with which these characteristics were present in the mediation

[10]EPR defines a group as politically relevant if "at least one significant political actor claims to represent the interests of that group in the national political arena, or if members of an ethnic category are systematically and intentionally discriminated against in the domain of public politics" (325).

attempts under study as well as the percentage of efforts with each combination present.

Table 3.3: Components of Contextual Knowledge by Mediation Effort

	Cultural Ties	No Cultural Ties	Total
Previous Successful Mediation	11	69	80
	3.64	22.8	26.5
No Previous Successful Mediation	37	185	222
	12.3	61.3	73.5
Total	48	254	302
	15.9	84.1	100

Counts and percentages for the presence of previous successful mediation/cultural ties in mediation attempts.

Mediator Strength

Resource leverage is determined by the material wealth and power of the intervener. All mediators have some resource leverage, but to fulfill this role the mediator must have sufficient resources to alter the negotiating environment and fund the negotiation and post-negotiation process. Therefore, mediators are divided into those with high levels and those with low levels of resource leverage. Major (global) powers (as determined by the Correlates of War (COW) State System Membership List, 2011) are high resource leverage mediators. Regional powers, when mediating a conflict in their region, also have sufficient economic and military strength to coerce and compel the disputants. For each region and each year, the regional power is the state with the highest Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score using the National Material Capabilities dataset (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972). Regions are coded following the COW designations.[11] Table 3.4 lists both the regional and major powers, years they held this status (within the time period under observation), as well as frequency of mediation.[12]

Credible Staying Power

Mediators are coded as having credible staying power if they currently have peacekeepers or monitors in the country they are mediating, a history of sending monitors to the conflict, or are regional/international organizations known for peacekeeping efforts. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Multilateral Peace Operations (MPO) Database identifies all peace operations conducted by the

[11]This generates nine regions: North and Central America, South America, Europe, Northern Africa, Southern Africa, Middle East, Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania.

[12]For regional powers, the frequency of mediation only includes mediation attempts in the power's region.

Table 3.4: Global & Regional Powers

Global Powers		
Power	Years	Frequency
United States	1989–2005	54
United Kingdom	1989–2005	5
France	1989–2005	25
Germany	1991–2005	2
Russia	1989–2005	41
China	1989–2005	0
Japan	1991–2005	6

Regional Powers		
Power	Years	Frequency
Brazil	1989–2005	0
Nigeria	1989–2005	1
South Africa	1989–2005	6
Turkey	1989–2005	0
Indonesia	1989–2005	13
Australia	1989–2005	3

UN, regional organizations, or "ad hoc coalitions of states" (Soder, 2012). This dataset lists each state that contributed personnel as well as the years of participation. A state mediator has credible staying power if it sent peacekeepers to that conflict in the past or currently has peacekeepers on the ground. Additionally, organizations have credible staying power if they are known for engaging in peacekeeping operations and the country in conflict is a member of that organization. MPO identifies organizations that deployed peacekeeping missions during and shortly before the time period of interest.[13] These organizations, therefore, have credible staying power when mediating a dispute in a member country.

Determining Complementary Mediation

Finally, these sources of influence were combined to determine the overall complementary nature of the mediation team. A source of mediation is considered present in the mediation team if at least one mediator is coded as having that type of leverage. *Complete* is a dummy variable that captures if the mediation team possesses all three sources of leverage. If each source of leverage is present, then the team is complete. If a source of leverage is lacking, then the mediation team is labeled incomplete.

[13]These organizations are: United Nations, African Union, Economic Community of Central African States, Commonwealth of Independent States, Economic Community of West African States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union, Organization of American States, and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

If all of a mediator's sources of leverage are accounted for by the other mediators, then that mediator is redundant. The number of redundant mediators determines the level of redundancy in the mediation effort. *Redundancy* is a count variable equal to the number of redundant mediators. Table 3.5 summarizes the frequency with which each source of leverage is present as well as the frequency of complete mediation teams. Figure 3.2 describes the distribution of the number of redundant mediators in the mediation attempts in this sample.

Table 3.5: Sources of Influence & Complete Mediation

	Cont. Knowledge	Resource Lev.	Staying Power	Complete
Attempts Present	117	107	131	20
	38.7	35.4	43.4	6.6
Attempts Absent	185	195	171	282
	61.3	64.6	56.6	93.4

Counts and percentages for the presence of the three sources of leverage.



Figure 3.2: Distribution of Redundancy

Mediation Balance

To determine the balance of the mediation team, first the biases of each mediator were identified. Each mediator's bias was coded from the perspective of the mediator's relationship with the government. A mediator can either be biased in favor of the government (and thus against the rebels), biased against

Table 3.6: Mediation Balance Coding

For Each Mediator			*For Mediation Team*	
	Value	Description	Category	Description
Mil/Pol Bias (MB)	1	supported G only	Balanced	$B < 0$ for at least one mediator & $B > 0$ for at least one mediator
	0	supported neither/both		
	-1	supported R only		
Cultural Bias (CB)	1	ethnoreligious ties to G	Impartial	$B = 0$ for all mediators
	0	ties to neither/both		
	-1	ethnoreligious ties to R		
Mediator Bias (B)	$MB + CB > 0$	Biased toward G	Biased	$B > 0$ for at least one mediator & $B = 0$ for all other mediators or $B < 0$ for at least one mediator & $B = 0$ for all other mediators
	$MB + CB = 0$	Impartial		
	$MB + CB < 0$	Biased toward R		

Note: R indicates rebels; G indicates government.

the government (in favor of the rebels), or impartial to both sides. The connections between each mediator and the disputants was determined along two dimensions: military/political bias and cultural bias. Table 3.6 provides a summary of the procedure that produces the variable *Balance*.

Military and Political Bias

The first dimension is the military/political bias of the mediators. Drawing on Svensson (2007*a*), a mediator is biased in favor of the government if it provided direct military or political support to the government during the conflict. Likewise, a mediator is biased against the government (i.e. in favor of the rebels) if it provided direct military or political support to the rebels, as coded from the UCDP External Support Project Primary Warring Party Dataset (Högbladh, Pettersson and Themnér, 2011). The External Support dataset identifies all secondary warring and non-warring providers of support in civil conflicts from 1975 to 2009. Warring support involves sending troops to assist in the ongoing conflict. Non-warring support can involve "provision of sanctuary, financial assistance, logistics and military support short of troops" that is provided by a state or an organization.[14] As one might expect the impact of military support to erode over time, mediators are only coded as biased if they provided military/political support within ten years of the start of the mediation effort.

While a history of support might generate perceptions of bias that persist for longer than ten years, mediators who provided support in the past and have stopped doing so are unlikely to be able to credibly commit to assisting their former allies now. On the other hand, a more narrow window would exclude mediators who have not provided support more recently because of a stalemate in the conflict, a lack of

[14]It should be noted that UCDP throws out "allegations of support that have limited spread or that are clearly outrageous".

continued need by their ally, or because they have found ways to provide support through more subtle channels not being detected by observers. MB is coded as 1 (indicating that the mediator is biased toward the government) if that mediator provided political or military support to the government in the conflict in the last ten years, -1 if the mediator provided support to the rebels in the last ten years, and 0 if the mediator provided support to neither side or both sides during the ten-year period.[15]

Cultural Bias

The second dimension is the cultural bias of the mediators. While some have dismissed this dimension of mediator bias in the past (see e.g. Savun (2008)), given the cultural and ethnic sources of tension in many civil conflicts, this dimension plays an important role in shaping the relationship between the combatants and mediator(s). Mediators with strong cultural ties to one side will be perceived as biased by the disputants, influencing how much the disputants trust the mediators. Moreover, mediators with strong cultural ties will be able to develop more confidence with and leverage over the combatants with which they share cultural connections. In this analysis, a mediator is considered culturally biased in favor of a disputant if the mediator shares politically relevant religious or ethnic ties with that disputant as coded previously.

The mediator received a value of 1 for cultural bias (CB) if the mediator shared ethnic/religious ties with the government, -1 if it shared ethnic/religious ties to the rebels, and 0 if it shared ties with neither or both sides. Notably, a mediator can share ethnic/religious ties to both sides in the conflict. In such cases the mediator has contextual knowledge but does not have a cultural bias.[16]

Relative Bias

Each mediator's biases are captured by these two variables: military/political bias (MB) and cultural bias (CB). These variables capture what Savun (2008) refers to as the *absolute* bias of the mediator. The *relative* bias of a mediator is $B = (MB) + (CB)$.[17] The calculation for B allows the mediator's cultural and political biases to potentially cancel each other out should a mediator be politically biased toward one side and culturally biased toward the other. The magnitude of B is not of interest in this

[15]Interestingly there are eight cases of a mediator having provided support to both sides during the ten years leading up to the mediation attempt. This is an interesting, albeit rare, phenomenon that perhaps deserves more attention in future work.

[16]This is empirically a very rare event. There is only one case of this occurring in this project's dataset.

[17]This follows the method of Savun but changes the components of the calculation in order to accommodate the relevant sources of bias in the civil war mediator-disputant relationship.

Table 3.7: Mediator Balance by Dimension & Overall Mediation Balance

	Military Dimension	Cultural Dimension	Overall
Balanced	10	0	17
	3.3	0.0	5.6
Impartial	221	255	192
	73.2	84.4	65.6
Unbalanced	71	47	93
	23.5	15.6	30.8

Counts and percentages of mediation attempts in each category.

study, only whether B is positive or negative. If B is positive, then the mediator is biased in favor of the government. If B is negative, then the mediator is biased against the government (i.e. biased toward the rebels). When B equals 0, the mediator is impartial, having no relative bias toward either side in the conflict.

Mediation Balance

After identifying each mediator's relative bias, these biases were aggregated to capture the overall balance of the mediation effort. The variable, *Balance*, is a three-category variable by which the baseline category of balanced mediation can be compared to impartial and unbalanced mediation. Mediation efforts were coded as impartial if all members of the team are impartial (i.e. all mediators had a relative bias of 0). The remaining mediation efforts have at least one biased mediator and therefore fall into either the unbalanced or balanced mediation categories. A team is balanced if both sides have a mediator biased in their favor (i.e. for at least one mediator B is negative and for at least one mediator B is positive). A team is unbalanced if only one side has mediators biased in its favor. Balanced mediation requires at least two mediators, making it inherently multiparty. Unbalanced and impartial efforts need not be multiparty. Table 3.7 provides summary information regarding how the mediation efforts are categorized for each dimension (military/political and cultural) as well as overall. In order to directly evaluate Hypothesis 3, the baseline category in all analyses is balanced mediation. Table 3.8 displays descriptive information about the mediation balance categories.

Table 3.8: Mediation Balance by Multiparty Mediation

	Single-Party	Multiparty	Total
Balanced	0	17	17
	0.0	5.6	5.6
Impartial	123	69	192
	40.7	22.8	63.6
Unbalanced	31	62	93
	10.3	20.5	30.8
Total	154	148	302
	51.0	49.0	100.0

Counts and percentages of mediation attempts by mediation balance.

Identifying Coordination

Existing datasets of mediation in intrastate conflicts do not include sufficient information on mediator composition and coordination. Therefore, to test Hypothesis 4, I gathered new data on coordination in multiparty mediation efforts for each of the cases in the CWM dataset. This relied on three primary sources: the Conflict Barometer annual reports (available in English after 2002)[18] and news articles identified using ProQuest Historical Newspapers and LexisNexus Academic databases. The Conflict Barometer reports provide an overview of both inter- and intrastate conflicts currently ongoing in the international system as well as key developments in the conflict in that year. More specific information about the conflicts and resolution efforts came from news articles reported before, during, and soon after the mediation attempts occurred. These articles were systematically identified using both ProQuest Historical Newspapers and LexisNexus Academic databases. Only articles contemporary to the resolution efforts were analyzed in order to avoid temporal biases in the data collection process. Other sources were also consulted as appropriate. For example, reports and press releases available through the Crisis Management Initiative and Center for Humanitarian Dialogue websites were consulted for cases mediated by these organizations.

To test the hypothesis that coordinated multiparty efforts should be more successful than uncoordinated multiparty efforts, I used these sources to determine if the mediators worked collectively or

[18]These reports are available at www.hiik.de/eh/konflktbarometer/.

independently. Often, the mediators would have meetings to set the agenda or agree to a plan of action. These meetings indicated that the mediation team sought to work collectively and were coordinating their work. Other times, mediators made separate statements that contradicted each other or were promising different outcomes. These statements signaled uncoordinated efforts. The coordination of these efforts was coded as a trichotomous variable identifying if the mediation effort was single-party and for multiparty efforts distinguishing between multiparty efforts that were coordinated and those that were not. Of the multiparty mediation cases, about twenty-two percent were uncoordinated. The other seventy-eight percent were coordinated. Table 3.9 summarizes this classification of mediation attempts.

Table 3.9: Mediation Coordination

Single-Party	Uncoordinated Multiparty	Coordinated Multiparty
154	32	116
51.0	10.6	38.4

Counts and percentages of mediation attempts by coordination type.

Control Variables

In addition to complementary, balanced, and coordinated mediation, other characteristics of the mediation process influence mediation success. I also control for alternative explanations of conflict resolution, including the following control variables in all subsequent models. The command structure of the rebel group influences the mediation process and thus the likelihood of reaching an agreement. A rebel groups with a strong central commands has a clear bargaining partner for the government negotiators (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009). Therefore, rebel groups with strong central commands are more likely to negotiate an agreement successfully. Moreover, the presence of a strong central command can help alleviate tensions as the agreement is implemented, protect against spoiling, and provide a focal point for the government to assess compliance. Thus, strong central command should also be associated with more durable agreements. The strength of the rebel group's central command structure is taken from the Non-State Actors in Civil Wars (NSA) Dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2013).

Past works on mediation have also identified issue salience as influencing the likelihood of negotiation success (e.g. Gartner and Bercovitch, 2006; Bercovitch and Houston, 2000; Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild, 2001). Fearon (2004) asserts that territorial wars are more difficult to resolve because they are more intractable. As the incompatibility influences not only the likelihood of reaching a peace agreement, but also the likelihood of peace following an agreement, all three models of mediation success include a variable indicating whether the conflict was over territory.[19]

The duration of the war should improve the chances of reaching an agreement as well as lengthen the duration of the post-agreement peace (Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild, 2001). As the conflict persists, both sides learn more about the conflict and their opponent, making a settlement more appealing. Thus, the longer the war, the more likely a signed agreement will produce a stable, lasting peace. The duration of the conflict is coded as the number of years between the conflict's first inclusion in the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset[20] and the last year of its inclusion before the signing of the peace agreement. Additionally, the intensity of the conflict may encourage disputants to consider a compromised settlement over continued fighting. In a discussion of international conflicts, Ghosn (2010) asserts that in higher intensity wars the disputants are more likely to embrace negotiation, but less likely to reach a successful outcome. The intensity of the conflict is coded from the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002).

Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001) also argue that the opposition's past experience with the government should influence their trust and mutual willingness to abide by the settlement. Therefore, higher levels of democracy during the negotiations and at the time of the agreement's signing should positively influence opposition expectations about future interactions, thus increasing the probability of peace. Therefore, the state's polity score, from the Polity IV Project (Marshall et al., 2002), in the year in which the agreement was signed is included in all three models. Finally, I control for the region in which the conflict being mediated occurs. This control seeks to accommodate the known impact of regional influences from spill-over effects to regional pressure to resolve the conflict.

Moreover, some factors influence the likelihood a signed agreement endures. To account for these factors I control for whether the agreement was a ceasefire in the logistic models. Additionally, the

[19]This variable is coded from the Conflict Barometer Annual Reports available at http://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/.

[20]The UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset v. 4-2010, 1946-2009 can be accessed from http://www.ucdp.uu.se.

strength of the rebels relative to the government is included in the logistic and duration models to control for the conflict environment in which the agreement is being implemented. This variable comes from the NSA dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2013).

In the duration models, an additional control variables is included. Third-party guarantees by way of a commission to oversee or monitor the implementation of the agreement (Mutwol, 2009) or the provision of a peacekeeping force (Fortna, 2004) in the final stages of the negotiations can increase the belligerents' faith in the peace process. Interestingly, Tiernay (2015) finds that peacekeepers present during the negotiations are not correlated with signing an agreement; this control is only included in the duration models. The presence of a peacekeeping or monitoring force soon after the cessation of negotiations was coded from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Multilateral Peace Operations Database (Soder, 2012) and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.[21]

After operationalizing the characteristics of the dream team and considering alternative explanations for mediation success, Hypotheses 1–4 can now be evaluated on the sample of mediation attempts in civil wars from 1989–2005. The next chapter reports and discusses the findings from these analyses.

[21] Information on past United Nations peacekeeping missions can be accessed at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/past.shtml with a complete list of operations available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS & RESULTS

This chapter presents the previously-described analyses in order to evaluate the effects of mediation dream team characteristics on mediation outcomes. Overall, I find support for Hypotheses 3 and 4 in terms of short-term outcomes. Balanced and coordinated efforts increase the probability of mediation ending in a comprehensive peace agreement. The support for my hypotheses is not as strong when considering the post-agreement impact of the mediation effort. Balanced mediation has a meaningful impact on halting the violence post-agreement, but no significant impact on decreasing the overall hazard of war recurrence. The characteristics of the dream team encourage the disputants to reach an agreement but are not sufficient to produce a durable post-agreement peace.

Bivariate Relationships

To give a better understanding of how complementary, balanced, and coordinated efforts relate to the different measures of mediation success, this section presents bivariate comparisons in the absence of controls.

Reaching Agreement

Beginning with the immediate mediation outcome (the type of agreement, if any, agreed to by the disputants) Tables 4.1–4.3 and Figure 4.1 present bivariate comparisons between mediation characteristics and the type of agreement reached. Complete mediation efforts show a relatively even distribution across outcome categories. More complete efforts end with the signing of a peace agreement (considering together partial and comprehensive) than fail or produce a limited commitment agreement. Incomplete efforts, on the other hand, more often produce limited commitment agreements than a peace agreement. The Fisher's exact test, however, does not indicate that this bivariate pattern is significant.

Table 4.1: Completeness & Agreement Outcome

	Failure	Limited Comm	Part Peace	Comp Peace	Total
Incomplete	46	141	56	39	282
	16.3	50.0	19.9	13.8	100
Complete	5	6	5	4	20
	25.0	30.0	25.0	20.0	100
Total	51	147	61	43	302
	16.9	48.7	20.2	14.2	100

Counts and percentages of mediation outcomes by completeness.
Fisher's exact test: $p = 0.290$.



Figure 4.1: Redundancy & Agreement Outcome

The number of redundant mediators also shows the expected pattern, albeit weakly. Figure 4.1 illustrates the percent of total mediation attempts that ended in each of the four outcome categories for the different number of redundant mediators present. A Spearman rank correlation test produces a negative coefficient: -0.018. While this is in the direction expected (more redundant mediators is associated with a less comprehensive agreement), the substantive size of the relationship is quite small, and the coefficient is not statistically significant at the 0.05 threshold.

Impartial and unbalanced mediation efforts are both most likely to result in limited commitment agreements. Limited commitment agreements are more likely for these categories than the combination of a partial or comprehensive peace agreement. Balanced mediation shows an interesting pattern; it is equally likely to result in failure as a partial peace agreement. When considering the two types of peace agreement together, however, a peace agreement is the most likely outcome for balanced mediation. Finally, coordinated multiparty efforts are more likely to result in a peace agreement (and less likely

Table 4.2: Balance & Agreement Outcome

	Failure	Limited Comm	Part Peace	Comp Peace	Total
Balanced	5	4	5	3	17
	29.4	23.5	29.4	17.7	100
Impartial	29	100	34	29	192
	15.1	52.1	17.7	15.1	100
Unbalanced	17	43	22	11	93
	18.3	46.2	23.7	11.8	100
Total	51	147	61	43	302
	16.9	48.7	20.2	14.2	100

Counts and percentages of mediation outcome by mediation balance.

Fisher's exact test: $p = 0.226$.

to result in failure) than uncoordinated or single-party efforts. Single-party efforts also outperform uncoordinated multiparty efforts.

Table 4.3: Coordination & Agreement Outcome

	Mediation Outcome				Total
	Failure	Limited Comm	Part Peace	Comp Peace	
Single-Party	23	87	25	19	154
	14.9	56.5	16.2	12.3	100
Uncoordinated	12	17	2	1	32
	37.5	53.1	6.3	3.1	100
Coordinated	16	43	34	23	116
	13.8	37.1	29.3	19.8	100
Total	51	147	61	43	302
	16.9	48.7	20.2	14.2	100

Counts and percentages of mediation outcome by coordination.

Fisher's exact test: $p < 0.000$.

Violence Halted

Tables 4.4 and 4.5 as well as Figure 4.2 provide the bivariate relationships between the characteristics of the dream team and whether peace lasted for at least two months after the signing of an agreement.[1]

The number of complete cases in this set of analyses is quite small with only ten total. Of these ten, six of them successfully navigate the initial post-agreement period, generating peace for at least two

[1]As coordination was not hypothesized to have a post-agreement effect, the relationship between coordinated efforts and reaching this two month threshold (as well as the average duration of peace considered below) are not discussed here.

Table 4.4: Completeness & Halted Violence

	Failed	Succeeded	Total
Incomplete	89	84	173
	51.4	48.6	100
Complete	4	6	10
	40.0	60.0	100
Total	93	90	183
	50.8	49.2	100

Counts and percentages of successfully halting violence by completeness. Fisher's exact test: $p = 0.532$.



Figure 4.2: Redundancy & Halted Violence

months. The other four fail to achieve this measure of success. While only a little more than half of complete efforts succeeded, a little less than half of the incomplete efforts succeeded. This bears out the general pattern expected in Hypothesis 1, although this pattern does not reach statistical significance.

Redundancy tells a more complex and less intuitive story. About half of the efforts that have no redundant mediators succeeded and the other half failed. A little more than half of the efforts with one redundant mediator failed. For larger numbers of redundant mediators, the majority of these efforts succeeded. Statistical tests of this relationship indicate a slight (and statistically insignificant) positive relationship between the number of mediators and successfully reaching the two-month threshold.[2]

[2]Difference of means tests looking at the average number of redundant mediators, comparing successful efforts to unsuccessful efforts, finds a difference of 0.09 with a corresponding p-value of 0.497.

Notably, the majority of attempts in which no redundant mediators are present are in fact single-party efforts.[3]

Table 4.5: Balance & Halted Violence

	Failed	Succeeded	Total
Balanced	1	8	9
	11.1	88.9	100
Impartial	69	48	117
	59.0	41.0	100
Unbalanced	23	34	57
	40.4	59.6	100
Total	93	90	183
	50.8	49.2	100

Counts and percentages of successfully halting violence by mediation balance. Fisher's exact test: $p = 0.003$.

Balanced mediation is associated with greater levels of success than both unbalanced and impartial mediation. Eight of the nine balanced efforts succeeded, while impartial efforts only had a success rate of 41.0 percent and unbalanced efforts had a success rate of 56.7 percent. With both unbalanced and balanced efforts having a greater success rate than impartial efforts, strong support is found for the hypothesis that bias in mediation attempts can play an important role in helping disputants both find a mutually agreeable compromise and overcoming post-agreement obstacles.

Durable Peace

Simple illustrations of bivariate relationships when one of the variables represents a duration can be tricky when some of the observations are censored, meaning they were still at peace when the UCDP dataset stopped monitoring conflict onset and termination. Of the 103 peace agreements signed, a little over forty percent are censored. The vast majority of uncensored cases failed within three years of the agreement being signed. The censored agreements, on the other hand, all endured for at least four years. The censored agreements, therefore, represent the longer-lasting agreements. These agreements are at varying risk of failure after observation stopped; therefore average or expected duration calculations that do not account for censoring should be considered cautiously. Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 below provide comparisons across mediation characteristics but do not account for the censoring. In all of these comparisons, duration of peace is measured in months.

[3]This is true for all mediation attempts as well as only those mediation attempts that resulted in some kind of agreement.



Figure 4.3: Completeness & Peace Duration

Figure 4.3 shows that complete mediation efforts tend to last about six years while incomplete efforts last about five and a half years. This difference is not substantively or statistically significant. Perhaps this is a function of the censoring. Given the results of more sophisticated analyses presented later, however, it seems more likely that the characteristics of the dream team that encourage short-term success do not have strong long-term impacts. While some characteristics of the dream team are capable of helping the disputants overcome their immediate differences, they are not able to overcome the additional post-agreement complexities and systematically mitigate the unpredictable post-agreement environment enough to prevent the disputants from falling back into war. While the identified pattern between the average duration of post-agreement peace across different numbers of redundant mediators is in the expected direction (an additional redundant mediator decreases the expected duration of peace), the correlation between these two variables is very weak.[4]

The relationship between mediation balance and peace duration is more obvious than the other dream team characteristics. Impartial mediation efforts endure, on average, about four years with balanced efforts lasting about seven and a half years and unbalanced efforts lasting just a little longer at about eight years. The impact of mediator bias does seem to continue to have an impact after the peace

[4]Correlation coefficient between duration of post-agreement peace and number of redundant mediators is -0.057 with an associated p-value of 0.570.



Figure 4.4: Redundancy & Peace Duration



Figure 4.5: Balance & Peace Duration

agreement has been signed.[5]

While the previous tables and graphs in this section provide some intuition for the bivariate relationships between the characteristics of the dream team and mediation success, these analyses do not provide robust tests of the hypotheses asserted earlier. They do not control for potential confounders, nor do they take into consideration complexities such as the censoring of post-agreement peace duration. Therefore, I conduct more sophisticated multivariate analyses in the following sections.

Reaching Agreement

To evaluate Hypotheses 1–4 with regard to the first measure of success (the type of agreement, if any, reached at the end of negotiations), I estimated an ordered logistic model with standard errors clustered by conflict. As ordered logistic models assume that the coefficients are constant across categories (see e.g. McCullagh, 1980), this assumption was tested for the model reported in Table 4.6. The Brant test calls into question the appropriateness of the proportional odds assumption for one of the control variables, *central control*.[6] Tables A.2 and A.3 report partial proportional odds models to verify and illustrate robustness to relaxations of the proportional odds assumption. The results are indeed robust to these relaxations. The ordered logistic model is chosen as the main model despite the Brant test results not only because it is a more intuitive and parsimonious model, but also because the Brant test is known for false positives (i.e. leading researchers to conclude the proportional odds assumption has been violated when it has not (see e.g. O'Connell, 2006)). In particular, tests of proportionality produce questionable results when there is a "general sparseness of cell sizes" (Peterson and Harrell Jr, 1990, 215). As cell sparseness is a concern here and the results are not qualitatively different between the ordered logistic and the partial proportional odds models,[7] I report as the main results the ordered logistic model.[8] The dependent variable captures how the negotiations ended: in failure, with a limited

[5] An anova test shows that the relationship is significant at the 0.10 level with an f-statistic of 1.52 and a p-value of 0.069.

[6] See Table A.1 for the full results of the Brant test.

[7] The only exception is that redundancy becomes significant in the expected duration when relaxing the proportionality constraint only for central command.

[8] For an extended discussion of the difference between the ordered logistic model and the partial proportional odds model as well as how the results change across models, see the discussion surrounding Tables A.2 and A.3.

commitment agreement, with a partial peace agreement, or with a comprehensive peace agreement.[9] From this regression, I find support for Hypotheses 3 and 4.

Table 4.6: Ordered Logistic Regression: Reaching Agreement

Variable	**Coefficient**	**(Std. Err.)**
Complete Mediation	0.118	(0.522)
Redundancy	−0.429	(0.220)
Impartial Mediation	−0.738	(0.477)
Unbalanced Mediation	**−1.348**	**(0.436)**
Single-Party Mediation	**−1.190**	**(0.286)**
Uncoordinated Multiparty	**−1.592**	**(0.436)**
Territorial Conflict	**−0.436**	**(0.188)**
Conflict Duration	−0.009	(0.011)
Conflict Intensity	−0.280	(0.303)
Polity	**0.088**	**(0.026)**
Central Command	−0.360	(0.214)
Europe	**1.459**	**(0.690)**
Asia	**1.858**	**(0.584)**
Africa	**2.293**	**(0.636)**
Latin America	**1.358**	**(0.666)**
(Failure/Limited Commitment)	**−2.943**	**(0.728)**
(Limited Commitment/Partial Peace)	−0.312	(0.734)
(Partial Peace/Comprehensive Peace)	0.991	(0.744)
N	302	

Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation, coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.

Complete efforts have a positive effect on reaching a more comprehensive peace agreement. While this coefficient is in the expected direction, it is not statistically significant at the 0.05 threshold. Notably, complete mediation efforts are an empirically rare event with only 20 of the 302 cases in this sample being complete.[10] As expected from the theory, an additional redundant mediator diminishes

[9]To ensure robustness of these results to the coding of the dependent variable, in particular the number of categories chosen, alternative models were estimated in which the dependent variable only included three categories: failure, limited commitment agreements, and peace agreements (both partial and comprehensive). The results of this model can be seen in Tables A.4–A.6.

[10]Alternative codings of complete including neighbors as mediators with credibility leverage as well as relaxing the threshold for previous successful mediation can be found in the appendix. Summary statistics can be found in Tables A.18 and A.19 and the regression results for the models included in this chapter using these alternatives can be found in Tables A.20–A.22.

the probability of reaching a more comprehensive settlement. This supports my argument that additional mediators complicate the negotiations, increasing the risk of forum-shopping or mixed messages and harming the mediation effort when mediators do not bring a unique source of leverage to the negotiating table. Furthermore, none of the mediation attempts in this sample are truly complementary. While some efforts are complete and others have no redundant mediators, none of the attempts in this study are both complete *and* have no redundant mediators.

Balanced mediation efforts are more likely to result in a more comprehensive agreement than both unbalanced and impartial efforts, although this relationship is only statistically significant when comparing balanced efforts to unbalanced efforts. Balancing the mediators' biases and including in the mediation team an ally for both sides improves the prospects for a more comprehensive agreement. Impartial mediation is more likely to produce a comprehensive agreement than unbalanced mediation,[11] indicating that the benefits of bias are being washed out by the negative externalities, such as greater distrust, that biased mediation produces, at least for overcoming the initial hurdle of finding and signing a mutually acceptable compromise.

Finally, coordinated multiparty efforts are more effective at producing more comprehensive peace agreements than both single-party and uncoordinated multiparty efforts. Single-party efforts are more likely to result in a comprehensive peace agreement than uncoordinated multiparty efforts, although this effect is not statistically significant.[12] Whether the effort is coordinated, therefore, identifies important variation in multiparty efforts with a substantial impact on conflict resolution outcomes. This supports Hypothesis 4; coordinating multiparty efforts diminishes the risk of overcrowding and enables the mediation effort to take advantage of the additional sources of leverage and influence that multiple mediators provide. Uncoordinated multiparty efforts, on the other hand, are less likely to produce comprehensive agreements than single-party efforts, indicating that the effect of multiparty mediation relative to single-party mediation is dependent upon the characteristics of the multiparty effort.

Overall, the control variables tell an intuitive story. Territorial conflicts are less likely to end in a

[11]This effect is statistically significant with a coefficient of -0.611 and a standard error of 0.231 on unbalanced mediation when impartial mediation is the baseline.

[12]The coefficient on single-party mediation when uncoordinated multiparty efforts are the baseline is 0.401 with a standard error of 0.578.

comprehensive agreement. Longer and more intense wars also result in lower probabilities of a comprehensive settlement, reaffirming that these conflicts are often difficult to resolve. Democracies are more likely to see comprehensive peace agreements, and mediation attempts in the Middle East are less likely to result in peace agreements than mediation attempts in other regions of the world.[13] Central command has the opposite effect on reaching a comprehensive agreement than expected from the literature. Having a stronger central command decreases the probability of reaching a comprehensive agreement, although this relationship is not statistically significant.



Figure 4.6: Predicted Prob. of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (with 95% CIs)

To better assess the substantive impact of variation in the complementary, balanced, and coordinated nature of these mediation attempts, Figures 4.6 and 4.7 illustrate the predicted probability of a comprehensive peace agreement for different combinations of these mediation characteristics.[14] Figure 4.6

[13]Europe is also statistically less likely to produce a comprehensive agreement than Africa. The other comparisons between regions are not statistically significant.

[14]These probabilities and their corresponding confidence intervals were simulated using the Clarify package (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000).

focuses on the effect of different types of mediation balance as well as different types of coordination on conflict resolution. Figure 4.7 focuses on the effect of complete versus incomplete efforts and the number of redundant mediators. For both sets of predicted probabilities, the other variables in the model are held at central values. Conflict duration is held at its mean. Conflict intensity, territorial conflicts, and central command are held at their median (and modal) values of low intensity, conflicts not over territory, and moderately strong control respectively. Polity is set at its median value of 0, and region is set to its modal category: Africa. In Figure 4.6 the values for the remaining characteristics of the dream team are incomplete (modal category) with one redundant mediator (median and mode). In Figure 4.7 the other characteristics of the mediation effort are held at impartial (modal category) and coordinated multiparty.[15]



Figure 4.7: Predicted Prob. of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (with 95% CIs)

Balanced coordinated efforts outperform the other types of mediation with a predicted probability of

[15]Single-party is the modal category but since two redundant mediators can only occur in multiparty efforts the value of coordination is held at coordinated multiparty (the modal category within multiparty efforts).

reaching a comprehensive peace agreement of almost sixty percent. Impartial coordinated efforts have a forty-two percent chance and unbalanced coordinated efforts have only a twenty-eight percent chance of reaching a comprehensive peace agreement. Balanced efforts are substantially more likely to reach a comprehensive agreement than impartial and unbalanced efforts. This pattern is born out for uncoordinated and single-party efforts as well. Coordinated multiparty efforts are also substantially more likely to end in a comprehensive peace agreement than uncoordinated efforts. These large differences in the expected outcome as the level of coordination and type of mediation balance change highlight the importance of mediator coordinaton to reduce the risks of forum-shopping, mixed-messages, and free-riding.

Figure 4.7 illustrates that an additional redundant mediator reduces the probability of reaching a comprehensive peace agreement by about ten percent. The difference between complete and incomplete efforts is small, implying minimal substantive difference in expected mediation outcomes between complete and incomplete efforts. The large error bars on the predicted probabilities for complete efforts reflects the small number of complete cases observed in this sample.

Halting the Violence

To evaluate Hypotheses 1–3 with respect to the longer-term impact of the negotiations, I estimated a logistic regression with the dependent variable indicating whether the violence stopped for two months after the signing of an agreement.[16] Ceasefires, partial, and comprehensive peace agreements are all included in this analysis. To account for the potentially different nature of ceasefires, a dummy variable indicating if the agreement was a ceasefire is included in the model.[17] Additionally, the strength of the rebel group is controlled for as power asymmetries could exacerbate existing tensions, encouraging the combatants to renege on their agreements and return to violence. Table 4.7 shows strong support for the importance of balanced mediation but not support for the complementary mediation hypotheses.

Complete mediation, in fact, has the opposite effect on halting the violence than anticipated, with a negative effect on reaching the two-month threshold for peace. In the sample with only ceasefires

[16]Logistic regressions using thresholds from one month to six months are included in the appendix. The results of these regressions can be found in Table A.8.

[17]A model excluding ceasefires from the analysis is reported in Table A.7.

Table 4.7: Logistic Regression: Halting the Violence

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Complete Mediation	-1.022	(0.819)
Redundancy	0.515	(0.306)
Impartial Mediation	$\mathbf{-4.183}$	$\mathbf{(1.204)}$
Unbalanced Mediation	$\mathbf{-3.926}$	$\mathbf{(1.148)}$
Single-Party Mediation	0.283	(0.680)
Uncoordinated Multiparty	-0.498	(0.861)
Territorial Conflict	$\mathbf{1.231}$	$\mathbf{(0.624)}$
Conflict Duration	$\mathbf{-0.094}$	$\mathbf{(0.040)}$
Conflict Intensity	$\mathbf{-3.264}$	$\mathbf{(0.849)}$
Polity	$\mathbf{0.150}$	$\mathbf{(0.063)}$
Central Command	-0.494	(0.458)
Rebel Strength	$\mathbf{-1.099}$	$\mathbf{(0.385)}$
Ceasefire	$\mathbf{-1.108}$	$\mathbf{(0.532)}$
Europe	$\mathbf{-1.949}$	$\mathbf{(0.575)}$
Asia	$\mathbf{-3.672}$	$\mathbf{(0.967)}$
Africa	$\mathbf{-3.381}$	$\mathbf{(0.972)}$
Latin America	$\mathbf{-4.921}$	$\mathbf{(1.005)}$
(Intercept)	$\mathbf{11.178}$	$\mathbf{(2.668)}$
N	183	

Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation, coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.

and peace agreements, however, the number of complete efforts falls from twenty to ten, limiting the extent to which strong conclusions can be drawn from the patterns identified with these ten cases. An additional redundant mediator has an insignificant effect on reaching the two-month threshold. Impartial and unbalanced efforts, as expected, are both less likely to reach this two-month threshold than balanced efforts.[18] Balanced efforts are therefore not only important in producing a peace agreement in the first place, but also in helping the disputants begin the process of implementing that agreement.

While coordinated efforts were not hypothesized to have an effect on the peace process post-agreement, coordination is included in the post-agreement models to control for this characteristic of

[18]Impartial and unbalanced efforts are not statistically different from each other. The coefficient on unbalanced efforts when impartial efforts are the baseline is 0.257 with a standard error of 0.508.

the mediation effort. No statistically significant relationships between the effort's coordination and the probability of reaching the two-month threshold were found.[19]

Once again, the control variables behave as expected. Peace agreements negotiated in longer and more intense conflicts are less likely to survive for two months as are agreements in conflicts in which the rebels are stronger relative to the government. Ceasefires are more likely to end within two months than peace agreements. Democracies are more likely to reach this goal. Interestingly, territorial conflicts are more likely to see two-months of peace than non-territorial conflicts. Agreements negotiated in conflicts in the Middle East are more likely to reach this threshold as well.[20] This may indicate that while negotiating agreements in territorial conflicts or conflicts in the Middle East is challenging, once these agreements are signed, they are more likely to produce a temporary peace than efforts in non-territorial conflicts and other regions.

Figures 4.8 illustrates the predicted probability of reaching the two-month peace threshold for different types of mediation efforts.[21] Once again, balanced mediation efforts substantially outperform impartial and unbalanced efforts. Within coordinated multiparty efforts, the predicted probability of halting the violence is ninety-eight percent compared to sixty-one percent for impartial mediation. For uncoordinated multiparty efforts, agreements produced by balanced mediation are about forty-four percentage points more likely to halt the violence than impartial efforts and about thirty-eight percentage points more likely to halt the violence than unbalanced efforts. Interestingly, single-party impartial and unbalanced efforts are more likely to result in halted violence than multiparty impartial and unbalanced efforts (regardless of coordination).

[19]Interestingly, if coordination is dropped from the regression and instead mediation balance is interacted with a dummy variable for multiparty efforts, balanced mediation outperforms impartial single-party, unbalanced single-party, impartial multiparty, and unbalanced multiparty mediation. See Table A.17 and Figure A.4 in the appendix for the results of this regression and the corresponding predicted probabilities.

[20]Agreements negotiated in conflicts in Europe are also statistically more likely to endure than those for conflicts in Asia and Latin America. All other comparisons across regions are not statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

[21]The control variables are held at the same central values as before. For the two new controls, rebel strength is held at its median value, and ceasefire is held at its modal category of peace agreements. The values for the remaining characteristics of the dream team are incomplete (modal category) with one redundant mediator (median).



Figure 4.8: Predicted Prob. of Halting the Violence (with 95% CIs)

Durable Peace

Finally, to evaluate the impact of the characteristics of the mediation dream team on the duration of post-agreement peace, I estimated Weibull survival models. These models include only peace agreements (partial and comprehensive) as many ceasefires are not expected to endure indefinitely. In particular, ceasefires are often negotiated with a stated termination date that may or may not be extended. Weibull models with selection are included in the appendix for interested readers (see Table A.12). As this exclusion of limited commitment agreements substantially decreases the sample size, Table 4.8 includes the results of two regressions.[22] Columns 2 and 3 report results with only the variables that capture the mediation dream team. The full model with the characteristics of the dream team and controls are in columns 4 and 5. It is worth noting that while the dependent variable is coded as the number of months of no violence (or the duration of post-agreement peace) the model is estimated in terms of

[22]Tables with the results reported in terms of hazard ratios instead of coefficients are included in the appendix. See Table A.10.

the risk of failure. The coefficients are therefore the average effect of the independent variable on the risk of peace failing (i.e. the risk of conflict recurrence). Positive coefficients indicate a greater risk of failure (i.e. a less durable post-agreement peace) and negative coefficients indicate a lower risk of failure (i.e. a more durable post-agreement peace).

Table 4.8: Weibull Regression: Duration of Post-Agreement Peace

Variable	**Coefficient**	**(Std. Err.)**	**Coefficient**	**(Std. Err.)**
Complete Mediation	0.237	(0.593)	1.000	(0.662)
Redundancy	0.269	(0.147)	−0.468	(0.325)
Impartial Mediation	1.167	(1.088)	0.675	(0.671)
Unbalanced Mediation	0.443	(1.142)	−0.327	(0.756)
Single-Party Mediation	0.471	(0.496)	−0.615	(0.684)
Uncoordinated Multiparty	0.372	(0.922)	−0.058	(0.549)
Territorial Conflict			−0.606	(0.543)
Conflict Duration			0.021	(0.032)
Conflict Intensity			**1.609**	**(0.643)**
Polity			**−0.219**	**(0.075)**
Central Command			**0.722**	**(0.335)**
Rebel Strength			0.540	(0.288)
Peacekeeping			**−2.001**	**(0.580)**
Europe			0.454	(0.573)
Asia			**2.834**	**(0.719)**
Africa			**1.732**	**(0.571)**
Latin America			**3.825**	**(1.070)**
(Intercept)	**−3.029**	**(1.100)**	**−5.303**	**(1.315)**
$ln(p)$	**−1.118**	**(0.072)**	**−0.520**	**(0.142)**
N	103		103	

Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation, coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.

In the model without controls, the components of complementary mediation are not statistically significant. Complete mediation and an additional redundant mediator are both associated with a greater risk of peace failure. In the full model with controls, redundancy is associated with a decreased risk of peace failure.

Peace agreements produced by impartial mediation and unbalanced mediation efforts are more likely

to fail than agreements produced by balanced efforts in the first model. In the full model, the coefficient on unbalanced mediation changes signs, indicating that agreements produced by unbalanced efforts are less likely to fail than those produced by balanced efforts. Impartial efforts are less likely to produce a stable peace than unbalanced efforts in both models, reaching statistical significance in the full model with controls.[23]

Coordinated multiparty efforts produce agreements that are less likely to fail than single-party and uncoordinated efforts in the basic model and are more likely to fail than single-party and uncoordinated efforts in the full model, although these coefficients are not statistically significant. The relationship between agreements produced by single-party compared to uncoordinated multiparty efforts changes sign between the two models and is insignificant in both.[24]

Of the controls, only polity, central command, conflict intensity, and the presence of peacekeepers reach statistical significance. Democracy has a negative effect on failure, meaning a positive effect on the duration of peace. Peace agreements signed in more intense conflicts and conflicts with stronger central command structures are more likely to fail, once again highlighting the difficulty of these conflicts and the challenge of producing a lasting peace in these areas. Peacekeeping decreases the risk of war recurrence as expected by the literature. Agreements signed in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are more likely to fail than agreements produced in the Middle East.[25]

As mentioned previously, one of the benefits of fitting a Weibull model is that the Weibull model estimates a parameter p that represents the shape of the baseline hazard.[26] In Table 4.8 the $ln(p)$ is negative and statistically significant in both models. This indicates a decreasing baseline hazard, meaning that the risk of failure decreases over time; the longer the peace agreements endure the less likely they are to fail.

[23]The coefficient on unbalanced efforts when impartial efforts are the baseline is -1.002 with a standard error of 0.418 in the full model and -0.724 with a standard error of 0.402 in the model without controls.

[24]Agreements mediated by single-party efforts are more likely to fail than those mediated by uncoordinated multiparty efforts with a coefficient of -0.471 on uncoordinated multiparty efforts when single-party efforts are the baseline (standard error 0.496) in the basic model. With controls the coefficient is 0.615 with a standard error of 0.684.

[25]Agreements signed in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are more likely to fail than agreements signed in Europe and those generated in Latin America is also more likely to fail than agreements signed in Africa. No other comparisons were statistically significant.

[26]Cox proportional hazard models, which make no assumptions about the baseline hazard, are reported in the appendix.



Figure 4.9: Median Expected Duration in Months (with 95% CIs)

Another benefit of the Weibull model is the ability to calculate substantive values of interest that provide a more intuitive interpretation. Taking advantage of this, Figures 4.9 and 4.10 illustrate the median expected duration (in months) of the post-agreement peace for different combinations of complementary, balanced, and coordinated mediation, holding the control variables at central values.[27] The error bars represent conservative ninety-five percent confidence intervals.[28]

From these figures, unbalanced mediation produces agreements that outlast those produced by impartial and balanced mediation. This substantive effect is quite strong for single-party mediation. For both uncoordinated and coordinated multiparty mediation, agreements negotiated by unbalanced mediation teams are also the most durable. Impartial single-party efforts result in agreements that are more

[27]The control variables are held at the same central values as before. In Figure 4.9 the values for the remaining characteristics of the dream team are incomplete (modal category) with one redundant mediator (median). As before, in Figure 4.10 the other characteristics of the mediation effort are held at impartial (modal category) and coordinated multiparty.

[28]These median durations and confidence intervals are computed from 1,000 simulations of the full Weibull model with controls holding the characteristics of the mediation attempt at the appropriate values. The conservative method used to calculate these confidence intervals forces the upper and lower bounds to fall on observed values.



Figure 4.10: Median Expected Duration in Months (with 95% CIs)

durable than those signed as a result of impartial coordinated or uncoordinated multiparty efforts. The importance of biased mediators is reflected in this figure, although balancing those biases does not seem to have the same effect as balanced mediation does on producing a signed agreement in the first place.

The expected durations plotted in Figure 4.10 are for different levels of redundancy within impartial coordinated multiparty efforts. Here a very unexpected pattern is seen with the presence of more redundant mediators resulting in longer periods of peace than fewer redundant mediators and incomplete efforts producing agreements that outlast those generated by complete efforts. While this is a quite surprising result, these differences are not statistically significant, perhaps in part as a consequence of the limited number of cases in these some of these categories.[29]

[29]When limiting the sample to mediation attempts that resulted in a peace agreement, only nine of the 103 agreements were mediated by a complete mediation team.

Discussion

Accounting for the number of redundant mediators, the level of coordination within multiparty efforts, and the balance of the effort produces valuable insights into the impact of mediation on producing peace agreements in civil wars. The variation within these characteristics has a meaningful impact on the likelihood of reaching a more comprehensive agreement and durable conflict resolution. More research needs to consider the unique challenges that occur post-agreement in order to better evaluate how and when mediation can help overcome those new obstacles to implementation.

Overall, the analyses presented in this chapter illustrate just how difficult a task mediators face. With many of the agreements that mediators broker failing very quickly, the mediation team needs to consider not only the immediate concerns of disputants, but also how the agreement will generate or shape the obstacles faced during implementation. Mediators, of course, cannot control every aspect of the conflict environment. Additionally, they cannot force the disputants to genuinely prefer peace to all other alternatives. This means that sometimes an agreement that is appealing in the short-term might not be appealing to one side of the dispute (or both) in the long-term.

The analyses in this chapter highlight the importance of the composition of mediation efforts. Coordination has a strong positive effect on reaching an agreement, with coordinated multiparty efforts being more likely to reach an agreement than single-party and uncoordinated multiparty efforts. Coordinated efforts enable the mediators to take advantage of each actor's strengths while mitigating the costs of overcrowding. Balanced mediation has a strong, positive impact on not only producing an agreement but also on halting the violence after an agreement has been signed. This supports my argument that balance provides the benefits of bias while also avoiding the negative effects of one-sided bias. Balanced mediation can improve both sides' confidence in the conflict resolution process and provide the disputants an ally invested in protecting their interests both at the table and during implementation. Moreover, balanced mediation can exert pressure on both sides as needed, helping keep both the government and rebels invested in the peace process.

The next chapter considers two cases of multiparty mediation in more depth. These cases allow for greater illustration of how the mediation effort assisted the disputants in navigating the peace process as well as when and how these efforts failed.

CHAPTER 5

ILLUSTRATIVE CASES

The multiparty mediation efforts in Angola and Mozambique illustrate the characteristics of the dream team at work. In Angola, coordinated, balanced mediation brokered the Bicesse Accords. This agreement, signed on May 31, 1991, produced a temporary peace. In Mozambique, coordinated, complementary mediation brokered the General Peace Agreement in Rome on October 4, 1992. The General Peace Agreement led to free and fair elections, demobilization, and a lasting peace.

I selected these cases because the characteristics of the dream team played a key role in producing (and in the case of Mozambique implementing) a peace agreement as well as because of the cases many similarities. Most civil wars, while primarily a conflict between two parties vying for power within a state, involve international actors. Angola and Mozambique are not exceptions; both involved external supporters of the government and the rebels, with neighbors and great powers funding whichever side they believed would provide them greater geopolitical benefits (Zartman, 1995, 4-8). Angola and Mozambique were both colonies of Portugal, and both attracted Portugal's attention during the conflict resolution process (Venancio and Chan, 1996, 61). Moreover, both conflicts emerged out of anti-colonial wars that left factions competing for power, and the post-colonial governments in both adopted socialist political platforms.

Regional dynamics also shaped the conflict environments in both countries. South Africa had adopted an anti-decolonization stance, exerting power in the region to protect its interests (Hume, 1994, 6). The peace agreement establishing Namibian independence also influenced both conflicts (Msabaha, 1995, 204-205). These regional dynamics provided a common background for the peace processes in Angola and Mozambique, and influenced their conflict dynamics, continued access to external support, and the attractiveness of political solutions.

Internally, both central governments were weak at local levels, providing rebel groups opportunities

for recruitment and growth (Vanneman, 1990, 68). These international, regional, and internal similarities provide a foundation from which the role of the mediation team can be evaluated.

Angola

The civil war in Angola grew out of Angola's war for independence. The three liberation movements that fought for Angolan independence had little in common once Portugal acquiesced. In January 1975, when Portugal agreed to hold elections in Angola, granting Angola independence, fighting broke out among the three groups. Each liberation group represented a different region of the country and received external support from different backers. The National Liberation Front of Angola, known by its Portuguese abbreviation FNLA, was based in the north and received external support from Zaire, western countries, and China. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was based in urban areas with support from Communist bloc countries and Cuba. The National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was based in the south with support from South Africa and some western countries (Hume, 1994, 6). The MPLA declared victory the day before independence, took control of Luanda, eliminated the FNLA, and left UNITA challenging MPLA's authority.

After independence, the MPLA received extensive support from the Soviet Union in the form of financial, materiel, and training assistance. The Soviets supported the MPLA because of the MPLA's Marxist ideology. In addition, the Soviet Union wanted to signal to the United States and China that it was still a major player in southern Africa (Rothchild and Hartzell, 1995). Economic interests (particularly oil) also made Angola an attractive ally (MacFarlane, 1992). At the height of the conflict, the Soviet Union poured one billion dollars worth of military equipment into Angola each year (Vanneman, 1990, ix). Cuba supported the MPLA with troops, training, and military equipment. Cuba's interest in the conflict was motivated in part by its shared ideology. Castro also wanted to extend his global influence (Rothchild and Hartzell, 1995, 180). In 1987, the Soviet Union had 2,500 troops in Angola, and Cuba had at least 37,000 (Vanneman, 1990, 46). Eventually, the expense of supporting the MPLA encouraged the Soviets to consider a negotiated settlement (MacFarlane, 1992). The Soviets also wanted to secure a solution that would not result in the MPLA losing or being humiliated (Cohen, 2000, 4). While they were interested in negotiations, they continued to support and protect their ally.

UNITA received support from South Africa and the United States throughout the conflict. American support included economic and military assistance intended to maintain the status quo in southern Africa (Rothchild and Hartzell, 1995). The United States had stayed out of the conflict for the first several years, becoming involved in 1981. Following Namibian independence, the United States became the main source of military support for UNITA (Venancio and Chan, 1996, 67). American support was aimed at preventing an MPLA victory, not enabling a decisive UNITA win. Even with this limited aim, American assistance was worth about twenty-five million dollars per year (Cohen, 2000, 4).

The Start of Negotiations

The conditions became favorable for negotiations as both the MPLA and UNITA began to see a military victory as unlikely. The combatants had reached a military stalemate, and the environment around them was changing rapidly. In December 1988, a tripartite agreement (to which the United States and the Soviet Union were parties) granted Namibia independence, removed Cuban and South African troops from Angola, and signaled that the two primary backers of the Angolan civil war were ready to consider a negotiated settlement to the Angolan conflict (Rothchild and Hartzell, 1995).

Despite concerns from both the MPLA and UNITA that the Namibian peace accord would mean a reduction in support from their allies, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was ready to leave their Angolan ally (Papp, 1993, 186). In fact, the United States sent letters and made public announcements of support for UNITA in order to signal that they were still invested (Cohen, 2000, 88). The United States also maintained its policy of not developing formal relations with the Angolan government until national reconciliation. While this made communication between the United States and the MPLA more difficult, it also signaled continued American support of UNITA (Cohen, 2000, 89). Finally, the United States agreed not to accept any settlement that did not include free and fair elections, a shift from its stance of no pre-conditions (Cohen, 2000, 96). This shift further encouraged UNITA that the United States would pursue a peace in line with UNITA's interests. These signals were important to UNITA, helped maintain the balance of power between the warring factions, and alleviated UNITA's security concerns in entering negotiations.

The Soviet-MPLA relationship developed similarly, with the Soviet Union promising to continue funding the MPLA while also encouraging negotiations (MacFarlane, 1992). With both sides secure in their relationships with their allies, the powers began to apply pressure to find a political solution.

The MPLA proposed a ceasefire in January 1989, in large part because of pressure from their Soviet supporters (Papp, 1993, 188). On March 13, 1989, Savimbi, UNITA's leader, broadcast a proposal for direct talks with the government and announced a one-month unilateral cessation of major military actions (Cohen, 2000, 89-90). The government of Angola did not agree to talks right away. Pressure from neighbors as well as the Soviet Union eventually led the MPLA to agree to negotiations in Gbadolite, Zaire. Savimbi agreed to participate in these negotiations in large part because of American pressure (Cohen, 2000, 94). Balanced mediation, therefore, helped get the disputants to the table with the external supporters using their relational leverage to encourage negotiation.

Mobutu, president of Zaire, led the Gbadolite summit in June 1989 in the presence of eighteen other African heads of state. Mobutu seemed a natural leader for the negotiations as Zaire recognized the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola but also allowed the United States to supply UNITA through Zaire's borders (Rothchild and Hartzell, 1995, 194). The Gbadolite summit, however, confronted many of the common challenges of multiparty mediation. In particular, many of the heads of state came from countries with one-party rule. They were reluctant to see a neighboring government removed because of a violent rebellion. UNITA, concerned that the majority of those present were biased in favor of the MPLA, did not trust the summit negotiations (Cohen, 2000, 92). Additionally, no one officially recorded the process or the agreements reached. As a result, different participants told different accounts, generating confusion and preventing continued negotiation. Despite this chaos, three points of agreement were collectively expressed: a mutual desire to end the war, a ceasefire effective June 24, 1989, and the establishment of a joint UNITA-MPLA commission under Mobutu's mediation (93).

After the Gbadolite summit, Mobutu was unable to keep the parties talking. He held a mini-summit in Harare, Zimbabwe with six other African presidents, which angered Savimbi and led him to back out of the ceasefire (Williams, 1993, 200). The United States pushed Savimbi to rejoin the negotiating table, but Savimbi refused. The mini-summit had accepted the MPLA's interpretation of the events at Gbadolite, confirming to Savimbi that the mediators preferred a settlement that protected the current government. Out of frustration with Savimbi's refusal to participate, Mobutu cut UNITA's supply lines through Zaire, further convincing Savimbi that Mobutu was not neutral (Williams, 1993, 201). Even pressure from the United States could not encourage Savimbi to negotiate in such a biased environment.

Still interested in finding a political solution to the conflict, UNITA held its own meeting and drafted its own peace plan. The plan requested a cease-fire, direct talks with the MPLA, release of political prisoners, establishment of a transitional government, a new constitution, and multiparty elections (Williams, 1993, 201). To this point, "the superpowers were yet to demonstrate that they were prepared to use the economic or military leverage they possessed, not merely to get their respective clients to the negotiating table, but to persuade them to make the necessary concessions" (Williams, 1993, 202). The United States and the Soviet Union had encouraged and supported the negotiations, but they had done so mainly from outside the formal negotiations. This changed as the powers became more directly involved.

Mediation after Gbadolite

Taking advantage of the lapse in Mobutu's mediation attempts, a Portuguese delegation visited Angola's neighbors to establish Portugal's role in the Angolan peace process, extended formal relations to UNITA, and encouraged international recognition of the group (Venancio and Chan, 1996, 68, 70). This initiative resulted in Portugal's take over as the primary mediator, with active participation by the United States and Soviet Union. Portugal controlled the negotiations while the United States and Soviet Union were official observers. UNITA saw an ally in the leftist Portuguese Socialist party while the Angolan government trusted the centrist Social Democratic government in Lisbon (Cohen, 2000, 102). This provided each side with a reason to trust Portugal as a fair, if not impartial, mediator (Venancio and Chan, 1996).

In the first four months, Portuguese mediation made little progress toward finding a solution (Williams, 1993, 204). Once the United States and Soviet Union became more active, however, negotiations progressed quickly (Schneidman, 1993, 219). In February 1990, foreign ministers from the United States and Soviet Union met in Moscow to discuss the Angolan peace process (Cohen, 2000, 99-100). The United States and Soviet Union agreed to meet with opposing leadership; representatives from the United States met with the Angolan foreign minister and the Soviet foreign minister held meetings with Savimbi. This signaled their support for a negotiated settlement, conferred some legitimacy to Savimbi (something the MPLA was still reluctant to do) and set the stage for a meeting with the disputants cosponsored by the United States and Soviet Union in Washington, DC. During these meetings, Portugal continued to lead the mediation efforts (Rothchild and Hartzell, 1995, 195).

Out of the meetings in Washington came an agreement with seven central provisions: the legalization of UNITA, holding of free elections, creation of a unified national army before elections, constitutional legalization of multiparty democracy, cessation of military supplies from all sources[1], UN involvement in cease-fire monitoring, and the presence of international election monitors (Cohen, 2000, 107). Debates over when the ceasefire would start prevented signing the agreement in Washington, but on May 31, 1991 the accord was signed by the MPLA and UNITA in Bicesse, Portugal (Williams, 1993, 207).

Soviet pressure was a significant factor in getting concessions from Angolan President dos Santos (Rothchild and Hartzell, 1995, 193). The American delegation also promised dos Santos that the United States would cooperate with international monitors during the implementation of the agreement in order to improve trust with dos Santos, who was skeptical of the United States' presence in the negotiations. Additionally, while the United States and Soviet Union cut lethal military aid to their allies, they continued to provide political aid throughout implementation (Cohen, 2000, 110).

Many factors set the stage for the signing of the Bicesse Accord. The hurting military stalemate made the disputants more interested in negotiations. The changing regional and international environments provided increased international interest in resolving the conflict in Angola. Changes in the MPLA's ideology provided more room for compromise. In July 1990, the MPLA held a party Congress, officially distancing itself from its previous Marxist principles (Knudsen and Zartman, 1995, 135). The rocky start to negotiations and failure of the Gbadolite summit, however, show that these environmental factors were not enough to get the disputants to sign an agreement. Soviet and American involvement provided the necessary leverage to get the disputants talking by tying funding to continued negotiations (Smock and Gregorian, 1993, 10). This leverage got the disputants to Gbadolite, but it was not until the United States and Soviet Union became more directly involved that real headway was made. Savimbi's distrust of Angola's neighbors eliminated potential mediators. Meanwhile, the government's distrust of the United States prevented the United States from mediating alone. The combatants' concerns about biased mediators illustrates the negative consequences of biased mediation. Fortunately in Angola, the

[1]This clause meant that UNITA agreed to stop receiving lethal support from the United States and the MPLA agreed to no longer receive lethal support from the Soviet Union. This became known as the "triple zero" option.

Soviet Union and United States were willing to both participate in the negotiations, balancing the mediation team. Additionally, Portuguese mediation provided an intermediary with which both sides had a positive relationship. Including the United States and Soviet Union at the table positioned these powers to encourage participation as well as observe the negotiations and promise protection and assurances when necessary.

The mediators worked together closely, quickly becoming known as the Troika. This collective name represents the collective spirit of the negotiations. The United States and Soviet Union respected Portugal's leadership, holding meetings as the Troika to discuss the conflict and its obstacles to peace. By coordinating their efforts, the Troika avoided the risks of over-crowding. All three actors were engaged in the mediation process, with minimal free-riding or mixed messages. Moreover, once the Troika was established under Portuguese leadership, the disputants did not engage in forum-shopping, even though the MPLA was not pleased with the inclusion of the United States. The United States' representatives acknowledged that "As UNITA supporters, we could not pretend to be neutral" (Cohen, 2000, 122). The lack of neutrality was balanced by Soviet involvement, providing the MPLA a protector as well. Portugal also welcomed the increased influence from the United States and Soviet Union, acknowledging the unique leverage these states had over their allies.

The coordination among the Troika provided a foundation for the United States and Soviet Union to pressure their allies to accept mediation, negotiate earnestly, and ultimately sign an agreement. The powers both exerted pressure on the disputants and offered assistance and protection. The balanced biases within the Troika helped alleviate disputants' concerns during and after the negotiations. The disputes and constant delays over the timing of elections and demobilization illustrate the disputants' concerns that an agreement would expose them to vulnerabilities that the other side would exploit. Moreover, neither side trusted the other to monitor the agreement. The United States and Soviet Union agreed to form the Joint Political and Military Commission (JPMC) comprised of the warring factions, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Portugal in order to provide monitors interested in protecting each side. Balanced mediation alleviated the security concerns felt by the disputants both during the negotiations and as implementation began. Unfortunately, the Troika's mediation was not sufficient to turn the Bicesse Accords into a stable peace.

Implementation of the Bicesse Accords

The implementation of the Bicesse Accord was to be monitored by the JPMC and UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II). The design of the JPMC, while effective at alleviating the disputants' concerns and inducing an agreement, was flawed. With only the disputants as full members and the United States, Soviet Union, and Portugal serving as observers, no member served as official tie breaker in times of disagreement (Cohen, 2000; Venancio and Chan, 1996). This stalled progress, made moving forward with the implementation difficult, and did not provide a mechanism for reopening mediation. Additionally, the MPLA insisted on limiting the UNAVEM II mission, not authorizing enough troops to monitor the country adequately. Moreover, the Angolan government maintained sole control over the police, which it used as paramilitary forces, increasing UNITA's distrust and vulnerability. UNITA's right to provide security for its leaders during the build-up to elections also gave the group access to areas of the country it had previously been unable to penetrate, increasing the government's distrust and vulnerability. Ultimately, neither side fully implemented the demobilization agreement (Knudsen and Zartman, 1995, 137).

Potentially more important than the limitations of the JPMC was the failure of the Bicesse Accords to ensure that both parties would be included in the post-election government (Knudsen and Zartman, 1995, 137). UNITA struggled to transition from a military rebel group to a political party ready to compete in an election (Venancio and Chan, 1996, 83). When it came time for the elections, ninety-one percent of eligible voters registered to vote, and over four million Angolans (more than ninety percent of registered voters) voted (Williams, 1993, 209). The elections were considered successful (Knudsen and Zartman, 1995, 137) and "generally free and fair" by observers (Cohen, 2000, 116). Savimbi clearly opposed an outcome that resulted in the MPLA taking over a majority of parliament and the presidency. Very early counts (only ten percent of the votes) had dos Santos winning. Before even waiting for the final count, Savimbi claimed fraud and threatened to abandon the peace process if UNITA did not win (Cohen, 2000, 117). The United States urged Savimbi to accept the results of the election[2] and hold the run-off quickly (Venancio and Chan, 1996, 100). Ignoring the United States, Savimbi backed out of the peace plan and UNITA withdrew their troops from the joint UNITA-MPLA army, relaunching

[2]By the final count, the MPLA had won 129 seats in the parliament compared to UNITA's 70 of the 220 total seats. While dos Santos had received more votes than Savimbi, a run-off would be necessary before the elected President could be officially announced (Knudsen and Zartman, 1995, 137).

attacks against the government (Cohen, 2000, 119). After UNITA withdrew from the agreement, the United States withdrew its support. With new access to diamond mines, UNITA funded their military campaigns without American support (Hare, 1999, 661).

Multiple factors led to the failure of the Bicesse Accords. The United Nations had not been a party to the negotiations and only became involved during implementation. Earlier UN involvement could have helped improve the design of the monitoring and peacekeeping mission. An earlier UN presence could also have warned about, and potentially prevented, dos Santos' efforts to limit the peacekeeping forces (Schneidman, 1993, 222). The inclusion of the UN would have complemented the Troika, providing an important source of leverage to the Angolan peace process. Finally, UNITA's wealth diminished, if not erased, the United States' leverage over UNITA and redefined the balance of power between the MPLA and UNITA. The former United States representative to the Angolan peace process concluded that "In the end, Savimbi chose the option of war over peace. That is the reason why the Lusaka peace process failed" (Hare, 1999, 661).[3]

The fact that the Troika had no formal responsibility in the implementation of peace accord is perhaps more central to understanding the role of mediation balance. Venancio and Chan (1996) assert that this allowed the United States and Soviet Union to distance themselves from the peace process when obstacles arose (84). The Troika managed to avoid free-riding during the negotiations, but succumbed to this obstacle of multiparty meditation during implementation.

By coordinating their efforts during the negotiations, the Troika managed to minimize the negative consequences of multiparty mediation. Balanced mediation exerted pressure on both sides of the conflict, encouraging direct talks between the disputants and concessions by both sides. Promises of continued assistance and support during and after negotiations alleviated the disputants' security concerns, helping the disputants reach an agreement and begin the implementation process of demobilization and preparation for elections. Ultimately however, the disputants continued to distrust each other, culminating in Savimbi's rejection of the election and return to war. The efforts of the United States and Soviet Union in Angola illustrate the benefits of balanced mediation while also demonstrating that even when the mediation is balanced, some factors are beyond the mediators' control.

[3]This sentiment is echoed by other diplomats as well. Cohen (2000) writes "the main reason Angola went back to war was UNITA's refusal to live up to its commitments" (123).

Mozambique

Mozambique became independent in June 1975. Following a military coup in Lisbon, Portugal hastily relinquished power to the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) (Bartoli, 2005, 80). Frelimo, with support from China and the Soviet Union, had fought against the Portuguese for independence for over a decade, adopting a socialist political platform as it took power (Bartoli, 1999, 253). Frelimo's relationship with the Soviet Union was much more limited than the MPLA's. The Soviet Union provided some aid to Frelimo, mainly through military advisors and favorable loans (Vanneman, 1990, 60). When Mozambique was rejected by the Council for Mutual Economic Assitance (CMEA), Mozambique looked to the West for donations (66).[4]

Frelimo, formed in 1962, had grown out of three anti-colonial groups that each represented a different region of the country and had different experiences with colonialism (Manning, 2002, 44). Divisions within Frelimo were common even before independence. By 1967, several of the original leaders of the anti-colonial groups had left or were expelled from the organization (45). Serious economic problems also plagued Frelimo. Although Frelimo had inherited many of these problems from Portugal, food shortages and other humanitarian crises, along with political repression, increased dissatisfaction with the government (Hume, 1994, 10-11).

Renamo emerged in 1976 "as a product of power struggles between competing external groups" (Manning, 2002, 77). Rhodesian intelligence exploited Frelimo's internal tensions and popular discontent to generate an opposition group. Frelimo allowed Rhodesian rebels to operate within Mozambique's borders (Bartoli, 1999, 253), and Maputo imposed the UN sanctions against Rhodesia when Frelimo took power, cutting off access to port Beira (Hume, 1994, 7). In retaliation, the Rhodesian government funded the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) to provide intelligence on Rhodesian rebels operating in Mozambique and to put pressure on the Frelimo government (Hume, 1994, 10). After independence in 1980, Rhodesia's support of Renamo transferred to South Africa's military intelligence agency (Schneidman, 1993, 220). South Africa, threatened by the diffusion of liberation and nationalist movements, supported insurgencies in order to protect its buffer (Moran and Pitcher, 2004). South

[4]In 1984 the Soviet Union was Mozambique's eighth largest donor after Italy, Sweden, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United States, the European Economic Community, and the Netherlands (Hume, 1994, 20).

Africa was the only significant source of external support for Renamo (Hume, 1994, 20).

Renamo's strategy focused on disrupting the government and preventing it from consolidating power (Bartoli, 1999, 254). Its tactics in pursuit of this goal (namely targeting civilians) gave Renamo the reputation as the "Khmer Rouge of Africa". This reputation alienated potential supporters who opposed Frelimo's socialist ideology but did not want to be associated with civilian atrocities. Despite Renamo's reputation, South Africa continued its support. Even after the Nkomati Accord of 1984, in which South Africa promised to stop supplying Renamo as part of a deal with Frelimo, South Africa continued to provide covert aid (Bartoli, 1999, 246).

The conflict in Mozambique resulted in at least three million displaced persons, 1.4 million refugees, and many dead (Ajello, 1999, 622). The humanitarian crises created by the conflict attracted international attention. In 1989, a mediation team consisting of the Community of Sant'Egidio and Italy, supported by France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the UN, initiated dialogue with the combatants (Whitfield, 2007, 29). Two years later, the disputants signed the General Peace Agreement in Rome.

Mozambique's Mediators

The Community of Sant'Egidio, founded in Rome in 1968 with a mission statement of "friendship with the poor",[5] took interest in the conflict when Bishop Gonçalves (the Bishop of Beira who had previously worked with the Community in Rome) spoke to the Community about the marginalization of Catholics in Mozambique under Frelimo. Religion had long been a source of tension in Mozambique. While the Catholic Church had historically received preferential treatment, the constitution of 1975 embraced secularism (Morier-Genoud, 2000). Frelimo also confiscated church property and imposed restrictions on religious leaders. Bishop Gonçalves spent six months in jail for violating these restrictions (Hume, 1994, 17).

The Community, interested in improving conditions for Mozambican Catholics, responded by developing relationships with Frelimo. On an official visit in August 1984, the Community initiated its formal relationship with Frelimo, bringing planeloads of humanitarian aid to Mozambique (Bartoli, 2005, 90). The Community continued to work to alleviate the humanitarian crises that accompanied the conflict, providing food and medicine whenever possible (Hume, 1994, 18). These humanitarian

[5]More about the Community's origins and mission can be found at http://www.santegidio.org/pageID/15/langID/en/Friendship_with_the_poor.html

missions provided opportunities for the Community to develop its relationship with the government.

The Community waited to develop a relationship with Renamo until negotiations seemed plausible (Bartoli, 1999, 256-257). In 1982, the Community negotiated the release of priests and nuns being held by Renamo, building contacts and relationships with members of Renamo (Hume, 1994, 18). In the mid-1980s, Renamo pursued a deeper relationship with the Church, and the Community responded positively (Venancio and Chan, 1996, 52).

Bartoli (1999) refers to the role of the Community as one of "referee". The community did not have coercive leverage and therefore the Community's intervention was "relational" (Bartoli, 2005, 89). The relationships built enabled it to help the disputants communicate, first through the Community and eventually directly. The Community's involvement in Mozambique and extensive relationship with the Mozambican people helped guarantee its impartiality and loyalty to the process (Bartoli, 1999, 270). Cohen refers to the role of the Community as "surprisingly logical" as it had contacts on both sides, knew the conflict well, and also understood the broader effects of the conflict on the Mozambican people (Cohen, 2000, 247).

Throughout the negotiations, the Community looked for mediation partners that could provide political or economic authority the Community lacked. The most prominent partner was Italy with assistance from the UN, the United States, and other interested states. Italy, interested in accessing southern Africa's economic markets, developed a relationship with Mozambique after its independence (Venancio and Chan, 1996, 57). By 1988, Mozambique's largest donor was Italy (Hume, 1994, 20). As a democracy composed of many different ideological perspectives, Italy also provided a role model for generating a democracy out of a country full of differences (Bartoli, 1999, 261).

Mediation by the United States had been proposed, but Chissano, Frelimo's leader, rejected this option, saying a "constructive role" by the United States was welcome (Hume, 1994, 27). The United States had been slow to pick sides in this conflict and thus never provided direct support to either group (Cohen, 2000, 181-184).[6] Despite this, Chissano did not expect the United States to be favorable to a socialist party. The United States supported the mediation efforts, providing expertise on military, legal, and economic challenges that the Community did not have the expertise to address (Bartoli, 1999, 270).

[6]The United States did provide humanitarian aid to the Mozambican people during the conflict, totaling one hundred million dollars per year (Cohen, 2000, 8).

The United States also shared lessons learned from other southern Africa peace processes, including Angola (Cohen, 2000, 188). The United States followed the negotiations through its embassies in neighboring countries as well as through contacts with the Community of Sant'Egidio (Cohen, 2000, 187). Hume, the deputy chief of the United States' mission to the Vatican, described his responsibilities as "support the mediators", saying his "position was at times on the outside of the negotiations, at other times on the fringe, never in the center" (Hume, 1994, xii).

Despite the United States' peripheral role, Chissano exploited America's international clout to signal to his allies that negotiations with Renamo were the only choice (Schneidman, 1993, 219). Chissano wanted negotiations, but hardliners within his party opposed dialogue with Renamo (Cohen, 2000, 9). By meeting first with Reagan and then Bush, Chissano was able to influence his own party and begin repairing Frelimo's relationship with the United States. In addition to supporting the Community's efforts with complementary expertise and political cover for Chissano, the United States helped shape the role of the UN in the peace process. While the UN's role was critical, the United States' cooperation provided more power for the UN and greater credibility to the UN's promises to fund a sizable mission during implementation (Schneidman, 1993, 220).

The Mediation Process

Kenya's Moi and Zimbabwe's Mugabe had initiated a round of negotiations in 1989, but the disputants did not seem interested in pursuing this option further. Frelimo accused Moi of bias toward Renamo, and Renamo accused Mugabe of bias toward Frelimo. Venancio and Chan (1996, 57) assert that these claims were at least partially excuses to stall negotiations. In particular, Renamo wanted to improve its political strength before ending the conflict. Moving the negotiations to Rome under the direction of the Community of Sant'Egidio revived the mediation efforts (Msabaha, 1995, 221). Negotiations with the Community began in 1990, progressed over several rounds between July 1990 and October 1992, and culminated in the signing of the General Peace Agreement in Rome on October 4, 1992 (Bartoli, 1999, 24).

A European forum was selected for the negotiations in part because of the relationship between Mozambique and Italy. In addition, Renamo saw negotiations in Europe as a way of establishing its legitimacy (Venancio and Chan, 1996, 57).[7] The core of the mediation team included two members of

[7]Renamo had proposed Portugal as a location for the talks, but Frelimo rejected this proposal as pro-Renamo lobbies in

the Community of Sant'Egidio, a representative of the Italian government (who also served as chairman), and Bishop Gonçalves as a representative of Mozambique's civil society. The team started off as observers to the talks, present to encourage the disputants to negotiate but given no formal authority. A few months into the negotiations, however, the team was acknowledged by the disputants as "full-fledged mediators" (Bartoli, 1999, 258). The talks began slowly, with Frelimo presenting a twelve-point plan to the Community to share with Renamo, and Renamo responding with a sixteen-point proposal for the Community to share with the government (Hume, 1994, 28). The disputants were initially reluctant to hold direct talks, but the mediators were able to encourage dialogue despite the extensive distrust between the two parties.

Throughout the negotiations, the Community helped the disputants compromise and identify possible solutions (Hume, 1994, 73). The Community's goal was to help the disputants' express their demands in ways that were consistent with the overall goal of reconciliation. When they were ready to discuss military arrangements and terms of implementation, the United States and UN played a more direct role (Hume, 1994, 95). At the request of the mediation team, the United States' State Department sent representatives to the third round of talks (Hume, 1994, 41). American legal and military experts went to Rome during the March 15–June 9, 1992 round to lend their expertise as well (Hume, 1994, 97). UN representatives were directly involved from June to October 1992, but not previously (Bartoli, 1999, 259). UN military representatives and Italian defense experts prepared ceasefire documents that built upon the plans proposed by American military experts (Hume, 1994, 118). In September, the UN sent survey teams to Mozambique to begin gauging what type of mission would be needed to monitor elections and aid demobilization in preparation for the signing of the agreement (Hume, 1994, 130-131).

Throughout the mediation process, Frelimo tried to diminish Renamo's legitimacy by making unilateral changes such as authorizing multiparty elections and redrafting the constitution (Schneidman, 1993, 223). At its fifth party Congress, Frelimo embraced economic and political liberalization (Alden, 2001, 12). These unilateral reforms responded to the grievances expressed during the conflict, but also made it more difficult for Renamo to establish legitimacy (Msabaha, 1995, 212). With the disputants coming closer on political issues, Frelimo was primarily concerned about demobilization and Renamo

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Portugal led Frelimo to distrust Portuguese mediation (Venancio and Chan, 1996, 56).

was focused on gaining political legitimacy (Alden, 2001, 25). After twelve rounds of talks, the disputants signed an agreement that included provisions for implementation and international monitoring of election preparations.

The case of Mozambique illustrates how multiple mediators with complementary sources of leverage can work together and pool their resources to overcome obstacles to resolution. The Community of Sant'Egidio provided contextual knowledge and cultural leverage. Its history with the country, particularly its efforts to alleviate the humanitarian crises during the conflict, established the Community as interested in helping the disputants and the Mozambican people find peace. The UN provided staying power and Italy and the United States provided resources and political and military expertise (Bartoli, 1999).

Importantly, Italy served as a liaison between the United States and the rest of the mediation team, allowing the team to draw on the United States' resources, while also minimizing the complications that would result from a more forceful US presence. This coordination of the mediators under Italy's leadership gained the disputants' trust and discouraged mixed messages and free-riding. Each of the mediators played an important role in the process, becoming more active in the negotiations when their expertise or leverage was needed and supporting the other mediators when it was not. The reluctance of the disputants to engage in direct negotiations indicates the importance of the Community's contextual knowledge in helping navigate the early stages of the negotiations. The mediators from the Community knew that they did not have traditional sources of power or authority (a strong military or economic incentives), so they focused on developing relationships and improving dialogue between the parties (Bartoli, 1999).

Chissano's distrust of the United States and Dhlakama's distrust of Kenya illustrates how sensitive the disputants were to the possibility of biased mediation. As in Angola, concerns over bias shaped the mediator pool. Where Angola balanced the mediation effort, bringing the main supporters into a more prominent role, supporters in the Mozambique conflict played a more peripheral role in the peace process. For example, Kenya and Zimbabwe, who had been rejected as mediators, played an observer role in later stages of the negotiations (Smock and Gregorian, 1993, 18).

These concerns of bias also meant that the United States could not play a central role. Instead, the United States exerted its resource leverage through commitments to the other mediators. American

commitment to the UN was especially important as it signaled international support and funding of the peacekeeping mission. Italy's role as host ensured a state with resources and the military and political expertise the Community lacked were always at the table. As Mozambique's primary donor and a country interested in developing deeper economic ties with Mozambique, Italy also provided economic leverage. Moreover, these mediators invested in the peace process after the agreement was signed, forming new partnerships in order to overcome new challenges as they arose.

Implementing the General Peace Agreement

ONUMOZ, the supervising and monitoring commission lead by the UN, helped the combatants implement the peace process. The Reintegration Support Scheme paid demobilized solders eighteen months of salary to encourage demobilization and incentivize cooperation with the peace accord (Ajello, 1999, 617). The UN's role during the negotiations enabled it to identify and respond to obstacles to implementation. In contrast to Angola, where the UN was brought in after the negotiations were finished, the UN had already established itself as an integral part of the peace process before the peacekeepers arrived. This positioned the UN to understand and respond to new challenges more effectively.

For example, Renamo faced several challenges to transforming itself into a competitive political party. Renamo held its first party Congress in 1989 to work out its identity as a political party, but it needed resources to campaign and expand their political ranks to fill the positions created by the peace commissions (Manning, 2002, 103-104). Renamo was reluctant to demobilize until it was confident that it would be able to finance a political campaign. The UN responded by putting pressure on Renamo to begin demobilization, reminding Dhlakama that the UN was present in part to protect Renamo through the transition and would not be around forever.[8] It was in Renamo's best interests to take advantage of the UN's presence to demobilize and hold elections. The UN also helped alleviate Renamo's concerns by finding donors to contribute campaign funds for Renamo (Ajello, 1999, 633).

All of this lead to the demobilization of 80,000 soldiers, a new army, and free and fair elections accepted by all parties (Ajello, 1999, 615). With eighty-seven percent turnout for the elections, Chissano took the office of President on December 9, 1994 (Bartoli, 1999, 246, 248). Despite some minor claims of fraud during the elections, Renamo never seized those opportunities to defect (Ajello, 1999, 634-636).

[8]ONUMOZ cost the international community 503 million dollars over two years (Alden, 2001, 64).

Discussion

In Angola and Mozambique, multiparty mediation efforts helped the disputants overcome the obstacles to negotiations, reach agreement and initiate the implementation process. Balanced mediation in Angola exerted leverage on the disputants to get them to the table. During negotiations, the United States and Soviet Union pressured their allies to negotiate sincerely and promised continued political aid and protection to alleviate the disputants' security fears. In Mozambique, complementary mediation brought contextual knowledge, economic and military resources, and staying power to the negotiating table, with different sources of leverage used during different rounds of negotiations. In both mediation efforts the mediators coordinated their efforts, maximizing their ability to use their collective leverage while minimizing the risk of overcrowding. While Angola began the implementation of the Bicesse Accords, the elections brought the return of violence. Mozambique's elections produced a relatively smooth transition to the post-election government and cessation of hostilities.

The difference in outcomes between these two cases can partially be attributed to Angola's mediation team ignoring the importance of staying power during the negotiation and failing to include the UN until after the agreement had been signed. Additionally, some factors are outside of the mediators' control. In Mozambique, the disputants shifted from preferring victory to preferring peace (Bartoli, 1999). In Angola, it seems that Savimbi always preferred victory to peace, never expecting that elections would not result in victory. Changing this mindset is not something that mediators alone can do, but it has strong implications for the success of any peace accord.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This dissertation explores the characteristics of multiparty mediation that influence when and how multiple mediators can help (or hurt) the prospects for peace. This project provides important insights into how the composition of the mediation team affects resolution, by looking deeper into multiparty efforts to understand the dynamics between the mediators as well as the dynamics between the mediators and the disputants. To pursue this question, I introduced a theoretical framework of multiparty mediation as a heterogeneous club good, providing a basis from which to consider when additional mediators are desirable and when they are not. While additional mediators can provide positive sources of leverage, they also increase the risk of overcrowding and thus increase the risk that forum-shopping, mixed messages, or free-riding will hinder the negotiations.

From this framework, I identified three characteristics of mediation efforts expected to improve mediation's chances of success. First, complementary efforts improve the mediation team's ability to respond to challenges at all phases of the resolution process. Complementary efforts are complete, providing three important sources of leverage to the negotiations: contextual knowledge, economic/military resources, and staying power. Furthermore, complementary efforts reduce the risk of overcrowding by excluding mediators who do not bring a unique source of leverage to the table. Thus, mediation efforts that are complete as well as those with fewer redundant mediators should be more successful.

Second, balanced mediation efforts include mediators biased toward both sides of the conflict. This provides each side with a mediator they trust to protect their interests at the negotiating table. Moreover, balanced mediation provides each side a mediator who is more likely to protect them if the other side reneges on the agreement. In this way, balanced mediation can help alleviate disputants' security concerns, improving the chances that negotiations are successful. Therefore, I expected balanced mediation to be more likely to produce an agreement that is implemented than unbalanced mediation (where only

one side has mediators biased in its favor) and impartial mediation (where none of the mediators are biased).

Finally, I expected that coordination among the mediators should improve the chances of mediation success. While multiparty efforts are at risk of overcrowding, a coordinated mediation effort can minimize the negative consequences of additional mediators. By working together, the mediators can reduce the disputants' incentives to forum-shop. Additionally, coordination reduces the risk that the mediators send mixed messages or succumb to the temptation to free-ride. Coordination improves the mediation team's chances of success by maximizing the ability to take advantage of the additional resources and tools of another mediator while also minimizing the negative effects of adding a new party to the negotiations. Thus, I expected coordinated multiparty mediation to be more successful at reaching a peace agreement than single-party mediation and uncoordinated multiparty mediation. When multiple mediators do not coordinate, the mediation effort cannot take full advantage of the mediators resources as forum-shopping, mixed messages, and free-riding are more likely to undermine the peace process. I expected, therefore, that uncoordinated mediation would be less effective than single-party mediation at producing an agreement.

To evaluate these expectations, I employed statistical tests on a set of mediation attempts in civil wars between 1989 and 2005. In these analyses I considered three measures of mediation success: reaching an agreement, overcoming the difficult two-month period post-agreement, and producing a durable peace. In addition to these statistical analyses, I discussed two cases of multiparty mediation: Angola and Mozambique. These cases allowed for a clearer look at the dynamics of complementary, balanced, and coordinated mediation during the conflict resolution process.

The case of Mozambique highlights the value of complementary sources of leverage. The mediators in Mozambique all brought something unique to the table, playing a more prominent role when their tools were needed and a more supportive role when they were not. The Community of Sant'Egidio provided contextual knowledge, building upon its connections with the disputants as well as the people of Mozambique. Italy provided resources as well as a neutral location for the negotiations. The United States provided resource leverage as well, although it did so in a more indirect role, primarily supporting the efforts of the Community and Italy. The UN also participated in the mediation effort, providing staying power and crafting the monitoring and peacekeeping missions that accompanied the General

Peace Agreement. These complementary sources of leverage ensured that all of the necessary sources of influence were available, guiding the disputants through the different stages of conflict resolution.

This positive effect of complementary efforts, however, did not find systematic support in the statistical analyses. Importantly, the case of Mozambique shows how mediators can play different roles, some central to the peace process and others in more supportive roles. Currently, the literature tends to consider a mediator present or not. Considering peripheral mediators as well as other international actors that are influencing the negotiations indirectly could strengthen the ability to identify complete and mediation efforts as well as better identify redundant mediators. Mozambique highlights the value of this peripheral role. While the United States is considered a mediator in the Mozambique peace process, its role was not as direct or forceful as Italy's. By playing a more peripheral role, the United States helped avoid overcrowding the mediation effort. Expanding the club goods framework of mediation to account for central and peripheral mediators would better capture the dynamics at play in Mozambique. This expanded framework could also provide more nuanced ways of operationalizing completeness and redundancy.

The quantitative and qualitative analyses in this dissertation show that balanced mediation has a strong and significant impact on reaching an agreement as well as helping that agreement last through the difficult first months of implementation. As balanced mediation is unique to multiparty efforts, this highlights the potential advantages of having multiple mediators at the table. Angola's mediation process illustrates that balanced mediation can provide leverage over the disputants and encourage them to continue negotiations until an agreement was reached. Balanced mediation also provided allies for both sides of the conflict, alleviating some of the disputants' security concerns during the negotiation and implementation of the peace agreement. Balanced mediation, therefore, can help move the peace forward, even if it is not sufficient to produce a long-term stable peace.

The analysis also provided support for the assertion that coordinated multiparty efforts are more likely to produce an agreement than single-party or uncoordinated multiparty efforts. Once again, this indicates that multiparty efforts vary in their composition and that this variance has important implications for mediation outcomes. The statistical analyses found a strong positive effect for coordinated efforts relative to single-party and uncoordinated multiparty efforts. In both Angola and Mozambique, coordination among the mediators was important to the mediation team's success. The coordinated

efforts of Angola and Mozambique were able to take advantage of the balanced biases and complementary sources of leverage to pressure the disputants most effectively. When multiple mediators are present, but do not coordinate their efforts (for example, in the cases of Guinea-Bissau and Burundi), the mediation effort becomes overcrowded, leading to forum-shopping, mixed messages and free-riding. Coordination, therefore, is an important characteristic of an effective multiparty mediation team.

Interestingly, none of the statistical analyses evaluating the effect of mediation composition on the duration of peace indicated any significant relationships. While balance and coordination improve the short-term effects of mediation, these characteristics are not enough to overcome the additional challenges that arise as the country transitions from conflict to peace. Some multiparty mediation teams, therefore, can help the disputants navigate the initial obstacles to peace, reaching an agreement as well as surviving the difficult window after the agreement is signed. Mediator composition can help build a foundation for creating a lasting peace, but balanced and coordinated efforts are not sufficient to ensure a durable peace.

Perhaps the lack of strong long-term effects is not surprising, as mediation is used in the hardest cases. Moreover, many new obstacles arise as the disputants implement an agreement and transition from conflict to peace. These obstacles are not necessarily predictable, leaving many factors outside of the control (and influence) of the mediators. Some of these obstacles, however, can be anticipated. For common roadblocks to implementation, provisions can be included in the peace agreement to improve the disputants' ability to overcome that challenge and continue on the road to peace. Power-sharing arrangements, for example, have a meaningful impact on creating a stable peace. In Angola, Savimbi was not satisfied with a solution that did not include UNITA in a substantial role in the post-conflict government. A power-sharing arrangement in which UNITA had been guaranteed a position in the government could have helped prevent UNITA from backing out of the agreement following the election.

This raises some interesting questions. How does the composition of the mediation team influence the nature and contents of the peace agreement? Are balanced mediation efforts more or less likely to include power-sharing? Are complementary efforts more or less likely to call for elections? With diversity in how the peace process unfolds after an agreement is signed, useful insights could be gained from considering how mediation composition influence the terms of the peace agreement. This could in turn produce insights into when (and how) multiparty mediation improves the chances of reaching a

durable peace.

From these analyses and discussion, I identify a few implications for both scholars and practitioners of mediation. First, instead of shying away from biased mediators when disputants express concerns about bias, look for opportunities to balance the mediation effort. Concerns of bias are often valid and interested intermediaries should be sympathetic to these concerns. Often, however, these concerns lead the disputants to select an impartial mediator. Balanced efforts can provide the security disputants seek while also providing the leverage necessary to exert pressure on the disputants.

Second, include important parties early in the resolution process. A key difference in the mediation effort in Angola and Mozambique was the inclusion of the UN during the negotiations in Mozambique. Even though the UN's main role in the peace process is during implementation, the inclusion of the UN during the negotiations can give credibility to the mediation's promises that international support will be present during implementation. Moreover, it provides the actor responsible for monitoring implementation the opportunity to acquire more knowledge of the conflict and the type of mission needed to assist implementation. This knowledge can also help the UN anticipate challenges and respond more quickly and forcefully when obstacles arise. In addition, including the monitoring group during the negotiations improves cohesion. The mediators do not hand off responsibility to a new actor, but instead are part of team responsible for the negotiation, monitoring, and implementation of the agreement.

Finally, coordinate multiparty efforts. The consequences of overcrowding can be very severe. Coordination among the mediators provides a first line of defense against forum-shopping, mixed messages, and free-riding. Coordination in Angola and Mozambique allowed a diverse set of actors to help the disputants reach agreement. In both cases, the mediators coordinated their efforts, ensuring that the peace process progressed smoothly, without competing plans being brought forward by different mediators.

Mediators face a challenging task. They must navigate the barriers that prevent the disputants from talking and open space for compromise. Multiple mediators means multiple sources of leverage and multiple paths available to navigate these barriers. Multiple mediators can also mean more actors with divergent interests and competing goals. Multiparty mediation encompasses a wide variety of mediation efforts composed of different types of mediators. As multiparty mediation has become more common, and will likely remain a popular conflict resolution technique, understanding the dynamics of multiparty mediation can help the international community better design mediation efforts. Moreover, it can help

potential mediators evaluate their relative impact in different conflicts and better allocate their energy, investing in conflicts where they can best improve the chances of mediation success.

APPENDIX

This appendix includes robustness checks, tests of model assumptions, and discussion of how alternative specifications alter the inferences drawn. It is broadly organized in the same way as the analyses in Chapter 4: first models of reaching agreement, then of halting the violence, and then of peace duration. Interaction terms are considered in the next section; alternative codings of contextual knowledge conclude the appendix.

Proportional Odds Assumption

As mentioned previously, ordered logistic models (also known as proportional odds models) assume that the independent variables have a constant effect across the cut points, meaning that the effect of, for example, democracy on moving from one category to higher categories is constant regardless of the initial category. So the effect of democracy on moving from failed negotiations to a more successful outcome (limited commitment or peace agreement) is the same as moving from a limited commitment agreement to a more successful outcome (partial or comprehensive peace agreement).

The Brant test evaluates whether this assumption is violated for individual variables in the model as well as for the entire model. Table A.1 provides the results of this test for the model reported in Table 4.6. The statistically significant p-value for central command indicates that the proportional odds assumption might not be appropriate in this model.

Generalized ordered logistic models (also known as partial proportional odds models) allow the proportional odds assumption to be relaxed for variables that do not satisfy the assumption. By only relaxing the proportional odds assumption on variables for which it does not hold, the generalized ordered logistic model is more efficient and parsimonious than alternative models for which the assumption is removed for all variables (e.g. a multinomial logistic model) (Williams, 2006). For the variables with the proportional odds restriction removed, the generalized ordered logistic model estimates a series of binary logistic models. That is, it estimates the effect of the variable on going from the first category (failure) to all higher categories (limited commitment or peace agreement); then it estimates the effect on going from the first or second category (failure or limited commitment agreements) to a higher category (partial or comprehensive peace agreements), continuing through all the categories. For all other variables, the generalized ordered logistic model continues to estimate coefficients with the proportional odds constraint imposed.

Table A.1: Brant Test of Proportional Odds Assumption

Variable	χ^2	p**-value**
All	73.93	0.000
Complete Mediation	0.60	0.741
Redundancy	0.49	0.781
Impartial Mediation	0.93	0.629
Unbalanced Mediation	1.16	0.560
Single-Party Mediation	1.30	0.523
Uncoordinated Multiparty	1.39	0.498
Territorial Conflict	3.35	0.187
Conflict Duration	2.72	0.256
Conflict Intensity	2.05	0.359
Polity	0.24	0.887
Central Command	6.05	0.049
Europe	2.32	0.313
Asia	4.56	0.102
Africa	2.86	0.240
Latin America	4.45	0.108

Note: A significant test statistic indicates that the proportional odds assumption has been violated.

Table A.2 presents the results of a generalized ordered logistic model in which the proportional odds constraint was removed for central command. The first block of this table reports the coefficients and standard errors for the variables that still have the proportional odds restriction imposed. The groups at the bottom indicate the coefficients for central command as well as the cut point (or intercept) for each transition. The main difference between the results from this generalized ordered logistic model and those presented in Table 4.6 is that redundancy is statistically significant in this model. An additional redundant mediator has a negative effect on reaching a comprehensive peace agreement. The results for the rest of the characteristics of the dream team are similar, producing the same inferences as before. Conflicts in Europe and Latin America are still more likely to reach comprehensive peace agreements than conflicts in the Middle East, although this effect is no longer statistically significant. With the proportional odds restriction removed, central command has a negative effect across all categories. The unintuitive result from the analyses reported in Chapter 4 remains; stronger central control makes reaching a more comprehensive peace agreement less likely, although this effect remains insignificant.

A global Wald test on this generalized ordered logistic model, however, indicates that the proportional odds assumption is potentially still violated. Iterative Wald tests, which impose the proportional

Table A.2: Generalized Ordered Logistic Results: Unconstrained Central Command

Variable	**Coefficient**	**(Std. Err.)**
Complete Mediation	0.123	(0.515)
Redundancy	**−0.439**	**(0.221)**
Impartial Mediation	−0.716	(0.466)
Unbalanced Mediation	**−1.336**	**(0.428)**
Single-Party Mediation	**−1.186**	**(0.285)**
Uncoordinated Multiparty	**−1.623**	**(0.447)**
Territorial Conflict	**−0.409**	**(0.193)**
Conflict Duration	−0.012	(0.012)
Conflict Intensity	−0.276	(0.303)
Polity	**0.093**	**(0.027)**
Europe	1.406	(0.726)
Asia	**1.815**	**(0.612)**
Africa	**2.245**	**(0.671)**
Latin America	1.279	(0.715)
Central Command	−0.568	(0.324)
(Failure/Limited Commitment)	**3.289**	**(0.902)**
Central Command	−0.425	(0.247)
(Limited Commitment/Partial Peace)	0.457	(0.793)
Central Command	−0.020	(0.333)
(Partial Peace/Comprehensive Peace)	−1.350	(0.704)

Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation, coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.

odds constraint on one variable at a time (the variable which most clearly does not violate the assumption) and then re-evaluate the model until all the remaining variables fail the proportional odds test, indicate that territorial conflict, conflict duration, and region might also violate the proportional odds assumption. Table A.3 reports the estimates from the generalized ordered logistic model when the proportional odds constraint is removed for each of these variables.

The results presented in this model reflect those in Table 4.6 for the characteristics of the dream team. Redundancy has a negative and insignificant effect. Territorial conflict is now only statistically significant when comparing failure, limited commitment, and partial peace agreements to comprehensive peace agreements. Conflict duration and central command both have a negative and statistically significant effect on moving from a failed agreement to some kind of agreement. Conflicts in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America are almost always more likely to reach more comprehensive agreements than conflicts in the Middle East. This relationship only reaches statistical significance when comparing failures to signing at least a limited commitment agreement.

Coding Mediation Outcome

To ensure that the results in Table 4.6 are not sensitive to the decision to divide partial and comprehensive peace agreements into distinct categories, the tables below use a three-category dependent variable. This variable divides mediation outcomes into failures, limited commitment agreements, and peace agreements. Table A.4 presents the results of an ordered logistic regression with this three-category variable. Table A.5 shows the Brant test for the model in Table A.4, and Table A.6 reports the results of the generalized ordered logistic regression selected in response to potential violations of the proportional odds assumption.

Overall, the results in Table A.4 are very similar to those in Table 4.6. The few differences between the models include redundancy being statistically significant with a negative effect on reaching a peace agreement. Territorial conflict loses its significance, although it still has a negative effect. Additionally, central command continues to have a negative effect, which is statistically significant in the model with a three-category dependent variable. Finally, the coefficient on Latin America (in comparison to the Middle East) loses significance, although conflicts in Latin America are still more likely to produce a signed peace agreement as a result of mediation than those in the Middle East.

I evaluated this model for violations of the proportional odds assumptions. Table A.5 indicates that

Table A.3: Unconstrained Cent. Command, Terr. Conflict, Conf. Duration & Region

Variable	**Coefficient**	**(Std. Err.)**
Complete Mediation	0.230	(0.504)
Redundancy	−0.389	(0.222)
Impartial Mediation	−0.225	(0.466)
Unbalanced Mediation	**−0.839**	**(0.406)**
Single-Party Mediation	**−1.123**	**(0.297)**
Uncoordinated Multiparty	**−1.747**	**(0.508)**
Conflict Intensity	−0.219	(0.320)
Polity	**0.103**	**(0.028)**
Territorial Conflict	0.152	(0.388)
Conflict Duration	**−0.044**	**(0.017)**
Central Command	**−0.833**	**(0.384)**
Europe	**1.332**	**(0.545)**
Asia	**2.153**	**(0.629)**
Africa	**2.063**	**(0.636)**
Latin America	**2.337**	**(0.925)**
(Failure/Limited Commitment)	**3.266**	**(1.041)**
Territorial Conflict	−0.519	(0.275)
Conflict Duration	−0.005	(0.014)
Central Command	−0.435	(0.246)
Europe	0.175	(0.651)
Asia	0.578	(0.515)
Africa	0.998	(0.558)
Latin America	−0.441	(0.684)
(Limited Commitment/Partial Peace)	1.036	(0.729)
Territorial Conflict	**−1.512**	**(0.642)**
Conflict Duration	0.028	(0.035)
Central Command	0.012	(0.304)
Europe	1.983	(2.787)
Asia	1.882	(2.329)
Africa	3.329	(2.682)
Latin America	2.035	(2.526)
(Partial Peace/Comprehensive Peace)	−2.851	(2.707)

Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation, coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.

Table A.4: Ordered Logistic Regression: 3 Category Outcome Variable

Variable	**Coefficient**	**(Std. Err.)**
Complete Mediation	0.020	(0.596)
Redundancy	**−0.445**	**(0.222)**
Impartial Mediation	−0.755	(0.519)
Unbalanced Mediation	**−1.302**	**(0.495)**
Single-Party Mediation	**−1.262**	**(0.284)**
Uncoordinated Multiparty	**−1.754**	**(0.449)**
Territorial Conflict	−0.266	(0.211)
Conflict Duration	−0.015	(0.011)
Conflict Intensity	−0.188	(0.306)
Polity	**0.086**	**(0.027)**
Central Command	**−0.505**	**(0.207)**
Europe	**1.166**	**(0.585)**
Asia	**1.689**	**(0.515)**
Africa	**1.878**	**(0.568)**
Latin America	1.052	(0.602)
(Failure/Limited Commitment)	**−3.469**	**(0.757)**
(Limited Commitment/Peace Agreement)	−0.838	(0.776)
N	302	

Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation, coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.

Table A.5: Brant Test of Proportional Odds Assumption: 3 Category Outcome

Variable	χ^2	p**-value**
All	51.97	0.000
Complete Mediation	0.57	0.448
Redundancy	0.21	0.648
Impartial Mediation	0.92	0.337
Unbalanced Mediation	1.01	0.315
Single-Party Mediation	1.06	0.304
Uncoordinated Multiparty	1.18	0.278
Territorial Conflict	0.53	0.468
Conflict Duration	2.64	0.104
Conflict Intensity	0.04	0.836
Polity	0.00	0.971
Central Command	0.85	0.358
Europe	1.96	0.162
Asia	4.47	0.035
Africa	1.68	0.195
Latin America	3.20	0.073

Note: A significant test statistic indicates that the proportional odds assumption has been violated.

some of the coefficients on the regional dummies violate the assumption. Iterative Wald tests also raise concerns for each of the regional dummies as well as complete mediation. Table A.6, therefore, reports the results of a generalized ordered logistic regression in which the coefficients on complete mediation and the regional dummies are not constrained by the proportional odds assumption.

Overall, the results of the generalized ordered logistic model reflect the same patterns as the ordered logistic regression. The coefficient on redundancy loses its statistical significance, while the coefficient on Latin America is now significant when comparing failure to ending in some kind of agreement. Complete mediation has a positive, albeit statistically insignificant, effect when comparing failure or limited commitment agreements to peace agreements. The regional effects become insignificant and the effect of the conflict being in Europe or Latin America becomes negative.

The results reported in Table 4.6 for the characteristics of the dream team are robust to relaxations of the proportional odds assumption as well as to coding the dependent variable to include only three categories. Balanced mediation outperforms impartial and unbalanced mediation in all of the models presented. Coordinated multiparty efforts are substantially and significantly more likely to result in a comprehensive peace agreement than single-party and uncoordinated multiparty mediation attempts.

Table A.6: Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression: Complete Mediation & Region

Variable	**Coefficient**	**(Std. Err.)**
Complete Mediation	-0.784	(0.765)
Redundancy	-0.416	(0.232)
Impartial Mediation	-0.415	(0.489)
Unbalanced Mediation	$\mathbf{-0.966}$	$\mathbf{(0.431)}$
Single-Party Mediation	$\mathbf{-1.204}$	$\mathbf{(0.285)}$
Uncoordinated Multiparty	$\mathbf{-1.722}$	$\mathbf{(0.485)}$
Territorial Conflict	-0.296	(0.229)
Conflict Duration	-0.018	(0.012)
Conflict Intensity	-0.168	(0.318)
Polity	$\mathbf{0.091}$	$\mathbf{(0.027)}$
Central Command	$\mathbf{-0.509}$	$\mathbf{(0.222)}$
Europe	$\mathbf{1.946}$	$\mathbf{(0.602)}$
Asia	$\mathbf{2.632}$	$\mathbf{(0.666)}$
Africa	$\mathbf{2.554}$	$\mathbf{(0.608)}$
Latin America	$\mathbf{2.684}$	$\mathbf{(0.845)}$
(Failure/Limited Commitment)	$\mathbf{2.514}$	$\mathbf{(0.795)}$
Complete Mediation	0.599	(0.484)
Europe	-0.378	(0.537)
Asia	0.114	(0.437)
Africa	0.452	(0.473)
Latin America	-0.716	(0.614)
(Limited Commitment/Peace Agreement)	$\mathbf{1.883}$	$\mathbf{(0.741)}$
N	302	

Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation, coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.

Table A.7: Logistic Regression: Halting the Violence (Peace Agreements Only)

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Complete Mediation	-1.382	(0.906)
Redundancy	$\mathbf{0.811}$	$\mathbf{(0.394)}$
Impartial Mediation	$\mathbf{-3.879}$	$\mathbf{(1.372)}$
Unbalanced Mediation	$\mathbf{-4.350}$	$\mathbf{(1.191)}$
Single-Party Mediation	0.187	(1.024)
Uncoordinated Multiparty	0.102	(0.804)
Territorial Conflict	1.667	(0.972)
Conflict Duration	$\mathbf{-0.097}$	$\mathbf{(0.046)}$
Conflict Intensity	$\mathbf{-3.516}$	$\mathbf{(1.172)}$
Polity	0.144	(0.085)
Central Command	-0.174	(0.528)
Rebel Strength	$\mathbf{-1.497}$	$\mathbf{(0.513)}$
Europe	-1.847	(1.060)
Asia	-0.441	(1.089)
Africa	-1.341	(1.006)
(Intercept)	$\mathbf{8.108}$	$\mathbf{(2.586)}$
N	103	

Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation, coordinated multiparty mediation, and Latin America are the baseline categories.

Support for Hypotheses 3 and 4 with respect to the type of agreement, if any, reached is robust to alternative model specifications.

Excluding Ceasefires

As ceasefires are not always intended to halt the violence for extended periods of time, the model of violence termination post-agreement was also estimated without ceasefires included in the sample. Interestingly, when only looking at partial and comprehensive peace agreements, whether the conflict was in the Middle East is strongly correlated with whether peace lasted for two months. Ten of the eleven peace agreements signed in the Middle East reached the two-month threshold. As this strong correlation causes collinearity and identification challenges for the model, the reference category for *region* was changed to Latin America, and the Middle East was excluded.

The coefficient on redundancy is the only one of the mediation characteristics of interest that differs

between the two models, gaining significance. Having an additional redundant mediator at the negotiating table increases the likelihood that the agreement produces two months of peace post-signing. This effect is still surprising, but once again perhaps indicates that having more mediators also means a greater presence by the international community and more actors to monitor, observe, and continue to pressure the disputants immediately after an agreement is signed. The effect of territorial conflicts and level of democracy lose significance. The rest of the results are qualitatively similar to those from Table 4.7.

Violence Halted Thresholds

Next, the sensitivity of the results in Table 4.7 to the selection of a two-month threshold for the dependent variable is evaluated. Table A.8 presents the results when the dependent variable captures whether the violence halted post-agreement for one, three, four, five, and six months. Importantly, across the models presented below there is no attrition in the sample. None of the observations were censored within six months of signing an agreement.

When comparing the results in Table A.8 to those in Table 4.7, the general patterns in the original model seem to bear out across thresholds for the dependent variable. The effect of complete mediation is always negative and statistically insignificant; redundancy is positive and insignificant. Agreements produced by balanced mediation are more likely to reach any of these thresholds than impartial and unbalanced mediation, maintaining statistical significance and strong substantive effects across models. Single-party mediation outperforms coordinated multiparty efforts, which in turn outperform uncoordinated multiparty efforts, in all models.

When comparing the effects of the control variables, the effect of territorial conflicts gains significance at the three-month threshold, maintaining a positive but insignificant effect across the rest of the models. Ceasefires consistently have a negative effect across models, although this effect is statistically insignificant in the model with the one-month threshold and the model with the four-month threshold. The regional effects also indicate that conflicts in the Middle East are more likely to reach these thresholds than conflicts in other regions, although at the four, five, and six-month thresholds this effect loses significance for all regions except Latin America.

The threshold chosen for the dependent variable does not influence the inferences drawn regarding the effect of mediation characteristics on halting the violence after an agreement. These thresholds

Table A.8: Logistic Regression: Varying Peace Thresholds

	1 Month		3 Month		4 Month		5 Month		6 Month	
Variable	**Coef**	**(SE)**	**Coef**	**(SE)**	**Coef**	**(SE)**	**Coef**	**(SE)**	**Coef**	**(SE)**
Complete Mediation	−1.199	(0.825)	−1.022	(0.819)	−1.059	(0.813)	−0.791	(0.789)	−0.754	0.812
Redundancy	0.545	(0.325)	0.515	(0.306)	0.445	(0.302)	0.364	(0.291)	0.424	(0.287)
Impartial Mediation	**−4.367**	**(1.230)**	**−4.183**	**(1.204)**	**−4.127**	**(1.183)**	**−3.920**	**(1.125)**	**−3.946**	**(1.103)**
Unbalanced Mediation	**−4.252**	**(1.166)**	**−3.926**	**(1.148)**	**−3.865**	**(1.136)**	**−3.561**	**(1.052)**	**−3.550**	**(1.038)**
Single-Party Mediation	0.124	(0.704)	0.283	(0.680)	0.126	(0.639)	0.331	(0.650)	0.300	(0.645)
Uncoordinated Multiparty	−0.502	(0.888)	−0.498	(0.861)	−0.620	(0.852)	−1.063	(0.791)	−1.177	(0.816)
Territorial Conflict	1.178	(0.636)	**1.231**	**(0.624)**	1.221	(0.640)	1.199	(0.641)	1.112	(0.589)
Conflict Duration	**−0.101**	**(0.041)**	**−0.094**	**(0.040)**	**−0.081**	**(0.038)**	**−0.075**	**(0.037)**	**−0.076**	**(0.037)**
Conflict Intensity	**−3.556**	**(0.893)**	**−3.264**	**(0.849)**	**−3.293**	**(0.855)**	**−2.845**	**(0.703)**	**−2.843**	**(0.707)**
Polity	**0.150**	**(0.063)**	**0.150**	**(0.063)**	**0.158**	**(0.066)**	**0.167**	**(0.068)**	**0.161**	**(0.065)**
Central Command	−0.437	(0.478)	−0.494	(0.458)	−0.516	(0.465)	−0.441	(0.446)	−0.556	(0.429)
Rebel Strength	**−1.334**	**(0.385)**	**−1.099**	**(0.385)**	**−1.055**	**(0.382)**	**−0.989**	**(0.357)**	**−0.999**	**(0.366)**
Ceasefire	−1.078	(0.558)	**−1.108**	**(0.532)**	−0.978	(0.516)	**−1.177**	**(0.524)**	**−1.083**	**(0.511)**
Europe	**−1.804**	**(0.594)**	**−1.949**	**(0.575)**	−0.072	(1.075)	−0.170	(1.120)	−0.223	(1.112)
Asia	**−3.785**	**(1.018)**	**−3.672**	**(0.967)**	−1.907	(1.211)	−1.549	(1.204)	−1.806	(1.139)
Africa	**−3.436**	**(1.028)**	**−3.381**	**(0.972)**	−1.513	(1.300)	−1.254	(1.274)	−1.379	(1.264)
Latin America	**−5.020**	**(1.041)**	**−4.921**	**(1.005)**	**−3.162**	**(1.248)**	**−2.979**	**(1.261)**	**−3.034**	**(1.247)**
(Intercept)	**12.132**	**(2.752)**	**11.178**	**(2.668)**	**9.201**	**(2.759)**	**8.356**	**(2.595)**	**8.585**	**(2.575)**
N	183		183		183		183		183	

Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict.
Balanced mediation, coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.

also do not change the expected direction of the relationships between the control variables and the probability of halting the violence.

Selection Effects: Halting the Violence

As the models of halting the violence only include those mediation attempts that produced an agreement, the effect of variables of interest on reaching this two-month threshold could potentially be influenced by selection processes that encourage these agreements to be signed in the first place, confounding the effect of, for example, balanced mediation on helping halt the violence with the effect of balanced mediation on producing an agreement in the first place. To address this possibility, Table A.9 presents the results of a censored probit regression in which the selection equation estimates the probability of producing a signed agreement (ceasefire, partial peace agreement, or comprehensive peace agreement). Then the effect of the mediation characteristics of interest on helping those conflicts that signed an agreement reach the two-month threshold of peace is estimated.

Agreements produced by a balanced mediation team are still more likely to halt the violence than agreements produced by impartial and unbalanced mediation efforts. The other characteristics of the dream team remain insignificant, and the coefficients on complete and uncoordinated mediation efforts change sign. Complete mediation efforts are less likely to produce an agreement in the first place, but more likely to halt the violence should an agreement be reached. Uncoordinated multiparty efforts are less likely than coordinated efforts to produce an agreement, but more likely than coordinated efforts to halt the violence. Additionally, the negative effect of ceasefires relative to peace agreements becomes insignificant.

The strong support found for Hypothesis 3 is robust to excluding ceasefires, alternative peace thresholds for the dependent variable, and specifying a selection model.

Hazard Ratios, Survival, & Cumulative Hazard Curves

Table A.10 presents the results from the same model as Table 4.8, reporting hazard ratios instead of coefficients. Hazard ratios greater than 1 indicate a higher risk of peace failure (and thus a shorter expected duration of post-agreement peace) while hazard ratios less than 1 indicate a lower risk of peace failure (and thus a longer expected duration of post-agreement peace). Additionally, Figures A.1 and A.2 illustrate the survival and cumulative hazard curves for the full model reported in Table 4.8.

Table A.9: Censored Probit Estimation

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Violence Halted		
Complete Mediation	0.009	(0.389)
Redundancy	0.044	(0.123)
Impartial Mediation	**−1.024**	**(0.361)**
Unbalanced Mediation	**−0.785**	**(0.385)**
Single-Party Mediation	0.136	(0.210)
Uncoordinated Multiparty	0.411	(0.391)
Rebel Strength	**−0.538**	**(0.125)**
Ceasefire	−0.268	(0.140)
(Intercept)	**2.586**	**(0.539)**
Selection Equation		
Complete Mediation	−0.434	(0.418)
Redundancy	−0.150	(0.092)
Impartial Mediation	−0.041	(0.294)
Unbalanced Mediation	−0.479	(0.284)
Single-Party Mediation	**−0.664**	**(0.203)**
Uncoordinated Multiparty	**−1.006**	**(0.357)**
Territorial Conflict	−0.157	(0.171)
Conflict Duration	**−0.031**	**(0.007)**
Conflict Intensity	**−0.518**	**(0.215)**
Polity	**0.067**	**(0.017)**
Central Command	−0.144	(0.117)
Europe	−0.090	(0.278)
Asia	−0.213	(0.226)
Africa	0.177	(0.189)
Latin America	−0.696	(0.536)
(Intercept)	**1.824**	**(0.445)**
ρ	**−1.000**	**(0.000)**

Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation, coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.

Table A.10: Weibull Regression: Hazard Ratios of Peace Failure

Variable	**Haz. Ratio**	**(Std. Err.)**	**Haz. Ratio**	**(Std. Err.)**
Complete Mediation	1.267	(0.751)	2.720	(1.800)
Redundancy	1.309	(0.192)	0.626	(0.203)
Impartial Mediation	3.213	(3.496)	1.964	(1.318)
Unbalanced Mediation	1.557	(1.778)	0.721	(0.545)
Single-Party Mediation	1.602	(0.795)	0.541	(0.370)
Uncoordinated Multiparty	1.451	(1.338)	0.944	(0.518)
Territorial Conflict			0.545	(0.296)
Conflict Duration			1.021	(0.032)
Conflict Intensity			**4.997**	**(3.211)**
Polity			**0.803**	**(0.060)**
Central Command			**2.058**	**(0.689)**
Rebel Strength			1.717	(0.495)
Peacekeeping			0.135	(0.078)
Europe			1.575	(0.903)
Asia			**17.015**	**(12.239)**
Africa			5.653	(3.228)
Latin America			**45.817**	**(49.004)**
(Intercept)	**0.048**	**(0.053)**	**0.005**	**(0.007)**
$ln(p)$	$\mathbf{-1.118}$	**(0.072)**	$\mathbf{-0.520}$	**(0.142)**
N	103		103	

Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation, coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.



Figure A.1: Survival Curves



Figure A.2: Cumulative Hazard Curves

Table A.11: Cox Proportional Hazard Models: Duration of Post-Agreement Peace

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Complete Mediation	0.158	(0.433)	0.462	(0.343)
Redundancy	0.205	(0.105)	−0.150	(0.187)
Impartial Mediation	0.891	(0.948)	−0.126	(0.508)
Unbalanced Mediation	0.377	(0.985)	−0.516	(0.568)
Single-Party Mediation	0.364	(0.360)	−0.027	(0.403)
Uncoordinated Multiparty	0.240	(0.638)	−0.062	(0.352)
Territorial Conflict			−0.273	(0.340)
Conflict Duration			0.000	(0.020)
Conflict Intensity			0.777	(0.402)
Polity			**−0.135**	**(0.043)**
Central Command			0.327	(0.245)
Rebel Strength			0.337	(0.203)
Peacekeeping			**−1.128**	**(0.334)**
Europe			0.489	(0.609)
Asia			**1.936**	**(0.621)**
Africa			1.000	(0.599)
Latin America			**2.470**	**(0.807)**
N	103		103	

Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation, coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.

Cox Proportional Hazards Model

As previously mentioned, the Weibull model assumes that the baseline hazard is either monotonically increasing, monotonically decreasing, or flat. The appropriateness of the Weibull model for duration analysis is dependent upon the validity of this assumption. The Cox proportional hazard model does not require such an assumption as it does not estimate the baseline hazard. Therefore, the results of both the basic model and the full model with controls from Table 4.8 were also estimated as Cox proportional hazard models. The results from the Cox proportional hazards estimates are presented in Table A.11.

The results from the basic model without controls are qualitatively similar to those from the Weibull model. A few noticeable differences do arise when comparing the full models with controls, although the coefficients on the mediation dream team characteristics all remain insignificant. The coefficient on

impartial mediation changes sign. Impartial mediation in the Weibull model increases the risk of failure relative to balanced mediation; in the Cox model, impartial mediation decreases the risk of failure relative to balanced mediation. The effects of the control variables on the risk of peace failure are in the same direction in both models, although the coefficients on conflict intensity, central command, and Africa all lose significance.

Selection Effects: Duration of Peace

Just as the selection into an agreement could influence the effect of mediation on the likelihood an agreement halts the violence, the selection into an agreement could influence the effect of mediation on the duration of peace post-agreement. Therefore, Table A.12 reports the results of a Weibull model with selection. The selection equation estimates the probability of reaching a peace agreement and then the effect of mediation characteristics on the duration of post-agreement peace is estimated.

The characteristics of mediation efforts included in this model do not have a statistically significant effect on the duration of post-agreement peace. Complete mediation and an additional redundant mediator both increase the hazard of peace failure. Impartial mediation is at a greater risk of failure than balanced mediation, while unbalanced mediation is at a lower risk of failure than balanced mediation. Uncoordinated multiparty efforts are expected to endure longer than coordinated multiparty efforts, which in turn are expected to endure longer than single-party efforts. The control variables for the duration equation both have a statistically significant effect. Conflicts with stronger rebels are at a greater risk of failure, while those with peacekeepers present are at a decreased risk.

Interacting Complete and Redundancy

As previously mentioned, complete mediation efforts could potentially mitigate the expected negative effects of additional redundant mediators. To explore this possibility, the main analyses presented in Chapter 4 are repeated with the inclusion of an interaction between complete mediation and redundancy. Truly complementary efforts, those in which the effort is both complete and the number of redundant mediators is zero, are empirically a very rare event. In the sample considered here, none of the cases are truly complementary. Future studies on mediation attempts should examine the causes of overcrowding and how it can be avoided

Table A.13 reports the effects of the variables, including the interaction term, on the first measure

Table A.12: Weibull Duration Model with Selection

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Duration		
Complete Mediation	0.821	(0.708)
Redundancy	0.147	(0.150)
Impartial Mediation	0.682	(0.866)
Unbalanced Mediation	−0.136	(0.928)
Single-Party Mediation	0.331	(0.483)
Uncoordinated Multiparty	−0.332	(0.956)
Rebel Strength	**0.752**	**(0.300)**
Peacekeeping	**−1.343**	**(0.438)**
(Intercept)	**−4.133**	**(1.160)**
Selection		
Complete Mediation	0.329	(0.308)
Redundancy	−0.211	(0.119)
Impartial Mediation	0.169	(0.361)
Unbalanced Mediation	−0.285	(0.300)
Single-Party Mediation	**−0.845**	**(0.207)**
Uncoordinated Multiparty	**−1.321**	**(0.480)**
Territorial Conflict	**−0.333**	**(0.135)**
Conflict Duration	−0.003	(0.008)
Conflict Intensity	−0.098	(0.189)
Polity	**0.064**	**(0.019)**
Central Command	**−0.397**	**(0.140)**
Europe	−0.128	(0.321)
Asia	0.090	(0.287)
Africa	0.307	(0.293)
Latin America	−0.647	(0.383)
(Intercept)	**1.233**	**(0.461)**
ρ (Error Correlation)	**−0.250**	**(0.000)**
$ln(p)$ (Duration Dependence)	**−0.924**	**(0.082)**
N (Selection)	301	
N (Duration)	103	

Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation, coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.

Table A.13: Ordered Logistic Regression: Interaction Complete & Redundancy

Variable	**Coefficient**	**(Std. Err.)**
Complete Mediation	-0.095	(1.185)
Redundancy	$\mathbf{-0.441}$	$\mathbf{(0.203)}$
Complete x Redundancy	0.113	(0.477)
Impartial Mediation	-0.715	(0.483)
Unbalanced Mediation	$\mathbf{-1.329}$	$\mathbf{(0.438)}$
Single-Party Mediation	$\mathbf{-1.208}$	$\mathbf{(0.282)}$
Uncoordinated Multiparty	$\mathbf{-1.593}$	$\mathbf{(0.440)}$
Territorial Conflict	$\mathbf{-0.435}$	$\mathbf{(0.187)}$
Conflict Duration	-0.009	(0.011)
Conflict Intensity	-0.277	(0.301)
Polity	$\mathbf{0.089}$	$\mathbf{(0.026)}$
Central Command	-0.358	(0.214)
Europe	$\mathbf{1.460}$	$\mathbf{(0.695)}$
Asia	$\mathbf{1.865}$	$\mathbf{(0.596)}$
Africa	$\mathbf{2.303}$	$\mathbf{(0.642)}$
Latin America	$\mathbf{1.368}$	$\mathbf{(0.671)}$
(Failure/Limited Commitment)	$\mathbf{-2.933}$	$\mathbf{(0.741)}$
(Limited Commitment/Partial Peace)	-0.302	(0.743)
(Partial Peace/Comprehensive Peace)	1.002	(0.756)
N	302	

Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation, coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.

Table A.14: Logistic Regression: Interaction Complete & Redundancy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Complete Mediation	**−4.281**	**(1.946)**
Redundancy	0.468	(0.311)
Complete x Redundancy	2.176	(1.237)
Impartial Mediation	**−3.348**	**(1.255)**
Unbalanced Mediation	**−3.051**	**(1.223)**
Single-Party Mediation	0.191	(0.683)
Uncoordinated Multiparty	−0.666	(0.891)
Territorial Conflict	**1.279**	**(0.629)**
Conflict Duration	**−0.093**	**(0.040)**
Conflict Intensity	**−3.175**	**(0.850)**
Polity	**0.154**	**(0.065)**
Central Command	−0.502	(0.454)
Rebel Strength	**−1.068**	**(0.384)**
Ceasefire	**−1.083**	**(0.536)**
Europe	**−1.970**	**(0.567)**
Asia	**−3.665**	**(0.970)**
Africa	**−3.348**	**(0.948)**
Latin America	**−4.807**	**(0.997)**
(Intercept)	**10.306**	**(2.611)**
N	183	

Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation, coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.

of mediation success—the type of agreement, if any, reached at the end of the mediation attempt. Complete mediation has a negative and insignificant effect on reaching a more comprehensive agreement for efforts with no redundant mediators. Redundancy has a negative effect for both incomplete and complete efforts. This effect is only statistically significant for incomplete efforts.[1] The negative effect of redundancy does seem to be mitigated for complete efforts. The sign and significance of the coefficients for the other variables in the model are unchanged from the original model in Table 4.6.

I explored the effect of mediation characteristics on halting the violence post-agreement. Table A.14 reports the results of a logistic regression including the interaction term. Complete mediation

[1]The coefficient on redundancy for complete efforts is -0.327 with a standard error of 0.564.

has a negative and statistically significant effect for efforts with no redundant mediators. Redundancy has a positive effect for both complete and incomplete efforts, with the effect only reaching statistical significance for complete efforts.[2] In this case, redundancy appears to have a substantially larger positive effect for complete efforts. The sign and significance of the coefficients for the other variables in the model are unchanged from those in Table 4.7.

Finally, Table A.15 reports the results for the duration model with the final measure of success (duration of post-agreement peace). Columns 1-4 report the coefficients and hazard ratios of the model without control variables. Columns 5-8 report the coefficients and hazard ratios of the full model with controls. In both models, complete mediation has a positive effect; complete mediation efforts are at greater risk of failure than incomplete efforts when there are no redundant mediators. Redundancy has a positive and statistically significant effect for incomplete efforts, increasing the hazard of peace failure, in the model without controls. For complete efforts, however, redundancy decreases the risk of failure.[3] For the model with controls, redundancy decreases the risk of failure for both complete and incomplete efforts.[4]

Interacting Balance and Multiparty

The effect of balance on both reaching a comprehensive agreement and halting the violence post-agreement is both strong and robust. When impartial and unbalanced mediation efforts are broken into single- and multiparty efforts, the strength of balance (relative to other types of mediation) be assessed, and the impact of multiparty mediation can also be considered. To highlight the variation on mediation outcomes that occurs within the category of multiparty mediation, Tables A.16 and A.17 present the results of impartial single-party, impartial multiparty, unbalanced single-party, and unbalanced multiparty mediation relative to balanced mediation for the first two measures of mediation success—reaching an agreement and halting the violence. Figures A.3 and A.4 show the predicted probabilities of reaching a comprehensive agreement and of halting the violence respectively.

Both the results in Table A.16 and Figure A.3 illustrate the strength of balanced efforts relative to other types of mediation in reaching a more comprehensive settlement. The predicted probability of

[2]The coefficient on redundancy for complete efforts is 2.644 with a standard error of 1.212.

[3]The coefficient on redundancy for complete efforts is -0.410 with a standard error of 0.391.

[4]The coefficient on redundancy for complete efforts is -1.488 with a standard error of 0.827.

Table A.15: Weibull Regression: Interaction Complete & Redundancy

Variable	Coef	(SE)	Haz Rat	(SE)	Coef	(SE)	Haz Rat	(SE)
Complete Mediation	1.795	(1.038)	6.019	(6.248)	2.682	(1.404)	14.619	(20.523)
Redundancy	**0.431**	**(0.193)**	**1.539**	**(0.296)**	−0.397	(0.326)	0.672	(0.219)
Complete x Redundancy	−0.841	(0.469)	0.431	(0.202)	−1.090	(0.846)	0.336	(0.284)
Impartial Mediation	0.659	(1.026)	1.933	(1.984)	0.079	(0.648)	1.082	(0.701)
Unbalanced Mediation	−0.067	(1.051)	0.935	(0.982)	−0.937	(0.702)	0.392	(0.275)
Single-Party Mediation	0.723	(0.550)	2.061	(1.134)	−0.497	(0.702)	0.609	(0.427)
Uncoordinated Multiparty	0.498	(0.953)	1.646	(1.569)	0.305	(0.559)	1.356	(0.758)
Territorial Conflict					−0.625	(0.515)	0.535	(0.276)
Conflict Duration					0.020	(0.030)	1.020	(0.031)
Conflict Intensity					**1.543**	**(0.642)**	**4.678**	**(3.003)**
Polity					**−0.221**	**(0.077)**	**0.802**	**(0.062)**
Central Command					**0.763**	**(0.345)**	**2.145**	**(0.741)**
Rebel Strength					0.519	(0.295)	1.681	(0.495)
Peacekeeping					**−2.030**	**(0.587)**	**0.131**	**(0.077)**
Europe					0.609	(0.638)	1.838	(1.173)
Asia					**2.939**	**(0.725)**	**18.888**	**(13.670)**
Africa					**1.862**	**(0.597)**	**6.437**	**(3.842)**
Latin America					**3.875**	**(1.010)**	**48.161**	**(52.963)**
(Intercept)	**−2.828**	**(0.932)**	**0.059**	**(0.055)**	**−5.371**	**(1.400)**	**0.007**	**(0.010)**
$ln(p)$	**-1.108**		**(0.073)**		**-0.511**		**(0.144)**	
N	103				103			

Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation, coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.

Table A.16: Ordered Logistic Regression: Interaction Balance & Multiparty

Variable	**Coefficient**	**(Std. Err.)**
Complete Mediation	0.068	(0.506)
Redundancy	**−0.462**	**(0.219)**
Impartial Single-Party	**−1.596**	**(0.436)**
Impartial Multiparty	−0.763	(0.453)
Unbalanced Single-Party	**−2.316**	**(0.472)**
Unbalanced Multiparty	**−1.279**	**(0.446)**
Territorial Conflict	**−0.524**	**(0.194)**
Conflict Duration	−0.006	(0.010)
Conflict Intensity	−0.309	(0.319)
Polity	**0.104**	**(0.027)**
Central Command	−0.228	(0.222)
Europe	**1.670**	**(0.505)**
Asia	**1.842**	**(0.408)**
Africa	**2.576**	**(0.480)**
Latin America	**1.369**	**(0.536)**
(Failure/Limited Commitment)	**−2.247**	**(0.733)**
(Limited Commitment/Partial Peace)	0.286	(0.771)
(Partial Peace/Comprehensive Peace)	**1.559**	**(0.780)**
N	302	

Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation and the Middle East are the baseline categories.

Table A.17: Logistic Regression: Interaction Balance & Multiparty

Variable	**Coefficient**	**(Std. Err.)**
Complete Mediation	-1.067	(0.815)
Redundancy	0.519	(0.312)
Impartial Single-Party	$\mathbf{-3.845}$	$\mathbf{(1.102)}$
Impartial Multiparty	$\mathbf{-4.317}$	$\mathbf{(1.121)}$
Unbalanced Single-Party	$\mathbf{-3.775}$	$\mathbf{(1.365)}$
Unbalanced Multiparty	$\mathbf{-3.922}$	$\mathbf{(1.181)}$
Territorial Conflict	$\mathbf{1.205}$	$\mathbf{(0.610)}$
Conflict Duration	$\mathbf{-0.096}$	$\mathbf{(0.039)}$
Conflict Intensity	$\mathbf{-3.315}$	$\mathbf{(0.847)}$
Polity	$\mathbf{0.148}$	$\mathbf{(0.063)}$
Central Command	-0.446	(0.456)
Rebel Strength	$\mathbf{-1.115}$	$\mathbf{(0.386)}$
Ceasefire	$\mathbf{-1.145}$	$\mathbf{(0.541)}$
Europe	$\mathbf{-1.907}$	$\mathbf{(0.611)}$
Asia	$\mathbf{-3.659}$	$\mathbf{(0.958)}$
Africa	$\mathbf{-3.346}$	$\mathbf{(1.019)}$
Latin America	$\mathbf{-4.917}$	$\mathbf{(1.023)}$
(Intercept)	$\mathbf{11.172}$	$\mathbf{(2.648)}$
N	183	

Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation and the Middle East are the baseline categories.



Figure A.3: Predicted Prob. of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (with 95% CIs)

reaching a balanced settlement is a little over fifty-five percent, while the second most likely category to end in a comprehensive peace agreement has a predicted probability of just under forty percent. Interestingly, multiparty efforts outperform single-party efforts for both impartial and unbalanced mediation efforts.

The predicted probabilities for halting the violence show that not only does balance have a strong and substantively interesting effect on the probability of halting the violence post-agreement, but that for impartial and unbalanced efforts, single-party mediation outperforms multiparty mediation. For impartial mediation, the difference between single-party and multiparty efforts is about ten percentage points. For unbalanced efforts, this difference is much less.

These analyses provide additional evidence that variation within multiparty efforts (balanced compared to impartial or unbalanced) has a substantial impact on mediation outcomes and that considering this variation can provide a more nuanced understanding of mediation success. From earlier analyses, whether the multiparty effort was coordinated led to different expectations for mediation success. Here



Figure A.4: Predicted Prob. of Halting the Violence (with 95% CIs)

whether the multiparty effort is balanced, impartial, or unbalanced has a meaningful impact on expectations that a comprehensive peace agreement will be signed as well as whether an agreement would put a temporary stop to the violent conflict. Together with the analyses in Chapter 4, Tables A.16 and A.17 provide strong evidence that not all multiparty efforts are the same and that the composition of the mediation team can have meaningful implications for mediation outcomes.

Operationalizing Contextual Knowledge

Selecting a good operationalization of contextual knowledge that simultaneously includes mediators that can be expected to have contextual knowledge while excluding those mediators who do not have such knowledge is a difficult task. The operationalization chosen as the main measure of contextual knowledge was intentionally narrow. Here I consider alternate codings that are broader in their identification of mediators with contextual knowledge.

First, ninety-three of the 302 mediation attempts had a neighboring country at the negotiating table (30.8 percent). As neighbors are likely to be invested in nearby crises and to have knowledge of the actors and grievances at the core of the conflict, including neighbors in the category of mediators with

Table A.18: Alternative Operationalizations of Contextual Knowledge

	Original	Neighbors	Neigh & 2 Yrs	Neigh & 5 Yrs
Attempts Present	117	151	166	173
	38.7	50.0	55.0	57.3
Attempts Absent	185	151	136	129
	61.3	50.0	45.0	42.7

Counts and percentages for the presence of contextual knowledge, including neighbors and mediators who succeeded previously within two and five years of the current effort as having contextual knowledge.

contextual knowledge is the appropriate next step. Additionally, I relaxed the constraint around previous successful mediation. While the one-year threshold was chosen to exclude mediators who had lost touch with the disputants or failed to stay current on the causes of continued conflict and obstacles to renewed negotiations, this threshold may be unnecessarily strict. I relaxed the threshold to include mediators who had successfully mediated in the country within two to five years of the current negotiations. Table A.18 illustrates how including these additional mediators changes the number of mediators with contextual knowledge. Table A.19 shows how these different thresholds for contextual knowledge influence the number of complete efforts in the sample of cases.

While the number of efforts with contextual increases quite substantially across these codings, truly complementary efforts remain very rare, even with more relaxed conceptualizations of contextual knowledge. When including neighbors and relaxing the threshold for previous success to a five-year window, the number of complete mediation attempts only increases from twenty to twenty-nine. The distribution of redundancy is not substantially influenced by these changes. Redundancy's minimum and maximum values across all conceptualizations of contextual knowledge are 0 and 6, respectively. The median and mode remains at 1 for all conceptualizations as well. Including neighbors generates one truly complementary effort. Relaxing the threshold for previous successful mediation to two years increases this to two complementary efforts, and relaxing the threshold to five years does not add any new complementary efforts.

With the number of complete, redundant, and complementary efforts varying little across operationalizations, the results of the analyses do not change substantially when these alternative operationalizations are used. Tables A.20–A.22 present the results of ordered logistic, logistic, and Weibull models

Table A.19: Complete Mediation by Coding of Contextual Knowledge

	Original	Neighbors	Neigh & 2 Yrs	Neigh & 5 Yrs
Attempts Complete	20	25	28	29
	6.6	8.3	9.3	9.6
Attempts Incomplete	282	277	274	273
	93.4	91.7	90.7	90.4

Counts and percentages for complete mediation efforts, including neighbors and mediators who succeeded previously within two and five years of the current effort as having contextual knowledge.

of the three measures of mediation success. Each table reports the results when adding neighbors in the first two columns, the results when also relaxing the threshold for previous successful mediation to two years in the third and fourth columns, and the results when relaxing the threshold for previous successful mediation to five years in the last two columns.

When modeling the type of agreement, if any, produced by a mediation attempt, the sign and significance of the main mediation variables are unchanged both across models in Table A.20 and when comparing those models to Table 4.6. Territorial conflict is the only variable that sees a noteworthy change, continuing to have a negative effect on reaching a more comprehensive agreement but not reaching statistical significance in any of the models in Table A.20.

Comparing the results reported in Table A.21 to those in Table 4.7, once again, few differences are apparent. Redundancy has a positive effect in all models, increasing the likelihood of reaching the two-month threshold for peace, although this effect only reaches statistical significance when neighbors and a two-year threshold for previous mediation success are used in the operationalization of contextual knowledge. No other mediation characteristics see changes in the sign or significance of the estimated coefficients. Two control variables, territorial conflict and ceasefires, lose statistical significance in the models in Table A.21.

The results for the Weibull models of post-peace duration are more interesting when considering the more relaxed definitions of contextual knowledge. Complete mediation efforts and redundancy continue to have the unexpected effect of increasing and decreasing the risk of failure respectively. In the models in Table A.22, however, these effects are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. None of the other characteristics of mediation teams are affected, and the only control variable that changes significance across models is rebel strength.

Table A.20: Ordered Logistic Results: Contextual Knowledge

	Neighbors		Neighbors & 2 Yrs		Neighbors & 5 Yrs	
Variable	**Coef.**	**(Std. Err.)**	**Coef.**	**(Std. Err.)**	**Coef.**	**(Std. Err.)**
Complete Mediation	0.248	(0.410)	0.308	(0.423)	0.239	(0.386)
Redundancy	−0.438	(0.232)	−0.440	(0.235)	−0.436	(0.233)
Impartial Mediation	−0.743	(0.411)	−0.788	(0.415)	−0.851	(0.440)
Unbalanced Mediation	**−1.415**	**(0.398)**	**−1.467**	**(0.420)**	**−1.517**	**(0.448)**
Single-Party Mediation	**−1.213**	**(0.321)**	**−1.203**	**(0.323)**	**−1.209**	**(0.321)**
Uncoordinated Multiparty	**−1.668**	**(0.426)**	**−1.650**	**(0.428)**	**−1.667**	**(0.425)**
Territorial Conflict	−0.393	(0.204)	−0.396	(0.207)	−0.402	(0.206)
Conflict Duration	−0.010	(0.011)	−0.011	(0.012)	−0.010	(0.011)
Conflict Intensity	−0.250	(0.303)	−0.268	(0.295)	−0.275	(0.294)
Polity	**0.089**	**(0.027)**	**0.090**	**(0.028)**	**0.089**	**(0.028)**
Central Command	−0.365	(0.214)	−0.370	(0.217)	−0.360	(0.214)
Europe	**1.405**	**(0.666)**	**1.353**	**(0.651)**	**1.386**	**(0.661)**
Asia	**1.832**	**(0.566)**	**1.794**	**(0.556)**	**1.808**	**(0.569)**
Africa	**2.212**	**(0.602)**	**2.160**	**(0.589)**	**2.178**	**(0.606)**
Latin America	**1.364**	**(0.648)**	**1.316**	**(0.637)**	**1.343**	**(0.651)**
(Failure/Limited Commitment)	**−2.991**	**(0.718)**	**−3.090**	**(0.742)**	**−3.115**	**(0.751)**
(Limited Commitment/Partial Peace)	−0.360	(0.718)	−0.459	(0.748)	−0.486	(0.754)
(Partial Peace/Comprehensive Peace)	0.940	(0.734)	0.841	(0.754)	0.814	(0.759)
N	302		302		302	

Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the$p = 0.05$ level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation, coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.

Table A.21: Logistic Results: Contextual Knowledge

	Neighbors		Neighbors & 2 Yrs		Neighbors & 5 Yrs	
Variable	**Coef.**	**(Std. Err.)**	**Coef.**	**(Std. Err.)**	**Coef.**	**(Std. Err.)**
Complete Mediation	0.190	(0.753)	0.036	(0.774)	0.177	(0.674)
Redundancy	0.521	(0.304)	**0.592**	**(0.287)**	0.506	(0.311)
Impartial Mediation	**−3.517**	**(1.091)**	**−3.512**	**(1.223)**	**−3.417**	**(1.166)**
Unbalanced Mediation	**−3.169**	**(1.050)**	**−3.158**	**(1.186)**	**−3.072**	**(1.149)**
Single-Party Mediation	0.420	(0.689)	0.484	(0.699)	0.426	(0.725)
Uncoordinated Multiparty	−0.484	(0.893)	−0.452	(0.886)	−0.409	(0.870)
Territorial Conflict	1.194	(0.616)	1.214	(0.613)	1.187	(0.611)
Conflict Duration	**−0.091**	**(0.039)**	**−0.091**	**(0.039)**	**−0.090**	**(0.039)**
Conflict Intensity	**−3.173**	**(0.788)**	**−3.193**	**(0.795)**	**−3.163**	**(0.795)**
Polity	**0.150**	**(0.064)**	**0.147**	**(0.064)**	**0.146**	**(0.064)**
Central Command	−0.507	(0.459)	−0.516	(0.462)	−0.489	(0.450)
Rebel Strength	**−1.039**	**(0.382)**	**−1.060**	**(0.382)**	**−1.034**	**(0.367)**
Ceasefire	−0.985	(0.510)	−1.004	(0.515)	−0.996	(0.510)
Europe	**−1.937**	**(0.596)**	**−1.896**	**(0.573)**	**−1.895**	**(0.565)**
Asia	**−3.626**	**(0.929)**	**−3.634**	**(0.932)**	**−3.567**	**(0.926)**
Africa	**−3.222**	**(0.916)**	**−3.215**	**(0.908)**	**−3.181**	**(0.898)**
Latin America	**−5.010**	**(1.006)**	**−4.977**	**(1.007)**	**−4.960**	**(0.999)**
(Intercept)	**10.141**	**(2.466)**	**10.112**	**(2.572)**	**9.975**	**(2.515)**
N	183		183		183	

Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the$p = 0.05$ level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation, coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.

Table A.22: Weibull Results: Contextual Knowledge

	Neighbors		Neighbors & 2 Yrs		Neighbors & 5 Yrs	
Variable	**Coef.**	**(Std. Err.)**	**Coef.**	**(Std. Err.)**	**Coef.**	**(Std. Err.)**
Complete Mediation	**1.270**	**(0.617)**	**1.643**	**(0.579)**	**1.359**	**(0.540)**
Redundancy	**−0.583**	**(0.266)**	**−0.635**	**(0.298)**	−0.389	(0.305)
Impartial Mediation	0.697	(0.840)	1.150	(0.850)	1.020	(0.887)
Unbalanced Mediation	−0.449	(0.948)	−0.069	(0.967)	−0.021	(0.963)
Single-Party Mediation	−0.677	(0.654)	−0.727	(0.682)	−0.435	(0.674)
Unbalanced Mediation	−0.301	(0.552)	−0.527	(0.525)	−0.295	(0.607)
Territorial Conflict	−0.583	(0.519)	−0.570	(0.532)	−0.607	(0.565)
Conflict Duration	0.022	(0.031)	0.021	(0.032)	0.017	(0.032)
Conflict Intensity	**1.614**	**(0.610)**	**1.604**	**(0.580)**	**1.363**	**(0.546)**
Polity	**−0.227**	**(0.074)**	**−0.230**	**(0.074)**	**−0.224**	**(0.072)**
Central Command	**0.673**	**(0.314)**	**0.574**	**(0.274)**	**0.756**	**(0.332)**
Rebel Strength	**0.551**	**(0.269)**	**0.574**	**(0.274)**	0.508	(0.285)
Peacekeeping	**−2.064**	**(0.601)**	**−2.123**	**(0.601)**	**−2.131**	**(0.615)**
Europe	0.370	(0.526)	0.212	(0.471)	0.377	(0.484)
Asia	**2.866**	**(0.756)**	**2.770**	**(0.698)**	**2.727**	**(0.646)**
Africa	**1.643**	**(0.583)**	**1.533**	**(0.557)**	**1.614**	**(0.537)**
Latin America	**3.763**	**(1.089)**	**3.629**	**(1.049)**	**3.751**	**(0.985)**
(Intercept)	**−5.145**	**(1.453)**	**−5.471**	**(1.642)**	**−5.596**	**(1.727)**
$ln(p)$	**−0.494**	**(0.145)**	**−0.472**	**(0.151)**	**−0.517**	**(0.134)**
N	103		103		103	

Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the$p = 0.05$ level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation, coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.

Overall, this indicates that the results for complete and redundancy are robust to operationalizations of contextual knowledge. The change in significance in the Weibull models across specifications and the surprising direction of the results in these models provides an interesting area for additional research. More research on the long-term effects of mediation, as well as more research on the long-term prospects for post-agreement peace, could shed light on this surprising finding. It could also provide additional insights into why the presence of additional mediators encourages disputants to abide by the peace process, despite the risks of forum-shopping and free-riding.

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